



Community Violence Intervention in Detroit: 'Each of us has a role to play'

Evaluation of the City of Detroit's
ShotStoppers Program

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Executive Summary

The City of Detroit's ShotStoppers is an ongoing grant-funded, performance-based Community Violence Intervention (CVI) program started in 2023 that aims to decrease gun violence. The program funds selected community-based organizations, known as CVI teams, to develop and implement programs and activities to address violence in specific geographically defined "CVI zones." Community violence intervention is a community-centered, non-law enforcement approach that empowers community members to disrupt violence within their neighborhoods.

The City's ShotStoppers program developed as part of a larger movement towards municipal involvement in CVI programs. ShotStoppers has several characteristics that make the program unique, including:

- The selection of six CVI teams and the assignment of each team to a designated 3- to 5-square mile zone;
- One main performance metric, which is a CVI score calculated from the number of victims of homicides and non-fatal shootings in a CVI team's designated zone over a particular time period;
- A combination of significant base funding - \$700,000 annually for each team - and the opportunity for the CVI teams to earn performance-based bonuses on a quarterly basis;
- The CVI teams had direct mayoral office support and access; and
- Autonomy for the CVI teams to choose their own intervention strategies.

The City partnered with Poverty Solutions at the University of Michigan to assess the implementation and outcomes of the program over its first two federally funded years of operation. This report presents both findings and recommendations. Poverty Solutions researchers sought to understand the following five key research questions:

1. Did ShotStoppers affect the city's homicides and non-fatal shootings?
2. Did any of the city's other major crime categories change during ShotStoppers?
3. What effect did ShotStoppers have on perceptions of public safety?
4. What factors were critical for successful program implementation, what challenges did teams face, and what led to variation in team outcomes?
5. What are the key lessons learned from the ShotStoppers program and what are the key recommendations that could inform future city-wide efforts to decrease violent crime in Detroit and beyond?

To address these research questions, the evaluation team used multiple methods and data sources. Reductions in homicides, non-fatal shootings, and other crimes were measured using data from the Detroit Police Department. Assessing program processes and evolution relied on in-depth interviews with key personnel including leadership at the City, the CVI teams, and the Detroit Police Department; focus groups with members of each CVI team's staff; and information gathered at quarterly meetings and CVI team events. Survey data offered insights on Detroit

residents' perceptions of public safety. Listed below are key findings related to each of the research questions.

1. Did ShotStoppers affect the city's homicides and non-fatal shootings?

- All the CVI teams saw reductions in non-fatal shootings and homicides in their designated zones during ShotStoppers.
- All teams saw at least some improvement in at least one of their "hotspots" for non-fatal shootings and homicides, and two teams – Force Detroit and Detroit Friends & Family – saw decreases in most hotspots.

2. Did any of the city's other major crime categories change during ShotStoppers?

- Detroit saw notable declines in robberies and motor vehicle thefts during ShotStoppers.
- Declines in aggravated assault (minus non-fatal shootings) and burglary reports were less notable.

3. What effect did ShotStoppers have on perceptions of public safety?

- Overall, residents' perceptions of crime and safety, as measured by the Detroit Metro Area Communities Study (DMACS) surveys, were relatively unmoved from the end of the first year to the end of the second year of the program.
- Residents within the Force Detroit target area on Detroit's west side experienced statistically significant increases in perceptions of neighborhood safety.
- The CVI zones as a whole experienced a significant decrease in the percentage of residents who reported hearing gunshots.

4. What factors were critical for successful program implementation, what challenges did teams face, and what led to variation in team outcomes?

- ShotStoppers' flexibility, designated zones for each CVI team, straightforward performance metric, and the support provided to the CVI teams by the City were critical factors in the program's success.
- The majority of CVI team activities involved violence interruption with smaller portions of work dedicated to wraparound services and community programming. Data limitations made it difficult to ascertain precisely what types of activities were conducted or where the activities took place.
- The CVI teams consistently pointed to two substantive achievements: their ability to establish safety with CVI team presence and to shift cultural norms away from violence.
- People involved in the program identified a range of successful strategies, including hiring staff with lived experience with violence from the team's CVI zone, hiring specialized staff to recruit and mentor individuals from unique high-risk groups, and

developing cross-neighborhood partnerships to share information and build programming capacity .

- The CVI teams consistently noted challenges with:
 - funding limitations and delays,
 - program design elements that may have encouraged unhealthy competition and led to some lack of awareness of cross-neighborhood conflicts, and
 - severe limitations in changing the underlying societal dynamics that lead to violence.

5. What are the key lessons learned from the ShotStoppers program and what are the key recommendations that could inform future city-wide efforts to decrease violent crime in Detroit and beyond?

Trust and credibility are the foundational building blocks for CVI success across all aspects of the program. People involved at all levels of the program – from the on-the-ground CVI team interventionists to top officials at the City and Detroit Police Department – remarked on the centrality of trust. At the most basic level, intervening with individuals at high risk of becoming perpetrators or victims of violence requires a strong reputation for conflict resolution and pragmatic discretion grounded in credibility earned in the community. Each team incorporates its team leader’s and members’ reputations to build its own credibility, both with the community and with institutions like the police department. In turn, the police department and the City develop credibility with the teams by stepping back and trusting them to handle community situations and dynamics with the potential to become violent. The whole structure of the program is built on an interlocking structure of hard-earned trust.

For ShotStoppers, this has translated into a particular kind of leadership that empowers and trusts but also holds teams accountable for violence reduction outcomes. Given the nature of the work, lower-ranking workers cannot simply be told what to do or micromanaged, either at the City or on the CVI teams. Instead, they must be empowered to make their own decisions, forge their own relationships, even take their own risks. At the program level, this has meant allowing the CVI teams to pursue a wide range of approaches and strategies. At the individual worker level, this has meant allowing interventionists to cultivate and manage their own relationships with high-risk individuals in their own ways. This empowerment and independence do not come without accountability, however. The City has held the CVI teams to account by incentivizing performance-based improvements and requiring financial and administrative standards, and individual CVI teams have held their workers to similar standards of performance and effort. As noted by several program partners, it has been the “right” people and teams that have allowed the program to grow and adapt to a range of communities and challenges.

The program’s flexibility allowed for significant levels of adaptability and experimentation, both at the level of individual CVI teams in their designated zones and at the level of program administration by the City CVI team and its partners at DPD. This flexibility encouraged the CVI teams, their City staff counterparts, and even the police department to adapt their programming to neighborhood-level conditions and to experiment with

novel approaches and partnerships, like a summer basketball league or emergency relocation resources. Given the variety of program dynamics this encouraged, communication between the partners became particularly important. Support from and access to top City leadership engendered trust and commitment from the CVI teams and the wider police department and produced a program environment primed for experimentation. At its most successful, this experimentation led to the creation of specialized roles on both the CVI teams and on the City CVI staff that equipped the organizations with the skills to navigate the complex challenges inherent to CVI work.

However, this flexibility contributed to complications in the development of the CVI teams' relationships with their police counterparts. Some teams cultivated close relationships with their precincts, while others kept their distance, relying on a standardized system of notifications to stay in touch as needed. Importantly, the full range of relationships between CVI teams and DPD produced positive outcomes. At the same time, this lack of standardization has left the relationship between the CVI teams and the Detroit Police Department is tenuous and at risk of conflict, particularly given the high levels of trust and credibility required for the work to be successful.

Teams showed success in decreasing the number of homicides and non-fatal shootings by using two distinct strategies: individual intervention and community engagement with resource provision. For the teams that focused on individual intervention, the best results came from hiring full-time staff with local connections and pairing short-term intervention strategies like conflict resolution and mentorship with longer-term supports like formal peer cohorts, workforce skill development, and food and housing assistance. Teams focused on community engagement, specifically New Era, forged a distinct strategy that has nevertheless resulted in success. Successful community engagement strategies included activating communities through mobile block parties and targeted resource fairs in disinvested areas dealing with high levels of violence.

While most teams deployed some combination of individual intervention and community engagement, teams have increasingly sought to bring resources directly to the community. Most teams had limited success in broader community engagement and buy-in, as evidenced by community surveys administered during the first and second year of the program. Additionally, teams faced limitations in their capacity to address other types of violence like domestic/intimate partner violence, and most teams faced limited success in working within the school system, mainly due to lack of access.

Recommendations for the City of Detroit's Ongoing CVI Efforts

- **Strike a balance between allowing for continued experimentation among teams and more strictly enforcing program standards.** ShotStoppers' flexibility has been central to its success but has also led to some challenges like team underperformance and administrative complexities. As it matures, the program should bridge the gap between team autonomy and operational rigor through the standardization of reporting, training, and liaisons between CVI teams and the police department.

- **Incentivize broader community engagement in order to encourage more sustainable community support for CVI.** While most CVI teams have only recently broadened their efforts to community engagement, resident surveys suggest CVI teams have considerable work to do to establish more community-wide recognition and support. This broader community recognition and support will be increasingly important as the CVI teams move their focus from decreasing the already low number of homicides and non-fatal shootings to broader efforts to intervene in less extreme but more widespread versions of community violence like school-based conflict.
- **Refine performance measures to adjust for success.** As the program currently stands, teams' success at decreasing the number of homicides and non-fatal shootings in their zones risk becoming a barrier to further incentive-based improvements. Alternatively, the City should consider novel performance metrics that reward teams for maintaining their low scores and/or decreasing other forms of violence.
- **Empower teams to confront other types of violence connected to domestic/intimate partner violence and mental health crises.** Whereas teams proved their expertise in interrupting violence arising from the street and violent groups, teams struggled to address these other types of violence that nonetheless counted against their performance score. The City should provide more direct support for teams to address these types of issues, either by offering them specialized training and resources or by connecting them more effectively to experts in the field.
- **Encourage more cooperation and coordination among the CVI teams.** People from across the program mentioned successes they witnessed connected to teams' cooperative "cross-neighborhood" work. The City should capitalize on this dynamic by incentivizing the teams to cooperate more consistently and more fully, especially beyond their immediate allies in the program. Efforts could include more regular meetings focused on sharing practices and data.
- **Institutionalize CVI within the City government.** ShotStoppers was originally established as a two-year program, created with one-time federal American Rescue Plan Act funding. The program's temporary nature has led to limitations, including in the establishment of long-term services and partnerships. Making the support of CVI work a more formal part of City government will likely alleviate some of these limitations and encourage more transparency.
- **Address staff burnout to ensure program sustainability.** The CVI teams and their partners at the City and DPD have had great success in the difficult challenge of intervening in violence in their zones. As impressive as this success has been, interviews with the frontline CVI workers show this type of work is physically and mentally draining, requires intervention at any time of the day and night, and has the propensity to be traumatic and dangerous. The City needs to assist the CVI teams in building out their capacity to spread out the burden of the work and in developing their skills to cope with and recover from the difficult work of violence intervention.

Continue reading the full report for more information on the design of ShotStoppers, each CVI team's approach, the program's impact, and a more comprehensive discussion of lessons learned and recommendations for Detroit's ongoing CVI work.

1. Introduction

A. Program Background

Origin of ShotStoppers


The City of Detroit's ShotStoppers Community Violence Intervention (CVI) Program is an ongoing grant-funded, performance-based program started in 2023 focused on decreasing gun violence. The program funds selected community-based organizations, known as CVI teams, to develop and implement programs and activities to address community violence in specific geographically defined "CVI zones." Community violence intervention is a community-centered, non-law enforcement approach that empowers community members to disrupt violence within their neighborhoods.

Community organizations in Detroit have a history of grassroots crime reduction efforts, such as neighborhood patrols, even before the City launched ShotStoppers. ShotStoppers emerged when federal resources became available through the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) to scale these community efforts with a unique funding structure and partnership design. Todd Bettison, then Deputy Mayor and currently Chief of Police, spearheaded the effort to develop the ShotStoppers program with support from the Mayor's Office and Detroit Police Department.

Program Design

Unlike CVI initiatives in some cities that lacked clear metrics to measure program impact, Detroit decided to focus on homicides and non-fatal shootings as well-defined and measurable outcomes. Next, DPD and the City developed a map of non-fatal shootings and homicides and identified areas with concentrated gun violence. The City asked community organizations with interest in participating in ShotStoppers to use the map shown in Figure 1 to identify a three-to-five square mile zone to focus their efforts. The City wanted community organizations to work in defined areas in order to create accountability and make it easier to compare the impact of various approaches to violence intervention. Thus, the novel design of Detroit's program was for CVI efforts of funded organizations to be responsible for reducing two measurable outcomes—homicides and non-fatal shootings—each in a defined geographic zone of the city that encompasses areas with concentrated gun violence.

Figure 1-1: Map of Homicides and Non-Fatal Shootings in Detroit, 2018-2022 (Downtown excluded)



Source: Detroit Police Department

In addition to these innovative features, ShotStoppers included several other unique characteristics compared to CVI programs in other cities:

- Performance bonus incentives: participating CVI teams received additional grant funds for reducing shootings and homicides as compared to the previous year at a rate that exceeds citywide trends in the non-CVI areas by 10%.
- Direct Mayoral Office support: participating CVI teams received direct interactions with the mayor and his staff at quarterly meetings, as well as ongoing support from a City CVI department housed in the Mayor's Office.
- Non-directive approach in terms of intervention strategy: the Mayor's Office allowed the CVI teams to select and implement the CVI strategies and interventions they thought best address non-fatal shootings and homicides.

Selected teams received \$700,000 per year in base funding with the opportunity to receive up to an additional \$700,000 each year in performance-based bonuses. The City measured

performance using a standardized score comprising the number of victims of homicide and non-fatal shootings in a zone, with the homicide victims worth two points and non-fatal shooting victims worth one point. For scoring purposes, it did not matter whether the shooting or homicide is connected in any direct way with the CVI team's work; whether the violence occurred on the street after an argument or in a house as part of a domestic dispute or even a mental health crisis, any homicide or non-fatal shooting that occurs within a team's zone counts toward their CVI score.¹

In each quarter, the City team that manages ShotStopper compared each team's score to their score from the same three month period in the prior year and calculates a percentage change. This is compared to the percent change for the rest of the city, defined as the non-CVI zone. To receive a bonus, a team needed to outpace the aggregate score of non-CVI parts of the City by 10 percentage points for a single bonus of \$87,500 or 20 percentage points for a double bonus of \$175,000. At the end of each quarter, the City CVI team put together a scorecard listing the teams' quarterly scores alongside the quarterly score for the rest of the city.

The score card below demonstrates how the scoring system works. In the second quarter of the program in 2023, the non-CVI area of the city had a 36.29% decrease in its score. This meant that a CVI zone had to have a percentage decrease of at least 46.29% in order for that team to qualify for a single bonus or 56.29% for a double bonus. Based on the scorecard below, Detroit Friends and Family qualified for a single performance bonus as the result of their 48.15% decrease in score and Force Detroit qualified for a double performance bonus with a 72.22% decrease. No other team qualified for a performance bonus.

¹ The City CVI team makes a small number of exceptions to this general rule of including all homicides and non-fatal shootings within a team's zone in their score. The City CVI team excludes homicides and non-fatal shootings geolocated at hospitals within a zone, because this generally occurs when a victim comes to a hospital to receive services; information on where the homicide or shooting actually occurred is not always available. In lieu of the actual location, DPD tags the hospital as the incident location. As a general policy, the City CVI team works with DPD to identify and exclude these datapoints from the scoring system. In addition, the City CVI team created a set of detailed rules for how to assign points for incidents that occurred or changed between quarters. See Appendix C for more detail.

Figure 1-2: Example Score Card²



ShotStoppers - Community Violence Intervention
CVI Quarterly Report
November 2023 - January 2024

2/13/2024

	Nov 2023 - Jan 2024			Nov 2022 - Jan 2023			
	Homicide	Non-Fatal Shooting	CVI Score	Homicide	Non-Fatal Shooting	CVI Score	Percent Change
Non CVI	32	80	151	51	126	237	-36.29%
Detroit 300	1	8	10	3	4	10	0.00%
Detroit Friends & Family	4	6	14	3	20	27	-48.15%
Detroit Peoples Community	3	8	14	4	11	19	-26.32%
Force Detroit	0	5	5	2	14	18	-72.22%
New Era CC	2	5	11	3	11	17	-35.29%
Wayne Metro	2	16	20	6	10	22	-9.09%

Notes: Criminal Homicide and Non-Fatal Shooting are counted by victim. This PRELIMINARY INFORMATION is used for strategic planning and crime analysis and is subject to change.

Program Implementation

In the spring of 2023 after hiring the first members of the City CVI team, the City solicited program proposals from community-based organizations interested in joining ShotStoppers. The City provided examples of CVI work (e.g., conflict mediation, violence intervention) and listed common characteristics of CVI programs, including their community-tailored nature, their use of credible community members as intervention staff, and their focus on individuals at risk of perpetrating or becoming the victims of violence.

To be selected for the program, nonprofits and formally organized community-based organizations needed to demonstrate their capacity in several ways, including:

- A deep understanding of the factors that drive violence in one of the areas identified by the City as experiencing concentrated gun violence;
- Community ties and resident relationships in that area;

² ShotStoppers - Community Violence Intervention: CVI Quarterly Report for November 2023 - January 2024, City of Detroit (updated on February 23, 2024).

- At least two years of experience providing violence intervention, conflict mediation, or services for at-risk youth; and
- Five years of experience managing federal grants, with the option to partner with another agency if the applicant did not have this expertise “in house.”

Twenty-six teams submitted applications, and the City selected six community-based organizations to participate in the two-year ARPA-funded program: Detroit 300, Detroit Friends & Family, Detroit Peoples Community, New Era Community Connection, Force Detroit, and Wayne Metro/Denby Neighborhood Alliance/Camp Restore. Almost every team proposal included elements of conflict mediation and community outreach. Within these broad categories, each team proposal had its own unique set of programs and targeted efforts.

The City CVI team’s broadly hands-off approach to programming encouraged each community-based team to develop and implement a unique combination of approaches, often based on their organizational background. For example, Detroit 300 had a history of organizing volunteer patrols, which was reflected in their proposal centered around zone-specific patrols. Similarly, teams like New Era Detroit and the Detroit Peoples Community had already been organizing block parties; their proposals included expanded and zone-focused versions of those programs. Teams like Detroit Friends & Family and Force Detroit centered intensive intervention programs with long-term mentorship structures. The Wayne Metro/Denby Neighborhood Alliance/Camp Restore team — a more coalition-based team — focused their efforts on a broader community-building approach with programs around community clean-up efforts and early childhood education. We will explore the six teams’ approaches in Chapter 2.

In the summer of 2023, the ShotStoppers program officially began and teams began building out their programs. In addition to tracking the performance score metric, the City CVI team required each team to log and report its program activities and budget expenses on a monthly basis. In order to manage the ShotStoppers program, the City’s relationships with the six grantee teams and all of the attendant data and paperwork, the City hired a program administrator who in turn built out the City CVI team that would eventually grow to four full-time staff members. This team — discussed more in depth in Chapter 4 — helped the community-based teams get started and remained in regular communication with the teams throughout the program. In addition, the City CVI team organized regular meetings between the teams and City departments and agencies, including quarterly roundtables with the Mayor and Chief of Police, and facilitated relationships between the teams and these departments and agencies, as well as other governmental partners.

B. Evaluation and Methodology

Purpose of Evaluation

While the City measures performance based on the homicides and non-fatal shootings metric, city staff also wanted to evaluate the program at a deeper level to determine the broader impact of the ShotStoppers program. For example, the performance metric only measures the overall

drop in homicides and non-fatal shootings, but cannot track whether incidents are simply being displaced into other bordering areas. Similarly, the performance metric doesn't capture changes in other major crime categories. Additionally, the performance metric is a blunt tool that does not provide an understanding of whether different activities have different types of impact and how organizational factors impact program design, implementation, and outcomes for the different teams. Nor can the performance measure give any insight as to how the influx of money changed the dynamics and practices of groups that were already engaged in CVI work. To fully assess the operations and impact of the ShotStoppers program, the City of Detroit contracted with Poverty Solutions at the University of Michigan to bring a holistic lens to the evaluation.

This report, prepared by Poverty Solutions, assesses the implementation and outcomes of ShotStoppers and presents both findings and recommendations. Broadly speaking, the report focuses on two major aspects of ShotStoppers: 1) its impact on public safety and 2) the process of its evolution as a city program. More specifically, Poverty Solutions researchers sought to understand the following five key research questions:

1. Did ShotStoppers affect the city's homicides and non-fatal shootings?
2. Did any of the city's other major crime categories change during ShotStoppers?
3. What effect did ShotStoppers have on perceptions of public safety?
4. What factors were critical for successful program implementation, what challenges did teams face, and what led to variation in team outcomes?
5. What are the key lessons learned from the ShotStoppers program and what are the key recommendations that could inform future city-wide efforts to decrease violent crime in Detroit and beyond?

The researchers used multiple methods and data sources to answer these questions. Reductions in homicides, non-fatal shootings, and other crimes were measured using data from the Detroit Police Department. Assessing program processes and evolution relied on in-depth interviews with key personnel including leadership at the City, the CVI teams, and the Detroit Police Department; focus groups with members of each CVI team's staff; and information gathered at quarterly meetings and CVI team events. Survey data offered insights on Detroit residents' perceptions of public safety. These data sources and how they were collected and used are described more fully below. (Appendix B includes the interview guides used to collect qualitative data.)

Data Sources

The evaluation relies on primary as well as administrative data sources. The evaluation team collected primary data from:

Interviews with CVI team leaders

Poverty Solutions researchers conducted six 1- to 2-hour semi-structured interviews with each of the community team leaders. In some cases, more than one team leader participated, resulting in a total of 10 respondents for this data source. These interviews, which took place in

the spring of 2025, explored topics including the respondents' backgrounds and motivations to participate in CVI work; their organization's history, philosophy, and approach to CVI; their partnerships and funding; their perceptions of the impact of the ShotStoppers program; and the challenges and barriers facing their work.

Focus groups with CVI team staff

Poverty Solutions also held five focus groups with CVI team staff.³ These sessions included a total of 39 respondents, with seven to eight people in a typical focus group. Each of the focus groups lasted about two hours and explored topics such as the organization's approach to CVI, team members' history with the group, the programming offered directly to participants, the training they participated in, the resources they shared with participants, and the additional resources they felt they needed for their work. Respondents were also asked to reflect on the challenges and the successes of the program. Finally, they were asked to offer suggestions and recommendations.

Interviews with Detroit Police Department officials

Nine Detroit Police Department officials participated in eight 1-hour interviews. Respondents reflected on their relationship with the City CVI team, their relationships with each of the individual CVI teams, the implementation of the program within the police department, and their perceptions of the program's impact, challenges, successes, and lessons learned.

City CVI team interviews

Although the evaluation team met regularly with the City's CVI team, for the purposes of the evaluation, Poverty Solutions conducted formal interviews with the City's CVI team. We conducted an independent interview with the City's CVI program administrator and then held a group interview with the other four members of the team. Interview topics included each team member's background and duties, the evolution of the team, its mission, their impressions of the program, and any notable successes and challenges.

Meetings and events

The evaluation team participated in a diverse range of activities to observe the CVI program in operation. They attended meetings, including the quarterly mayoral roundtable with all CVI teams, periodic check-ins between City staff and individual teams, and other ad hoc meetings for the program. Additionally, the evaluation team attended numerous community events organized by CVI teams, including mobile block parties and marches. The evaluation team consistently took observation notes at these events and regularly debriefed after these events.

³ Poverty Solutions was unable to hold a focus group with the staff of New Era after repeated attempts.

DMACS surveys of Detroit residents

Poverty Solutions partnered with the Detroit Metro Area Communities Study (DMACS) to survey city residents both inside and outside of the CVI zones on their perceptions of public safety and experiences with crime in their neighborhood. DMACS included these survey questions in two survey waves; the first took place during the summer of 2024 and the second during the summer of 2025, with more than 2,100 respondents in each wave. The DMACS team intentionally surveyed a higher proportion of people who live in the CVI zones compared to residents in other parts of the city to ensure there were enough respondents to provide accurate data for each zone; they also weighed the survey data to ensure that the results are representative of the entire population in the City of Detroit.

CVI team activity log data

The City CVI team required each CVI team to log all their program activities with information on the timing and location of each activity. These data were shared with the evaluation team for analysis of when, where, and how each team was implementing their CVI strategy in their zones.

DPD administrative data

The Detroit Police Department and the City CVI team provided access to longer trend data on non-fatal shootings and homicides (January 2018-July 2025), and Major Crimes (January 2018-July 2025).

The data sources used to answer each research question can be found in Table 1-1.

Table 1-1: Research Questions by Data Source

Research Question	CVI Leader Interviews	CVI Staff Focus Groups	DPD Interviews	City CVI Team Interviews	Meetings and Events	DMACS Surveys	City Activity Log Data	DPD Data
1. Did ShotStoppers affect the City's homicides and non-fatal shootings?	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
2. Did any of the city's other major crime categories change during ShotStoppers?			X					X
3. What effect did ShotStoppers have on perceptions of public safety?	X	X	X	X	X	X		
4. What factors were critical for successful program implementation, what challenges did teams face, and what led to variation in team outcomes?	X	X	X	X			X	
5. What are the key lessons learned from the ShotStoppers program and what are the key recommendations that could inform future city-wide efforts to decrease violent crime in Detroit and beyond?	X	X	X	X	X			

C. Report Structure

Chapter 2 profiles the six ShotStopper grantees to introduce the groups and their approaches to community violence intervention.

In Chapter 3, we analyze data to address the first three research questions concerning ShotStoppers' impact on: city-wide homicide and non-fatal rates, rates of other major crime categories, and perceptions of crime and public safety both within the CVI neighborhoods and across the City.

Chapter 4 focuses on the fourth research question by exploring the program's structure and governance, the roles and relationships of the ShotStoppers program partners, and the partners' perspectives on CVI team successes and challenges.

The last chapter addresses the remaining research question: what are the key lessons learned from the ShotStoppers program, and what are the key recommendations that could inform future city-wide efforts to decrease violent crime?

2. Implementation of ShotStoppers and CVI Team Approaches

Building on the description of the design of the ShotStoppers program presented in Chapter 1, this chapter discusses how the guidelines were used to select the CVI teams, then profiles the individual teams. Lastly, we make some comparisons between the teams to highlight commonalities and differences in leadership, experience, and programming.

A. Team Selection

A cornerstone of the ShotStoppers program is the flexibility teams were given to tailor their program to both their organization and the community that they intended to serve. The City provided minimum criteria that applicants needed to be a nonprofit or community-based organization with at least two years of experience providing violence prevention, violence intervention, conflict mediation, or services for at-risk youth. They noted three common features of CVI work: 1) programming that is tailored to their community's needs; 2) CVI staff who are trusted by and credible to that community; and 3) approaches focused on individuals at risk of committing or being the victims of violence.

The City's Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA) also offered broad guidelines and multiple examples of the types of work solicited for grant funding. The examples included:

- "Street outreach to build relationships with at-risk individuals and help them choose another path, including assistance to prevent individuals from joining a gang or help them to exit a gang.
- Violence interruption to stop cycles of violence and retaliation, including mediating disputes, promoting non-violent conflict resolution, relocating at-risk individuals or families, or outreach to individuals in prison or jail who continue to direct or contribute to violence in their home communities.
- Connecting at-risk individuals with wraparound services to reduce their risk of violence, including financial assistance or public benefits; job training or placement; education, including literacy programs; housing services, including temporary or emergency relocation; transportation assistance; treatment for mental health needs or substance use disorders; family restoration or reunification services; assistance with re-entry after incarceration; and/or other services as needed.
- Addressing community conditions that contribute to violence, including through community outreach, events, alternative activities during high-risk time periods, or helping youth in high-violence neighborhoods gain exposure to opportunities and experiences outside of their neighborhood." (Page 6-7 of the NOFA)

This flexible guidance encouraged teams to independently develop and execute their own unique strategies. As a result, the six CVI teams drew on their background and experience to offer six overlapping but distinct approaches to decreasing violence in their designated neighborhoods. During their meeting with the evaluation team, city officials explained that teams were selected based on their experience with and relationship to the community rather than


their particular proposed approaches, choosing to focus on the expertise of the people delivering the service rather than the type of service delivered.

The six awarded teams included the following organizations:

- Detroit 300 (D300)
- Detroit Friends & Family (DFF)
- Detroit Peoples Community (formerly known as The People's Alliance) (DPC)
- Force Detroit (FD)
- New Era Community Connection (NECC)
- Wayne Metro/Denby Neighborhood Alliance /Camp Restore (Wayne Metro Coalition or WMC)

The teams were organized into six geographic zones that covered the areas with high numbers of homicides and non-fatal shootings highlighted in Chapter 1 and shown in yellow on the map below. The City CVI staff selected four teams that covered areas on the city's west side and two teams that covered areas on the city's east side. Each zone comprises an area of between 3.9 and 4.6 square miles and has a population between 22,000 and 30,000.

Figure 2-1: Map of CVI Team Areas



The flexibility of the ShotStoppers selection criteria resulted in a wide range of teams in terms of experience with and approaches to CVI work; while there are many commonalities between the teams, the teams' distinct natures resist simple categorization. In the next section, we will provide profiles of the teams before making some comparisons between them with respect to history, leadership, programming, and target participants. Appendix A offers additional details.

Team Profiles

Detroit 300

Co-founded by the late Eric Ford and several other people, Detroit 300 arose as a volunteer organization providing community policing over a decade ago. It has a history of serving as an intermediary between the community and the police. Detroit 300's CVI zone is on the west side between Southfield Freeway and Hubbell Avenue, bordered on the north end by Puritan Avenue and Plymouth Road on the south end and has coverage from three police precincts — the Eighth, Second, and Sixth.

Detroit 300 focuses on supporting homeowners, neighborhood associations, and small business owners, with an eye to protecting the most vulnerable members of the community: women, children, and the elderly. The group provides basic safety around the community with the belief that a safe community encourages residents to be out and about and that will then deter disorderly and risky behavior, creating a positive feedback loop.

Programming involves maintaining a highly visible and consistent community presence, primarily through regular, volunteer-led community patrols. This approach emphasizes an "eyes on the street" methodology, focusing on visible presence and offering assistance, such as to stranded motorists. Detroit 300 ensures easy recognition and memorability through highly visible branding, using a distinct orange and black color scheme prominently featured on their uniforms, vehicles, and various materials.

A key component of their programming is extensive community outreach, including door-to-door canvassing of all houses within their designated zone, often multiple times per year. Furthermore, the organization implements special safety-focused programs, including "Safe Gas," "Safe Buy" (targeting liquor stores), "Safe Ride" (on buses), and safe routes to school. They also foster strong relationships with local neighborhood organizations, notably the Grandmont Rosedale Development Corporation, and they have developed a risk assessment tool that explores family background, home environment, and social connections to identify potential conflicts and high-risk individuals within the community.

Detroit 300's operational model is centralized, where nearly all significant decisions and external communications flowed directly through Ford. Ford openly discussed his own experiences with violence within his family and his own violent and disruptive behavior before dramatically turning his life around, which helps build rapport and serves as a testament to the possibility of change. Detroit 300 is a small organization with few full-time staff, but has a large, dedicated

pool of mostly older, established community volunteers who provide many of the team's CVI services.

Detroit Friends & Family

Detroit Friends & Family (DFF) is a CVI organization operating on the east side of Detroit bounded by Houston Whittier Street and Kelly Road to the north, Moross Road to the east, I-94 to the south, and Conner Street and Gratiot Avenue to the west. Under the veteran leadership of Ray Winans — whose experience spans the previous Ceasefire group violence intervention and community policing model and D-LIVE hospital-based violence intervention model — the team has a shared leadership model with three additional core team members.

For staffing, the organization embraces a "coaching" philosophy that prioritizes developing adaptable skills like problem-solving and independent decision-making over rote training practices like memorization and repetition, with the goal of training the next generation of staff to lead independently. The organization's strength lies in the lived experience of its members, meaning these members were once participants in street violence, members of gangs, or prisoners serving sentences for violent offenses. DFF has a deep respect for local street culture and believes in utilizing networks to resolve conflicts before they escalate. They aim to maintain a neutral, non-adversarial stance working to interface between the community and police — pointedly avoiding any perception of "snitching." The team focuses on correcting the misinformation that often triggers retaliatory violence. They also leverage partnerships with local rappers and DJs to promote a "pushing peace" narrative across the community.

DFF's programming is characterized by intensive, long-term mediation that often begins while the participants are still in prison. By maintaining significant communication with incarcerated individuals, the team gathers critical information and identifies potential conflicts before they spill back onto the streets. In addition to conflict resolution, the organization facilitates safe self-surrenders in partnership with law enforcement and provides essential wraparound services like housing and food. Recognizing the "hot faces" of high-risk individuals — meaning their high visibility makes traditional employment dangerous or difficult — DFF focuses on meeting immediate needs and maintaining long-term social networks rather than immediate workforce placement.

Detroit Peoples Community

Detroit Peoples Community (DPC) focuses its operations on a 4.5-square-mile area on the city's west side, delineated by 8 Mile to the north, Hubbell Avenue to the east, Curtis Street to the south, and Burt Road and Pierson Street to the west. The organization's leadership structure features founder Negus Vu, who focuses on strategy and data collection, while two staff members manage the day-to-day operations and interventions. DPC emphasizes empowering local community members to become agents of change, maintaining a robust contact list of 1,500 individuals and using intensive outreach methods (door knocks, phone calls, texts, and emails) to drive participation in key initiatives. This internal focus is paired with a limited relationship with the Detroit Police Department, as DPC prefers to "stay in their own lane" and manage community issues independently.

DPC's philosophical approach is heavily data-driven, prioritizing broad-based, consistent data collection on both program participants and wider community well-being. A major focus is preventative intervention for school-age youth, aiming to keep small, emerging neighborhood groups from evolving into formal gangs. An intervention team works with high-risk individuals, while community organizers manage activities for the general public. This dual approach ensures both targeted support and overall neighborhood engagement, aiming for sustained cultural change across the west side community.

The programming offered by DPC is diverse, blending environmental efforts with intensive individual mentorship. "Adopt the Block" initiatives combine block parties, resource fairs, and clean-up efforts, engaging dozens of residents at a time. The "at-risk mentorship program," which includes street outreach and a fellowship program, recruits participants from the court system, law enforcement, and juvenile centers. A significant partnership with four local schools features a 20-week academy for chronically absent students, which includes stipends to ensure commitment and success.

Force Detroit

Force Detroit is a CVI organization primarily focused on Detroit's west side. Its operational footprint is defined by West Chicago Avenue and Plymouth Road to the north; the Southfield Freeway to the east; a southern border tracing Tireman Avenue, West Warren Avenue, and Ford Road; and a western boundary along Evergreen Road, Heyden Street, and Burt Road. Originally led by Alia Harvey Quinn, leadership has transitioned to Zoe Kennedy, who has shifted away from daily field operations to empower a broader leadership team, ensuring the organization functions as a sustainable institution rather than one reliant on a single figurehead.

The organization utilizes what they call an "ecosystem" theory, operating on the principle that violence is best addressed by engaging not just high-risk individuals, but their entire social circles of family and friends. This social science-heavy approach treats violence through the lens of trauma-informed care and the social determinants of health, viewing violent groups as a means for individuals to satisfy a fundamental need for belonging. To address these root causes, Force Detroit employs interveners with lived experience who, in addition to working in the community, monitor social media for "disrespect" and retaliatory triggers. The team is constantly evolving, recently expanding its capacity by hiring female Violence Intervention Professionals to address gender-specific dynamics in community conflict.

At the program level, Force Detroit maintains a high-intensity engagement model that includes formal risk assessments and rigorous data collection to track participant progress. The team aims to communicate with at-risk individuals six days per week, effectively "occupying their time" with life-skills classes and productive opportunities to minimize windows for risky behavior. Long-term, their strategy involves engaging participants' families and stabilizing home environments, while using a peer-recruitment model where current participants help identify the next cohort, further cementing the organization's role as a cornerstone of west side safety.

New Era Community Connection

Operating primarily within the defined borders of Curtis Street to the north, Wyoming Avenue to the east, Schoolcraft Road to the south, and Hubbell Avenue to the west, New Era Community Connection represents a deeply rooted grassroots movement within the Detroit Police Department's Twelfth and Second Precincts. The organization is led by Zeek Williams, who has empowered key deputies with genuine administrative and decision-making authority, ensuring that the organization's operations are supported by a capable and invested inner circle. New Era has been doing CVI work in Detroit and has expanded into a multi-city initiative. Prior to ShotStoppers, New Era had a citywide presence and has continued conducting their citywide "Hood2Hood" block parties along with their zone-specific programming. New Era relies on a large, dedicated volunteer base to administer most of their programming.

New Era's philosophy is built on the bedrock of social cohesion and collective accountability, prioritizing community-led norm-setting over traditional institutional intervention. New Era maintains a robust social media presence and uses "doorstep programs" to prioritize direct, face-to-face engagement. Its goal is to change the local culture from within, with the belief that a self-empowered community will naturally marginalize antisocial behavior. Crucially, New Era maintains a stance of self-reliance, asserting that progress should not be contingent upon outside funding; they view funding not as their foundation, but merely as the "gas in the tank" for a vehicle they built themselves.

Functionally, New Era brings essential services directly to residents through mobile resource fairs rather than simply referring people to distant offices. Its diverse programming portfolio reflects this "boots on the ground" mentality, ranging from the "Streets is Watching" community patrols to comprehensive youth initiatives and crisis support like the "Hotel for Homeless" project. By hosting toy giveaways, apartment resource events, and vibrant "Hood2Hood" mobile block parties, the organization ensures it remains a constant, visible, and trusted entity. This multifaceted strategy — combining resource distribution with cultural transformation — aims to create a self-sustaining ecosystem of support that thrives independently of external assistance.

Wayne Metro/Denby Neighborhood Alliance/Camp Restore

The Wayne Metro/Denby Neighborhood Alliance /Camp Restore coalition (the Wayne Metro coalition) operated the largest CVI zone (4.6-square-miles), bounded by 8 Mile and Morang Avenue to the north, Kelly Road and Lakepointe Street to the east, Houston Whittier Street and Whittier Avenue to the south, and Goulburn Avenue to the west. This coalition, which dissolved after leaving ShotStoppers, functioned as a partnership with each group carrying its own set of responsibilities. Wayne Metro Community Action Agency served as the fiduciary and administrative anchor; Camp Restore managed large-scale volunteer-led neighborhood clean-ups; and Denby Neighborhood Alliance — founded by Sandra Turner-Handy — acted as the grassroots engine, focusing on educational advocacy and the development of local block clubs. To execute direct violence intervention and specialized outreach, the coalition subcontracted work to Phil Sample, a former Ceasefire worker with significant lived experience, and his organizations, 4820Live and Raham.

The coalition's core philosophy was rooted in the belief that the physical environment dictates human behavior. By addressing disorder, vacancy, and disuse, the coalition aimed to eliminate the environmental drivers of antisocial activity. It operated on the principle that this work is done best by those who are already doing it and those who are already involved at the neighborhood level.

Its "environment-first" approach focused on increasing resident presence through safe walk zones and vacant land reactivation, alongside early-age literacy and educational interventions designed to divert youth from the "school-to-prison pipeline." In practice, the coalition's programming was a diverse blend of environmental maintenance and social services. Their work ranged from reintegrating returning citizens and offering relocation services to the active creation of at least 15 new block clubs and neighborhood radio patrols. However, this decentralized "three-team approach" faced logistical hurdles. Coordinating between three distinct entities proved difficult, and Wayne Metro struggled at times to distribute funds to on-the-ground partners.

B. Comparisons Between the Teams

Each CVI team had a designated leader and staff dedicated to violence intervention. Additionally, all the teams, except for the Wayne Metro Coalition, worked with a separate fiduciary (generally an experienced third-party organization) to manage its funding.

Beyond these shared overarching characteristics, the teams varied significantly in several factors, including the type of programming offered, leadership style and experience, organizational history and size, and the presence of significant external funding (beyond ARPA dollars). Our examination will begin with these organizational criteria (leadership, history with CVI, and funding) before comparing how teams differed in their implementation strategies.

To compare organizational structure, we examine the following criteria:

Leadership style: Due to the nature of the work and the structure of the program, leadership style played a central role in team dynamics, successes, and challenges. While leadership style across organizations is on a continuum, for our purposes, we have divided them into two styles: hands-on or delegating. The leaders that take a hands-on approach are more directly involved in the day-to-day programming and activities of the team (e.g., communicating regularly with program participants, planning specific events). The leaders that take a delegating approach allow their senior staff members to handle most day-to-day programming and activities and instead focus on being the face of the organization for media appearances and partnerships with other teams, government agencies, and philanthropic partners.

Leader experience with CVI: Each leader brought a particular background to the work that may inform their abilities to leverage social capital and build trust with the community. In addition to considering their years of experience with community violence intervention, we focus on what each leader's background was: either the leader had lived experience, meaning they were previously involved in street violence, or had a background in community organizing.

Organizational history with CVI: The City required applicant organizations to have at least two years of experience doing CVI work. The evaluation team categorized the number of years of experience with CVI into one of three buckets: less than three years, three to five years, or more than five years.

Organization size: Each of the CVI teams had designated staff to implement the ShotStoppers program. We have divided the teams into three groups: those with five or fewer full-time staff, those with more than five full-time staff, and those with more than 10 full-time staff dedicated to CVI work. Note that some teams bolster their efforts using some combination of part-time staff, volunteers, and contractors.

External funding: ShotStoppers provided base funding for each team. However, some teams had other significant forms of outside funding like philanthropic grants or other governmental contracts. The table indicates which teams had external funding.

Table 2-2: Team Characteristics

Team	Target CVI Zone	Leader	Leadership Style	Leader Experience with CVI	Organizational History with CVI	Organization Size	Significant External Funding
Detroit 300	West Side	Eric Ford	Hands-on	Over 10 years and lived experience with street violence	More than 5 years of experience	5 or fewer full-time staff *	No
Detroit Friends & Family	East Side	Ray Winans	Hands-on	Over 10 years and lived experience with street violence	Less than 3 years of experience	5-10 full-time staff	No
Detroit People's Community	West Side	Negus Vu	Delegating	5 to 10 years and community organizer	3 to 5 years of experience	5-10 full-time staff	Yes
Force Detroit	West Side	Alia Harvey Quinn (original) and Zoe Kennedy	Delegating	5 to 10 years and lived experience with street violence	3 to 5 years of experience	More than 10 full-time staff	Yes
New Era Community Connection	West Side	Zeek Williams	Hands-on	More than 10 years and community organizer	More than 5 years of experience	5 or fewer full-time staff *	Yes
Wayne Metro coalition	East Side	Sandra Turner-Handy	Delegating	More than 10 years and community organizer	Less than 3 years of experience	5 or fewer full-time staff *	No

* Often full-time staff are supported by part-time staff, volunteers and/or paid contractors.

Leadership Style and Leader Experience with CVI

As noted in the table, half of the leaders are categorized as “hands-on” leaders who are very involved in the day-to-day operations of their organization. For some leaders, this means they are directly involved in developing and maintaining relationships with individuals at high risk of engaging in or being the victim of violence. For other leaders, it means they are out patrolling and interacting with the community on a regular basis with the staff and volunteers. Leaders characterized as hands-on shared how they approach the work, offering sentiments like this:

So to me, I don't mind going to the gangs because I did that. I don't mind going to the drug dealers; I've been there. I've had people call me and tell me about crimes. Gangsters call me and tell me about crimes... They trust me.

Other leaders delegate more of the work to their staff. They have teams who are empowered to make decisions separate from team leadership. One of the leaders explained the dynamic this way:

So we try to keep our outreach team, as much as possible, disconnected. They can look at me and say, 'Oh, he's with the police.' That's fine. I don't directly deal with participants. I sit out of the way and I allow the outreach team [to work with the participants]... I do come around to participants, but I'm not engaged with them. They know who I am, they see me, they know me by name, but I don't really engage with them too much.

Leaders also spoke about their own experience with violence and how it shapes the CVI work they are doing. Three of the team leaders have personal experience with violence and have spent time in prison. One leader laid out what his background means for his current work:

I come from the neighborhood. I'm a retired street guy, right? I'm a retired gang leader. I never gang-banged, I always hustled, but I had respect and credibility. ... I let it be known. 'Here's what I did, here's what I regret, here's how I'm transformed.' So even to the youngest guy who committed [a serious crime], when they talk to me, they see a possibility of what's possible outside. ... So that's the respect.

For those with backgrounds in community organizing, their work focuses on empowering members of the community. One leader provided an example of a particularly impactful project:

We gave [the students] a project: 'If you could do one thing, what could it be?' [They answered], 'Get rid of this vacant building that's sitting in front of the school at the bus stop that we have to stand at. At 4:30 in the afternoon, it gets dark and we're scared.' I told them, 'You are seniors. You're 17 and 18 years old. Guess what? You're going to have so much power in the next year because you get to vote. Call the mayor's office.' Over 200 students called the mayor's office and

said they wanted that building gone. They went on spring break, came back, that building was gone. Do you know how much energy it put into those young people that they could actually do something?

Organizational History with CVI and background

Of the six teams, two are new to CVI work, two have three to five years of experience, and two have been engaged for over a decade. For the two long-running organizations, their reputation is central to their strategy. They are an established touch point for younger members of the community and provide an example that didn't exist when the leaders were young.

In most cases among the newer organizations, their leaders have been engaged in CVI work for a long time. The organizations formed more recently in response to the rising prominence of CVI and new resources making it possible to engage in the work. Across the six teams, three had fewer than five full-time staff, two teams had between five and 10 full-time staff and one team had more than 10 full-time staff.

Funding

While all six organizations have some funding outside of the ShotStoppers funds, the amount of this funding varies. Three teams rely on local small-dollar donations, while the others have sought out and received significant grant funding. Across the six teams, three received external funding.

One leader provided an analogy for the ShotStoppers funding -- the gas to use in a vehicle they had already built:

[T]hat's really what our organization is based on: engagement, being able to build relationships and relate to people in a way that makes people feel comfortable and then also get valuable resources to people. Which is why we're always pushing for as many resources as we possibly can, and why this program works out so great, because now we do have an opportunity with a level of funding to get the certain resources that we might not have been able to obtain before. Now we have that option of doing that. So the program just helps put gas in the vehicle that we already have.

Organizations with less outside funding used the ShotStoppers funds to shore up their existing work. For example, Detroit 300 has continued to leverage its substantial volunteer network to fill out its community patrol roster. Detroit Friends and Family have distilled their work to a small closely knit staff of interventionists. All six organizations discussed the need to do the work regardless of funding. As one leader put it: "It is going to happen with or without state or city funding because it's divine work."

Because of the flexibility afforded to groups by the City in designing programming, the mix of team history and philosophies around how best to address community violence, and the hard-to-categorize nature of strategies that are responsive to the community, it is difficult to make direct comparisons between groups' programming. However, every CVI team had to make decisions about staffing, training, activities to offer, participant engagement, and case management, all of which impacted how teams implemented their programs.

C. Team Implementation of Programming

This section explores how the CVI teams implement their programming starting with hiring and training staff before focusing on the types of activities they engage in, how they engage with participants, and their approach to case management.

Hiring and Staff Composition

Each team brought on several staff members during ShotStoppers, hiring some staff to work in violence intervention and other staff to fulfill other functions within their organizations. Hiring staff for violence intervention roles requires recruiting people with a nuanced understanding of the community dynamics and the specific skills needed to effectively engage individuals at risk of engaging in violence. Two types of people are generally hired for these roles: individuals with a history of working in violence intervention, who are often older; or individuals with deep connections and reputations within specific neighborhoods, who are frequently younger.

As ShotStoppers progressed, several teams changed their hiring strategies to focus more on neighborhood connections and less on candidates with previous experience with violence intervention. In our interviews and focus groups, several team members noted the importance of this hyperlocal approach, with one staff member stressing: "You got to have people that know the lay of the land, that know the ecosystem over there, that know what's going on, that can tap you into the database. It's essential."

Most teams concentrated their hiring efforts on staff to do direct violence interruption work. A couple of the larger teams also hired additional staff for roles not directly involved in frontline work, such as program and event planning, or marketing and communications.

Training or Preparation

Teams took a range of approaches to training their staff and volunteers. At one end of the spectrum, some teams engaged in formal training to build core competencies, like emotional intelligence and conflict resolution, and professional certifications for community health care. Other teams, especially those with fewer staff members or more part-time staff or volunteers, tended to rely more on each staff member's prior training or experience. In a focus group with a team with less formal training, several members expressed a desire to receive more formal training.

Regardless of whether the team offered formal training or not, staff regularly stressed that their lived experience with violence was the most important training they brought to the job. See Chapter 4 for more discussion of how these approaches lend themselves to team success.

Types of Activities

Program implementation varied by the types of activities each team was engaged in. Broadly speaking, the main activities fall into three categories: violence interruption, wraparound services, and community programming. All the teams did some combination of each type of activity, which all fall under the umbrella of community violence intervention.

Violence interruption activities

Violence interruption includes outreach and relationship building with individuals and groups at risk of engaging in violence, recruitment of and engagement with at-risk individuals, mentorship, and conflict mediation. As part of the ShotStoppers program, all CVI teams were required to develop and maintain the capacity to respond immediately to gun violence in their zones. This has resulted in teams designing systems to maintain 24/7 communication with their local police precincts and responding in person when notified of a possible incident. Consequently, all CVI teams engaged in post-incidence response.

Four of the six teams – Detroit Friends & Family, Detroit Peoples Community, Force Detroit, and the Wayne Metro coalition – have well-developed violence interruption teams.

Wraparound services

Wraparound services complement violence interruption work by connecting people to social supports and community resources. Wraparound services can be short-term like transportation assistance or helping someone move to escape violence or longer-term resources like job and life skills training, behavioral health treatment to help participants improve their opportunities, and support efforts to move away from risky behavior.

Of the four CVI teams that focused on violence interruption with high-risk individuals, all have developed complementary programming to provide wraparound services for these individuals and, sometimes, their immediate family and friends.

Community programming

Community programming focuses on the larger community rather than a small portion of high-risk individuals. These efforts are designed to promote community cohesion or support those in need. These efforts include targeted community events in areas of need, broader community events like block parties, and cross-neighborhood programming like the CVI Basketball Tournament held in the summer of 2025. Detroit 300, New Era Community Connection, and the Wayne Metro coalition place particular emphasis on community programming.

Participant Engagement

Three programs relied heavily on working with individuals, by first identifying high-risk community members, building trust with them, and getting to learn about other high-risk individuals through their social networks. One CVI team member explained:

Once you get one high-risk individual, it only takes one, then you are in the gang. Because barbers know barbers, nurses know nurses, educators know educators. They're in the same networks. So the goal is if you are able to leverage your relationship with the high-risk, they'll bring others along and refer you and they'll educate you about the others. And that's the whole point of why we were so big on that.

These teams hired trusted local individuals, often referred to as credible messengers, to reach out to those directly involved in cycles of violence. For teams using the individual violence intervention approach, participant recruitment occurred at a variety of locations. Multiple teams spoke about recruiting participants directly from the street or other public spaces. Several teams discussed their desire to develop a presence in their community schools, both to train the larger student body in conflict resolution and to recruit high-risk individuals enrolled at the school. Most of these teams struggled to gain access to the schools, mostly because their staff have criminal records limiting their ability to work with minors in a public-school setting. The exception was Detroit Peoples Community, who had an existing relationship with their local high school, which allowed them to quickly gain access and develop an in-school “fellowship” program and provide in-school alternative programming for students.

Rather than focusing on individuals, two teams took a community outreach approach. This involved tapping into neighborhood networks for information on dangerous areas and known conflicts. As one team member put it:

What we do is we focus really on target areas. We patrol all around in our zones, but we focus on target areas. That's more higher crime, more higher active combat, family issues, trouble, things like that. We really focus more on that. So we have particular streets that we know that it's a little heavy and we will go down that street, make our presence known, get out, talk, play basketball. ... And then a lot of times what we do is talk to the people within that street or community and then they'll give us feedback on exactly what times of the day that we need to be there...

And then we could also visit establishments. And when we do that, once we visit establishments and ... let them know that ... we stay consistent and because of our consistency now when we come in, it is like that norm. ... We get out and make sure that they know who we are and what we are there for.

The teams that took this approach developed relationships with community members rather than focusing on high-risk individuals. The CVI teams often became aware of high-risk individuals through this approach, but instead of developing long-term relationships with these individuals, they stayed aware of them and only interacted with them as needed.

Regardless of which approach the teams took to engaging participants, CVI teams and their staff members interacted with their recruits at all times of the day and night.

Case Management Approaches

CVI teams utilized a variety of case management approaches to conduct and track their CVI activities and engagement. Case management often varied by participant engagement approach and the type of CVI programming a team conducted. Some CVI teams developed risk assessments of participants and used these assessments to prioritize engagement. Other teams took a less formal approach to assessing individuals participating in programs, instead focusing on keeping participants engaged in programming and focusing on their growth.

Force Detroit and Detroit Peoples Community used very formal tracking of participant contact and activities, while Detroit Friends & Family and the Wayne Metro coalition focused on one-on-one mentoring and personalized outreach, while tracking activities more informally. Detroit 300 sought out information about the family members of those being assessed, based on their experience that past family violence indicated a higher risk of current violent behavior for young people. Each team also established expectations for how often directly involved staff should be communicating with program participants and reporting on their interactions.

One staff member described meeting with other staff regularly and reviewing the level of risk of each individual on their caseloads. For most teams, a participant's risk level determined the extent to which the team would be in contact with that person, and the CVI teams prioritized more frequent touch points with high-risk individuals than those assessed as lower risk. As the participants progress, their risk level should decrease, according to one CVI team's outreach worker:

Every week we do case management and we go over there. We have to put the risk assessments in and see if anything has changed. Essentially it should change like somebody who's high risk, at some point, should go down, but then it's also good information to see somebody who was low risk if it goes up to just get a better understanding of what's happening on that.

A Detroit Peoples Community team member laid out their strategy in detail:

So we are tasking our outreach team to spend a certain amount of time, basically on their level, whether they are average risk or high risk. High risk are prioritized. And we do that through... we say, 'Hey, we have 45, 50 hours a week. We need you to prioritize this time with this individual.' So obviously they're tasked with at least 10 participants. They have to have at least a 10-person caseload. Out of that 10-person caseload, we want 80% of them to be high-risk. Meaning, if they're high-risk, they have a high propensity to commit violence or they are violent. The at-risk, a lot of times they may be heavily affiliated, they may have gun charges, but they may not necessarily be active. We want active people. With that being said, they go out with them, they go to functions. They may go to eat with them, they're calling them, checking up, doing house visits. We want you

to consistently build a relationship with them. And then we evaluate that. We have forms to see what their level is.

Apart from the case management tracking done by the individual teams, the City CVI staff required CVI teams to log their activities. In the next chapter, we analyze these activity logs and then look at the changes in the main outcome variables the City used to measure impact and award bonuses: homicides and non-fatal shootings. We also examine how trends in other major crimes changed during the evaluation period as well as whether and how resident perceptions of neighborhood safety changed.

3: Impact of ShotStoppers on Crime & Perceptions of Public Safety

Introduction

This chapter assesses the impact of the ShotStoppers program by examining community violence intervention (CVI) team activities, analyzing changes in crime trends, and exploring resident perceptions of neighborhood safety. The analyses rely on data from three sources: activity logs submitted by the CVI teams to the City CVI team, crime data from the Detroit Police Department (DPD), and survey data collected by the Detroit Metro Area Communities Study (DMACS).

The chapter is organized into three main parts:

- **CVI Team Activities:** The evaluation team summarizes the types and locations of activities each CVI team engaged in, using activity log data to compare across teams and within specific CVI zones.
- **Impact on Crime Trends:** We evaluate the potential effects of the ShotStoppers program on crime using several approaches:
 - Comparing non-fatal shooting and homicide numbers (CVI scores) before and after program implementation at the city level, in non-CVI areas, and within individual CVI target areas.
 - Analyzing general victimization trends in these same areas.
 - Mapping the specific locations ("where") of victimization trends within each CVI target area.
 - Examining whether ShotStoppers had any impact on other major crime categories (e.g., robberies).
- **Resident Perceptions:** We examine resident perceptions of neighborhood safety and experiences with crime using the DMACS data and discuss changes in these perceptions and experiences during the first two years of the program.

CVI Team Activities

The ShotStoppers program required each CVI team to log their programming activities – with relevant details like type, duration, and location – and submit the information to the City CVI team monthly. As part of these logs, CVI teams selected one or more activity types from a list of predefined codes.

To analyze the data, we grouped the activity codes into four categories: violence interruption, wraparound services, community building, and other. For the original list of activity codes and a detailed explanation of the categorization process, see Appendix D. We include a short explanation of each category below.

Category 1: Violence Interruption - The activities included in this category involved either interacting directly with at-risk individuals or intervening in active conflicts.

Category 2: Wraparound Services - These activities involve connecting program participants, their families, or other at-risk community members to resources through both direct service provision or referrals.

Category 3: Community Programming - These are activities aimed at the broader community in each zone. These activities could be event-based, like a block party or cleanup effort, or they could be longer-term such as offering support to a block club or local community group.

Category 4: Other - The "Other" category was meant to capture activities — such as administration or data entry — that did not fit the other categories.

A single team activity often fits multiple categories and was reported as such. For example, an event could be labelled as both "Violence Interruption - Conflict Mediation" and "Wraparound Services - Behavioral Health." We assigned these activities to each relevant category, meaning the category counts below are not mutually exclusive, and the percentage totals may exceed 100%.


Table 3-1: CVI Team Activity Log Data for Program Years 1 and 2

Team	Total Recorded Activities (Unique Events)	Violence Interruption	Wraparound Services	Community Programming	Other
Detroit 300	1,291	1,182 (91.6%)	45 (3.5%)	924 (71.6%)	126 (9.8%)
Detroit Friends & Family	2,599	2,540 (97.7%)	188 (7.2%)	878 (33.8%)	135 (5.2%)
Detroit Peoples Community	1,439	1,219 (84.7%)	438 (30.4%)	212 (14.7%)	473 (32.9%)
Force Detroit	4,413	3,403 (77.1%)	284 (6.4%)	1462 (33.1%)	1,152 (26.1%)
New Era Community Connection	2,303	640 (27.8%)	248 (10.8%)	289 (12.6%)	1,807 (78.5%)
Wayne Metro/Denby Neighborhood Alliance/Camp Restore (Wayne Metro coalition)	822	518 (63.0%)	355 (43.2%)	127 (15.5%)	200 (24.3%)

*Since activities could fall into multiple categories, the percentage totals for each team exceed 100%.

**Note: The Wayne Metro coalition did not complete the second year of the program. Their activity data covers the first year of ShotStoppers and one quarter of Year 2.

Figure 3-1: CVI Team Service Activities



*Since activities could fall into multiple categories, the percentage totals for each team exceed 100%.

**Note: The Wayne Metro coalition did not complete the second year of the program. Their activity data represents the first year of ShotStoppers and one quarter of Year 2.

As Table 3-1 and Figure 3-1 show, CVI team performance varied significantly in the number of recorded activities. Force Detroit led all teams with over 4,400 activities. Detroit Friends & Family (DFF) and New Era each recorded between 2,300 and 2,600 activities, while Detroit 300 (D300) and Detroit Peoples Community (DPC) reported around 1,300-1,400 each. The Wayne Metro coalition (WMC) reported just over 800 activities, since they did not complete the second year of ShotStoppers; those numbers represent activities through the first quarter of Year 2.

Notably, New Era reported most of its activities as "Other." While "Other" activities were typically re-categorized when notes were available, this was not possible for New Era: only 4.1% of their "Other" activities included details. Consequently, the vast majority of their activities remain unclassifiable.

Except for New Era, a majority of each team's CVI activities were categorized as "Violence Interruption." It is important to acknowledge the data's limitations, which stem from several factors. First, data is self-reported, which introduces minor errors in the number and type of activities for each team. Given the large numbers, however, the effect of this error is almost certainly negligible. Second, the City never clearly defined the categories, allowing for differing team interpretations. As a result, identical activities may even have been labeled differently across teams. Lastly, the "Other" category included activities that fit into existing categories, as indicated by service record notes. In some cases, teams did not specify the activity they recorded as "Other." Ultimately, these limitations mean we should be cautious in any detailed analysis of this dataset.

Impact on Crime Trends

CVI Scores – Quarterly Analysis

Our analysis of ShotStoppers' impact on crime trends begins with a review of the quarterly CVI scores for each target area (city, non-CVI, and each CVI zone) in the year leading up to the program's inception and the first two years of the program's existence. To award bonuses, the City has focused on scores within a single quarter. This analysis will examine quarterly scores over the full course of the program, providing a more comprehensive view than these quarterly snapshots.

Quarterly CVI scores are calculated based on victimization trends, using a specific formula: two points for each homicide victim and one point for each non-fatal shooting (NFS) victim. It is vital to stress that scores are assigned per victim, not per incident. For instance, a non-fatal shooting with more than one victim has multiple points assigned to it.

Using data provided by the Detroit Police Department, the table below replicates the CVI scores by CVI quarter for the city, non-CVI area, and the CVI teams. A CVI average is also included for reference. As expected, due to its larger population and geographical size, the non-CVI area of the city has more homicides and non-fatal shootings than any of the CVI neighborhoods, leading to substantially higher CVI scores than those found in the CVI neighborhoods.

Table 3-2: CVI Scores by CVI Quarter

CVI Scores	Aug- Oct 22	Nov 22- Jan 23	Feb- Apr 23	May- Jul 23	Aug- Oct 23 (Q1)	Nov 23- Jan 24 (Q2)	Feb- Apr 24 (Q3)	May- Jul 24 (Q4)	Aug- Oct 24 (Q5)	Nov 24- Jan 25 (Q6)	Feb- Apr 25 (Q7)	May- Jul 25 (Q8)
Citywide	444	345	274	438	338	232	197	378	225	199	141	283
Non-CVI	308	233	193	302	203	156	136	234	171	129	83	198
CVI Average	22.7	18.7	13.5	22.7	22.5	12.7	10.2	24	9	11.7	9.7	14.2
D300	20	10	20	22	15	10	18	18	9	11	22	16
DFF	16	26	14	17	21	14	9	21	3	12	7	16
DPC	21	20	10	18	24	12	9	14	6	15	13	18
Force Detroit	24	18	9	24	21	7	3	14	9	6	8	6
New Era	16	17	17	21	22	13	8	16	12	13	3	10
WMC	39	21	11	34	32	20	14	61	15	13	5	19

To help control for differences in geography area and population size, the city compared percentage changes in CVI scores for the CVI teams to those for the non-CVI area of the city each quarter to measure program effectiveness. Table 4-3 below replicates these percentage changes.⁴

In the table, percentages that represent a decline in CVI scores are highlighted in green. Those highlighted in the lightest green did not decline as much as the non-CVI area in that quarter. Percentages highlighted in a darker green but not bolded indicate percentage changes that surpassed the non-CVI decline but did not reach the 10 percentage point bonus threshold. Lastly, those highlighted in the darkest shade of green and bolded represent those percentage declines that surpassed the 10 percentage point bonus threshold. To earn a quarterly performance bonus, a team's CVI score had to have declined by at least 10 percentage points more than the non-CVI percentage decline. If the decline surpassed the non-CVI decline by 20 percentage points or more, the CVI team was entitled to a double bonus.

To illustrate this, consider the November '23-January 24 (Q2) column in the table below. The non-CVI area's CVI score decreased by 33% compared to the same quarter the year before. A CVI team's score would need to decline by at least 43% to earn a bonus and at least 53% to earn a double bonus. DFF and Force Detroit (highlighted in dark green and bolded) had

⁴ In Table 3-3, the percentages were constructed using data provided by the Detroit Police Department and might vary from the City's CVI team scores/percentages due to updates to crime reports (e.g., incident location changes after further investigation). Some of the CVI scores were small numbers and large changes in percentage could result from small changes in the numbers (e.g., moving from a CVI score of 5 in one quarter to a score of 4 in another results in a 20% reduction). Lastly, although the Wayne Metro/Denby Neighborhood Alliance/Camp Restore team was dismissed from the program at the end of Q5, their data have not been added to the non-CVI areas in our analysis as they and other groups continued to work in the target area through Q8. Further, the effect of their work during Q1-5 may have contributed to any further reductions in Q6-8.

reductions in the same quarter that surpassed the non-CVI's percentage drop by 13 percentage points and 28 percentage points, respectively. DPC had a reduction that exceeded the non-CVI area, but by only 7 percentage points. None of the other teams had reductions greater than the non-CVI area. Thus, based on the scoring model, DFF and Force Detroit earned performance bonuses for this quarter.

Table 3-3: Percent Changes in CVI Scores

Change in CVI Scores	Aug-Oct 23 (Q1)	Nov 23-Jan 24 (Q2)	Feb-Apr 24 (Q3)	May-Jul 24 (Q4)	Aug-Oct 24 (Q5)	Nov 24-Jan 25 (Q6)	Feb-Apr 25 (Q7)	May-Jul 25 (Q8)
Citywide	-24%	-33%	-28%	-14%	-42%	-31%	-40%	-31%
Non-CVI	-34%	-33%	-30%	-23%	-33%	-34%	-50%	-26%
CVI Average	-1%	-32%	-24%	6%	-60%	-25%	-18%	-39%
D300	-25%	0%	-10%	-18%	-49%	10%	16%	-20%
DFF	31%	-46%	-36%	24%	-84%	-40%	-39%	-16%
DPC	14%	-40%	-10%	-22%	-73%	-6%	37%	13%
Force Detroit	-13%	-61%	-67%	-42%	-60%	-52%	33%	-68%
New Era	38%	-24%	-53%	-24%	-37%	-13%	-76%	-46%
WMC	-18%	-5%	27%	79%	-58%	-37%	-60%	-60%

*Non-highlighted cells saw either no change or an increase in percentage. Cells highlighted light green did not decline as much as the non-CVI area in that quarter; Cells highlighted in a darker green but not bolded indicate percentage changes that surpassed the non-CVI decline but did not reach the 10 percentage point bonus threshold. Those highlighted in the darkest shade of green and bolded represent those percentage declines that surpassed the 10 percentage point bonus threshold. A negative percent change means a decrease in CVI score versus comparison period.

For all but one quarter (Q4), the CVI areas as a whole saw declines (see “CVI Average” row). Overall, the CVI areas outperformed the non-CVI area in two quarters (Q5 and Q8) and did so by more than 10%.

All teams saw declines in their CVI scores in most quarters, relative to their comparative quarterly scores, and there were multiple quarters when at least half of the teams met or surpassed the non-CVI percentage declines. Still, in most quarters, only one or two teams qualified for the performance-related bonuses. Q5, when nearly all the teams qualified for bonuses, stands out from this trend. Overall, teams saw improvement in their quarter-to-quarter scores but didn't consistently outperform the non-CVI areas, and Force Detroit is the only team to have consistently qualified for the bonuses.

CVI Scores – Annual Analysis

The quarterly CVI score comparisons help evaluate short-term program effectiveness (i.e., “What has been happening in the target area lately?”). Looking at program effectiveness in this way, however, may obscure larger program trends. In this section, therefore, we zoom out from the quarterly scores to examine the annual scores of the ShotStoppers program and to discuss the program’s impact more broadly.

The first four columns of Table 3-4 show the annual total CVI scores for each target area across four time periods: the two years preceding the ShotStoppers program and the program’s first two operational years (August 2023-July 2025). The following four columns compare CVI scores between time periods, tracking score changes between these years and against the pre-program baseline. By considering the years leading up to ShotStoppers, we have a better understanding of the context in which the program began, both for the larger and individual target areas of interest.

Table 3-4 - Annual CVI Scores by CVI Year and Percentage Changes

	CVI Scores by CVI Year				% Change between Time Periods			
	2 Yrs Prior	Yr Prior	Program Y1	Program Y2	Yr Prior vs 2Yrs Prior	Program Y1 vs Yr Prior	Program Y2 vs Y1	Program Y2 vs Yr Prior
Citywide	1,544	1,501	1,145	848	-2.8%	-23.7%	-25.9%	-43.5%
Non-CVI	1,060	1,036	729	581	-2.3%	-29.6%	-20.3%	-43.9%
CVI Total	484	465	416	267	-3.9%	-10.5%	-35.8%	-42.6%
D300	72	72	61	58	0.0%	-15.3%	-4.9%	-19.4%
DFF	90	73	65	38	-18.9%	-11.0%	-41.5%	-47.9%
DPC	92	69	59	52	-25.0%	-14.5%	-11.9%	-24.6%
Force Detroit	52	75	45	29	44.2%	-40.0%	-35.6%	-61.3%
New Era	72	71	59	38	-1.4%	-16.9%	-35.6%	-46.5%
WMC	106	105	127	52	-0.9%	21.0%	-59.1%	-50.5%

*The percent change cells are formatted on a red to green spectrum. The highest value (representing the largest increase) is the darkest shade of red. The lowest value (representing the greatest decrease) is the darkest shade of green. Values in between (from higher to lower) range from orange to yellow to light and dark green.

Table 3-4 illuminates some notable trends. Before the launch of Shotstoppers, both the non-CVI and CVI areas experienced slight overall decreases in CVI scores, though performance among the CVI zones varied significantly. DFF and DPC both experienced annual reductions (18.9% and 25%, respectively). D300, New Era, and the Wayne Metro coalition had little to no change. In contrast, Force Detroit saw a substantial 44% increase during this period, increasing its annual total and bringing it in line with other target areas.

In the program’s first year, non-CVI areas of the city saw a larger reduction (29.6%) than the CVI areas as a whole (10.5%), which is not necessarily unexpected due to typical startup delays for new community initiatives. Additionally, the Wayne Metro coalition experienced a mass shooting

event with multiple victims within their target area, driving up its score for Year 1. Excluding the Wayne Metro coalition from the CVI totals, the percentage decline would be closer to 20%. Despite start-up challenges, most teams achieved decreases of 11–17%, and Force Detroit successfully reversed its prior trend with a 40% reduction in its first program year.

In the second year of the program, the CVI teams outpaced the non-CVI area's percentage reduction (35.8% vs. 20.3%, respectively). The reductions were led by a dramatic turnaround for the Wayne Metro coalition, which followed its initial Year 1 increase with a substantial decrease in Year 2 (partly, it should be said, due to its inflated Year 1 score from the mass shooting event). Although the Wayne Metro coalition was dismissed from ShotStoppers at the end of Q5, other groups continued to work in the target area and continued to receive other types of funding. Further, the effect of the coalition's work during the first year of ShotStoppers may have contributed to any further reductions in violence in Year 2. Other top-performing groups – DFF, Force Detroit, and New Era maintained strong momentum, each achieving notable decreases of 35-42%.

By the end of Year 2 of the program, long-term trends showed that CVI areas and the non-CVI area had nearly identical cumulative declines compared to pre-program baselines (42.6% and 43.9%, respectively). Again, performance varied significantly by team. The Wayne Metro coalition and Force Detroit saw the most significant impact, 50.5% and 61.3%, respectively. New Era and DFF also outperformed citywide trends and the other CVI teams with reductions between 45-48%. D300 and DPC saw more modest but consistent decreases, ranging from 19% to 25%. It is worth reiterating that these CVI zones were selected for interventions due to their persistent non-fatal shootings and homicides, making these reductions all the more laudable.

CVI Score Components

Since the CVI scores are calculated based on both homicides and non-fatal shootings, it is instructive to examine each aspect of the score in turn as this provides insight into whether the program affected non-fatal shootings and homicides equally or if there was variation in impact among these crime categories.

Homicide Victimization

Table 3-5 below displays the annual homicide victim totals for the city, non-CVI area, and CVI areas by CVI year.

Table 3-5: Homicide Victims by CVI Year and Percentage Change

	Homicide Victims by CVI Year				% Change between Time Periods			
	2 Yrs Prior	Yr Prior	Program Y1	Program Y2	Yr Prior vs 2Yrs Prior	Program Y1 vs Yr Prior	Program Y2 vs Y1	Program Y2 vs Yr Prior
Citywide	295	289	225	182	-2%	-22%	-19%	-37%
Non-CVI	208	206	149	131	-1%	-28%	-12%	-36%
CVI Total	87	83	76	51	-5%	-8%	-33%	-39%
D300	13	13	7	11	0%	-46%	57%	-15%
DFF	16	13	17	7	-19%	31%	-59%	-46%
DPC	16	10	12	11	-38%	20%	-8%	10%
Force Detroit	13	16	8	3	23%	-50%	-63%	-81%
New Era	9	10	13	4	11%	30%	-69%	-60%
WMC	20	21	19	15	5%	-10%	-21%	-29%

*The percent change cells are formatted on a red to green spectrum. The highest value (representing the largest increase) is the darkest shade of red. The lowest value (representing the greatest decrease) is the darkest shade of green. Values in between (from higher to lower) range from orange to yellow to light and dark green.

**Note: Small changes in numbers can lead to significant changes in percentage.

Analyzing homicide data reveals shifting performance trends between CVI and non-CVI zones. In the program's first year, non-CVI areas saw a sharper decline in homicide victims compared to the CVI areas (28% vs. 8%). However, this trend reversed in the second year of the program, with the CVI areas as a whole outperforming the non-CVI areas (33% vs. 12% reduction). Measured against the pre-program baseline, the CVI areas achieved a total reduction in homicide victimization of 39%, slightly surpassing the 36% decrease in the non-CVI areas.

Again, there was variation in the outcomes of the individual CVI teams. Force Detroit achieved the most consistent and dramatic reductions across both Year 1 and Year 2 (50% and 63%, respectively), while the Wayne Metro coalition experienced a slight, steady decline, and DPC remained mostly unchanged over this period. Two teams, DFF and New Era, reversed increases in Year 1 with substantial decreases in Year 2. Conversely, D300 increased in Year 2 after an initial decline in Year 1.

Non-Fatal Shooting Victimization

Trends in non-fatal shooting (NFS) victims mirrored homicide patterns, showing a significant shift as the ShotStoppers program matured. While non-CVI areas initially outpaced CVI zones in Year 1 reduction in NFS, the CVI areas took the lead in Year 2. Cumulatively over the entire program, both non-CVI and the CVI areas as a whole saw large declines, with non-CVI areas slightly outpacing the CVI area (49% to 45%, respectively).

Table 3-6: Non-Fatal Shooting Victims by CVI Year and Percentage Change

	NFS Victims by CVI Year				% Change between Time Periods			
	2 Yrs Prior	Yr Prior	Program Y1	Program Y2	Yr Prior vs 2Yrs Prior	Program Y1 vs Yr Prior	Program Y2 vs Y1	Program Y2 vs Yr Prior
Citywide	954	923	695	484	-3%	-25%	-30%	-48%
Non-CVI	644	624	431	319	-3%	-31%	-26%	-49%
CVI Total	310	299	264	165	-4%	-12%	-38%	-45%
D300	46	46	47	36	0%	2%	-23%	-22%
DFF	58	47	31	24	-19%	-34%	-23%	-49%
DPC	60	49	35	30	-18%	-29%	-14%	-39%
Force Detroit	26	43	29	23	65%	-33%	-21%	-47%
New Era	54	51	33	30	-6%	-35%	-9%	-41%
WMC	66	63	89	22	-5%	41%	-75%	-65%

*The percent change cells are formatted on a red to green spectrum. The highest value (representing the largest increase) is the darkest shade of red. The lowest value (representing the greatest decrease) is the darkest shade of green. Values in between (from higher to lower) range from orange to yellow to light and dark green.

Performance among CVI teams was heavily influenced by localized events and rapid changes between the two program years. The Wayne Metro coalition's data was skewed by a mass shooting in Year 1, leading to a 41% *increase* in NFS victims when compared to the year prior. However, this was followed by a 75% reduction in Year 2, despite not being a full program participant for most of the CVI year. This may be in part because multiple members of the Wayne Metro coalition continued to receive funding for their violence interruption work from the state government instead of the City, so they were able to retain some capacity.

DFF and Force Detroit maintained steady, strong progress, with DFF achieving a cumulative 49% reduction, while Force Detroit saw a 47% reduction in NFS victimization. DPC and New Era both recorded consistent annual drops with total reductions of 39% and 41% respectively. D300 remained stable in Year 1, but gained traction in Year 2 with a 23% reduction, totaling a 22% decline from the pre-program baseline.

Comparison of Components

Now that each component has been discussed separately, we examine how each component impacted the overall scores. We start with a look at the citywide, non-CVI, and CVI area as a whole and then examine individual teams.

Table 3-7: Citywide, Non-CVI, and CVI (as a Whole) Homicide and NFS Victimization

	Victimization by CVI Year		% Change
	Yr Prior	Program Y2	Program Y2 vs Yr Prior
Citywide - Homicide	289	182	-37%
Citywide - NFS	923	484	-48%
Non-CVI - Homicide	206	131	-36%
Non-CVI - NFS	624	319	-49%
CVI Total - Homicide	83	51	-39%
CVI Total - NFS	299	165	-45%

At the conclusion of Year 2, citywide homicide victimization decreased by 37% relative to the baseline year and NFS victimization fell by 48%. These figures were closely mirrored in non-CVI areas. CVI areas specifically experienced a 39% reduction in homicides and a 45% reduction in NFS, indicating that the initial two-year impact was driven more heavily by reductions in non-fatal shootings. The following section details variations in these findings across specific CVI teams

Table 3-8: Individual Target Area Homicide and NFS Victimization

	Victimization by CVI Year		% Change
	Yr Prior	Program Y2	Program Y2 vs Yr Prior
D300 - Homicide	13	11	-15%
D300 - NFS	46	36	-22%
DFF - Homicide	13	7	-46%
DFF - NFS	47	24	-49%
DPC - Homicide	10	11	10%
DPC - NFS	49	30	-39%
Force Detroit - Homicide	16	3	-81%
Force Detroit - NFS	43	23	-47%
New Era - Homicide	10	4	-60%
New Era - NFS	51	30	-41%
WMC - Homicide	21	15	-29%
WMC - NFS	63	22	-65%

Four CVI teams experienced more pronounced reductions in NFS victimization than homicide victimization in Program Y2 compared to the year before ShotStoppers (D300, DFF, DPC, and

WMC). Among the teams, WMC had the greatest reduction in NFS victimization (65%), while D300 had the smallest (22%). DFF and DPC were at 49% and 39%, respectively. Force Detroit and New Era also had notable reductions in NFS victimization (47% and 41%, respectively), but had even greater reductions in homicide victimization. Force Detroit's homicide victimization fell by 81% and New Era's fell by 60%. With homicide victimization in the low, single digits, both teams' annual CVI scores were driven primarily by NFS victimization.

The individual components of the CVI score show that most teams experienced greater reductions in NFS victimization during the program than homicide victimization. For those teams where homicide victimization reductions were greater, NFS victimization reductions were still substantial. This suggests that ShotStoppers is having its greatest impact, percentage-wise, on NFS victimization while also impacting homicide victimization. If one considers a NFS as simply a failed homicide attempt, ShotStoppers could also be said to be reducing attempted homicides in addition to actual homicides.

Location Trends - Non-Fatal Shootings and Homicides

Originally, this analysis was designed to determine whether CVI team activities occurred within crime hotspots and whether these activities correlated with reductions in criminal activity in those hotspots. There were a few difficulties with this approach, however. First, there were difficulties geocoding ("placing on a map") a substantial number of activities, as the activity data either did not include an address or a location to which it could be mapped. Second, as noted earlier, there was variation in how teams reported their efforts, particularly in entering "Other" with no explanatory notes. In these cases, this meant the evaluation team was not confident about what types of activities were taking place. Third, some activities were more "person-based" vs. "place-based." For instance, a check-in call to an individual (person-based) can occur anywhere but a Safe Gas event at a gas station (place-based) occurs at a specific location. For many CVI teams, the preponderance of their violence interruption activities was recorded as taking place at their team headquarters, making person-based interventions nearly impossible to attribute to outcomes in specific locations within the CVI zone. Lastly, community patrols tended to cover large areas (e.g., several city blocks) and cannot be mapped accurately with only an address or intersection provided. These limitations drove us to focus on changes in geographic patterns of homicides and non-fatal shootings over the course of the program and not examine how these changes could be driven by team activities.

By analyzing the concentration of non-fatal shootings and homicides within CVI zones before and after the first two years of ShotStoppers, this analysis shows the dissipation of hotspot clusters, identifies persistent or emerging violent crime areas, and highlights potential CVI locations.

For each team, we start by describing each target area's boundaries. Next, we review the incident counts for homicides and non-fatal shootings for the two years prior to ShotStoppers and the first two program years. It should be noted that these are *incident* counts, so the numbers and percentage changes will vary some from the *victimization* numbers reviewed

earlier. Following this, we compared a baseline map showing non-fatal shootings and homicide incidents for the two years leading up to the program (August 2021-July 2023) with hotspot areas outlined with blue boxes. Next, we present a second map with incidents for the first two years of the program (August 2023-July 2025) overlaid on the hotspots of the original map. By overlaying new incidents onto historical heatmaps for each target area, we can visualize the program's impact on local high-crime clusters.

Detroit 300

The D300 target area is located on the city's west side and is bordered by Puritan Street to the north, Hubbell Street on the east, West Chicago Street on the south, and the Southfield Freeway on the west. As the table below displays, over the course of the ShotStoppers program, homicide incidents decreased by 36% and NFS incidents decreased by 5% compared to the two years prior to the program start.

Table 3-9: D300 Incident Counts

	Incidents Counts		% Change
	2 Prior CVI Yrs	ShotStoppers (Y1 & Y2)	ShotStoppers vs 2 Prior Yrs
D300 - Homicide	25	16	-36%
D300 - NFS	75	71	-5%

We identified five hotspots with concentrations of NFS and homicide incidents in the D300 target area prior to the ShotStoppers program (see maps on the following page):

- Hotspot 1: There was a dense cluster of NFS activity located in the northeast part of the zone in an area bordered by Puritan (north), Hubbell (east), Midland (south), and Greenfield (west).
- Hotspot 2: Southwest of Hotspot 1, there was a concentration of violent incidents centered along the Fenkell corridor between Lindsay (west) and Whitcomb (east).
- Hotspot 3: In the center of the zone, there was an area of activity radiating outward from the intersection of Grand River and Greenfield. This area is bounded by Eaton (north), Whitcomb (east), Schoolcraft (south), and Forrer (west).
- Hotspot 4: The zone's most intense cluster was in the southeastern part of the zone in the area of Wadsworth (north), Hubbell (east), Elmira (south), and Rutherford (west), and centered at the intersection of Plymouth and Greenfield.
- Hotspot 5: The remaining concentration of activity was identified in the southeast in the area bordered by Orangelawn (north), Terry (east), West Chicago (south), and Greenfield (west), with particular activity occurring along Orangelawn and Greenfield.


In the first two years of the ShotStoppers program, most established hotspots saw a reduction in overall incidents. The intensity of activity in the northeast and southern portions of the target area (hotspots 1 and 4) diminished, but activity continued to occur, with very little change in the pattern of where activity was occurring. Hotspots 2 and 3 saw substantial decreases in violence, particularly homicides; however, new activity emerged in adjacent areas. In hotspot 2, the new

activity emerged south of the hotspot along Greenfield on the eastern edge of the area. Similarly, southeast of hotspot 3, a new cluster of incidents emerged in the Cadillac Community, where none had previously been reported. Unlike the other hotspots, hotspot 5 in the southeastern portion of the target area continued to experience sustained levels of violent incidents throughout the program.


Taken together, there was a net decrease in incidents over the course of the ShotStoppers program, primarily driven by fewer homicides. Patterns of activity shifted slightly, with new pockets of incidents emerging in the two hotspots that had the largest reductions in activity, suggesting minor displacement.

Figure 3-2: D300 CVI Incident maps

CVI Incidents (August 2021-July 2023)



CVI Incidents (August 2023 - July 2025)



*Xs represent homicides and circles represent NFS

Detroit Friends & Family

The DFF CVI zone is on the city's east side, bounded by Moross in the northeast, I-94/ Harper on the southeast, Conner St on the southwest, and a collection of streets on the west/northwestern boundary (Gratiot Avenue / Houston Whittier Street / Whittier Street / Lakepointe Street / Morang Drive / Kelly Road).

During the first two years of ShotStoppers, DFF experienced a 21% decrease in homicide reports compared to the two years before the program. The number of NFS decreased by almost 50% during the same time period (see Table 3-10).


Table 3-10: DFF Incident Counts

	Incidents Counts		% Change
	2 Prior CVI Yrs	ShotStoppers (Y1 & Y2)	ShotStoppers vs 2 Prior Yrs
DFF - Homicide	29	23	-21%
DFF - NFS	93	51	-45%

We identified six distinct hotspots for NFS and/or homicide incidents within the DFF target area during the two years preceding the program:


- Hotspot 1: Located in the northeastern area of the zone, this cluster featured concentrated NFS activity along Morang (between Kelly and Cadieux) and extended south to a residential area on Nottingham Road (between Britain and Grayton).
- Hotspot 2: Southwest of hotspot 1, this area experienced both homicides and NFS, bordered by Courville (northeast), McKinney (southeast), Berkshire (southwest), and Roxbury (northwest).
- Hotspot 3: In the center of the zone, in an area bordered by Outer Drive (north and east), Chalmers (west), and Elmdale (south), a concentration of NFS incidents occurred.
- Hotspot 4: South of Hotspot 3, a fourth hotspot had NFS activity along Evanston and Harper between Newport and Nottingham.
- Hotspot 5: In the west area of the zone, several NFS and homicide incidents clustered around Goodale Elementary, specifically in the Wilshire/Dickerson/Annsbury/Harper area.
- Hotspot 6: The final hotspot was a small cluster of homicides and NFS in the southwest portion of the zone, situated between Conner and Gunston as well as Corbett and Harper.

Figure 3-3: DFF CVI Incidents Maps
CVI Incidents (August 2021-July 2023)



*Xs represent homicides and circles represent NFS

CVI Incidents (August 2023 - July 2025)



*Xs represent homicides and circles represent NFS

Since ShotStoppers began, NFS incidents in hotspot 1 decreased, but a handful of NFS and homicide incidents have emerged northeast of this area. This area had no reported incidents in the years prior to the program indicating possible minor displacement.

For hotspots 2 through 4, NFS incidents decreased markedly during the program. There were still, however, a handful of NFS and homicide incidents recorded within or near these hotspots. The two westernmost hotspots (5 and 6), also saw marked decreases in incidents since the program began, with only a handful of NFS being reported within them.

Overall, there were decreases in the number of incidents within each of the DFF area's hotspots, most notably in NFS, with evidence that there could have been minor displacement to the northeast of hotspot 1.

Detroit Peoples Community

The DPC target area, on the city's west side, is bordered by 8 Mile to the north, Hubbell to the east, Curtis to the south, and Burt on the west.

During the first two years of ShotStoppers, homicide incidents fell 8% compared to the two years prior, and NFS incidents fell by almost 40% (see table below).

Table 3-11: DPC Incident Counts

	Incidents Counts		% Change
	2 Prior Yrs	ShotStoppers (Y1 & Y2)	ShotStoppers vs 2 Prior Yrs
DPC - Homicide	25	23	-8%
DPC - NFS	93	57	-39%

The evaluation team identified five areas within the DPC target area with concentrations of NFS and/or homicide activity in the years leading up to ShotStoppers:


- Hotspot 1: On the west side of the zone, along Seven Mile between Burt and Evergreen, there was a concentrated spot of NFS and homicides.
- Hotspot 2: On the southwestern edge of the zone, three homicides and four NFS were concentrated in a small area bounded by Pickford, Vaughan, Curtis, and Stout.
- Hotspot 3: Near the center of the CVI zone, a third hotspot bordered by Saint Martins (north), Greenview (east), Cambridge (south), and Warwick (west) had a similar amount of activity as Hotspot 2.
- Hotspot 4: This was the primary area of concern with dense concentration of activity along 7 Mile stretching from west of the Southfield Freeway and extending to Coyle.
- Hotspot 5: The Lodge Fwy/8 Mile area in the northeastern corner of the target area also had a concentration of homicides and NFS.

The map displays the Evergreen-Outter community with five numbered blue hatched areas and purple 'X' marks. The areas are defined as follows:

- Area 1:** A small rectangular area on the left side of the map, near Patton St and Vassar Ave.
- Area 2:** A small rectangular area at the bottom left, near Ker St and Vassar Ave.
- Area 3:** A rectangular area in the center, near Saint Martin's Ave and Vassar Ave.
- Area 4:** A long horizontal rectangular area in the center, near Saint Martin's Ave and Vassar Ave.
- Area 5:** A triangular area at the top right, near Greenfield Rd and Trojan St.

Purple 'X' marks are located at various points throughout the community, including near Henry Ford High School, Comstock Playground, and several residential streets. The map also shows major roads like Hessel Ave, Trojan St, and Vassar Ave, and landmarks like Henry Ford High School and Comstock Playground.

CVI Incidents (August 2023 - July 2025)



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Three of these five hotspots experienced significant reductions in activity following the start of ShotStoppers. Hotspots 1, 2, and 5 reported only a handful of incidents between them in the first two years of the program.

Hotspot 3, the area just south of O'Hair Park, had a similar number of incidents in the two years before ShotStoppers as it did in the two years of the program. Hotspot 4, along 7 Mile Southfield and Coyle, not only remained active, but there was also an increase in NFS and homicides in the neighborhood directly south of it (east of the Southfield Freeway) compared to the years leading up to ShotStoppers. This suggests that further CVI interventions are needed in this area.

Further, two areas that experienced a handful of NFS in the years leading up to ShotStoppers experienced increased homicide activity during the program. The first area is 8 Mile/Southfield (two homicides – top center of the target area) and the other is a short stretch of Pembroke just east of the Southfield Freeway (three homicides), half a mile directly south of 8 Mile and Southfield.

While DPC experienced a 39% decrease in NFS incidents during the course of the program, it is one of the few groups who experienced little to no change in homicide incidents during the same time period. While several hotspots improved, persistent issues remain in some areas and new areas of serious activity are emerging.

Force Detroit

The Force Detroit CVI zone is on the city's west side. It is bordered by Plymouth Road to the north, Southfield Road to the east, Ford Road to the south, and its eastern boundary, which mostly runs alongside the city's Rouge Park, contains the following streets: Burt, Trinity, Pierson, Heyden, and Evergreen.

During Years 1 and 2 of ShotStoppers, the Force Detroit target area experienced a 63% decrease in reported homicides and a 42% decrease in NFS incidents. This percentage drop in homicides was the largest among the CVI teams.

Table 3-12: Force Detroit Incident Counts

	Incidents Counts		% Change
	2 Prior Yrs	ShotStoppers (Y1 & Y2)	ShotStoppers vs 2 Prior Yrs
Force Detroit - Homicide	27	10	-63%
Force Detroit - NFS	64	42	-34%


We identified four key spots of NFS and/or homicide concentration within the target area in the years leading up to ShotStoppers:

- Hotspot 1: Multiple homicides and NFS were concentrated in the northeast corner bounded by Elmira (north), Fitzpatrick (east), West Chicago (south), and Artesian (west).
- Hotspot 2: This zone bounded by West Chicago (north), Minock (east), Joy (south), and Trinity (west) reported a minimum of nine homicides and eight NFS.
- Hotspot 3: Just southeast of Hotspot 2, this sector encompassed by Joy (north), Southfield (east), Constance (south), and Piedmont (west) recorded several NFS alongside a small number of homicides.
- Hotspot 4: This area, located in the southern portion of the zone, had multiple NFS in addition to a few reported homicides.

There was a substantial reduction in incidents within each hotspot since ShotStoppers started. Only two NFS were reported in hotspot 1 since ShotStoppers began. In hotspot 2, NFS continued, but homicides decreased notably. There were fewer NFS and homicides in hotspot 3. Only one CVI score incident – a homicide – was reported in hotspot 4 in the program's first two years, a substantial decrease from the years leading up to the program. Unlike the other CVI zones, there is very little evidence of new concentrations of activity in the area. This suggests displacement is not occurring within the target area.


Figure 3-5: Force Detroit CVI Incident Maps

CVI Incidents (August 2021-July 2023)



*Xs represent homicides and circles represent NFS

CVI Incidents (August 2023 - July 2025)



New Era

The New Era CVI zone is located on the city's west side and is bordered by Curtis to the north, Wyoming to the east, Schoolcraft to the south, and Hubbell to the west.

During ShotStoppers, there was very little change in the overall number of homicides in comparison to the two years prior to the program (see table). As noted earlier in the chapter, most homicide incidents occurred in Year 1 of ShotStoppers (13 of the 17), leading to a decrease in homicide victimization in Year 2 versus the year prior to ShotStoppers. In terms of NFS, there was a notable decrease in the target area during ShotStoppers in comparison to the years before it.

Table 3-13: New Era Incident Counts


	Incidents Counts		% Change
	2 Prior Yrs	ShotStoppers (Y1 & Y2)	ShotStoppers vs 2 Prior Yrs
New Era - Homicide	18	17	-6%
New Era - NFS	87	56	-36%

The evaluation team identified four hotspots that accounted for the lion's share of homicides and NFS in the target area prior to program implementation:


- Hotspot 1: In the north, concentrated along West McNichols between Cruse (west) and Meyers (east), this hotspot reported multiple NFS and several homicides.
- Hotspot 2: Located approximately half a mile south of Hotspot 1, multiple homicides and NFS were centered on Puritan between Schaefer (west) and Meyers (east).
- Hotspot 3: Further south, frequent NFS and homicide incidents were recorded on or near Fenkell between Strathmoor (west) and Meyers (east).
- Hotspot 4: In the southeastern corner, a cluster of multiple NFS and a few homicides occurred on Ilene, Washburn, and Wyoming between Keeler (north) and Lyndon (south).

During ShotStoppers, hotspot 1 continued to be active with several NFS and homicides located along this stretch of West McNichols. To the south in hotspot 2, there were substantially fewer incidents during the course of the program compared with the years before it. However, a new cluster of NFS incidents directly west of this area emerged after ShotStoppers implementation, suggesting minor displacement.

Figure 3-6: New Era CVI Incident Maps
CVI Incidents (August 2021-July 2023)



CVI Incidents (August 2023 - July 2025)



*Xs represent homicides and circles represent NFS

Hotspot 3 experienced a marked decrease in NFS and homicide incidents during ShotStoppers, with only three or four incidents reported over the course of the program. Conversely, hotspot 4 saw continued activity during the program. It is notable that three homicides and two NFS were reported in the southernmost portion of this hotspot, on or just north of Lyndon.

Two areas with a handful of NFS reported in them prior to ShotStoppers saw an increase in homicides during the program. The first area is in the northeastern portion of the target area, just south of Mumford High School and north of McNichols. In the two years prior to ShotStoppers, four NFS incidents occurred in this neighborhood. During ShotStoppers, three homicides occurred in this area. The other area that followed a similar pattern is found in the southeastern portion of the target area, in the neighborhoods marked Happy Homes and Northwest Community. Prior to ShotStoppers, six to seven NFS incidents were reported with zero homicides. During ShotStoppers, however, four homicides and four NFS took place. It is worth investigating if these NFS and homicide cases were related. If they were, they would illustrate how gun violence can escalate within a community if not addressed at first.

Wayne Metro/Denby Neighborhood Alliance/Camp Restore (Wayne Metro coalition)

The Wayne Metro coalition target area is located on the city's east side. It is bounded by 8 Mile to the north, Kelly / Morang / Lakepointe to the east, Houston Whittier / Whittier to the south, and Goulburn to the west.

Compared to the two years leading up to the program, homicides decreased 11% and NFS incidents decreased 22% during ShotStoppers. Similar to New Era's experience with homicides, the Wayne Metro coalition area saw an uptick in NFS incidents in Year 1 of ShotStoppers (65, compared to 48 incidents the year prior), but a substantial drop in Year 2 (19 incidents).

Table 3-14: Wayne Metro Coalition Incident Counts


	Incidents Counts		% Change
	2 Prior Yrs	ShotStoppers (Y1 & Y2)	ShotStoppers vs 2 Prior Yrs
WMC - Homicide	36	32	-11%
WMC - NFS	108	84	-22%

The evaluation team identified five distinct hotspots of homicides and NFS incidents within the WMC target area:


- Hotspot 1: In the central, northern portion of the target area, a cluster of homicides and NFS incidents were centered around the 8 Mile/Gratiot intersection.
- Hotspot 2: Nearly adjacent, we identified another cluster of incidents bordered by Edmore (north), Boulder (east), East State Fair (south), and Gratiot (west).
- Hotspot 3: Situated directly southwest of Hotspot 2, this area showed a more intense concentration of incidents and is bounded by Manning (north), Gratiot (east), Eastwood (south), and Goulburn (west).
- Hotspot 4: This cluster is directly east of Hotspot 3, concentrated in the Manning/Kelly/E 7 Mile/Crusade area.
- Hotspot 5: In the central, southern part of the target area, incidents were clustered between Chalmers (west) and Hayes (east) with many on the southern boundary road of Houston Whittier and one block north on Alma.

Figure 3-7: Wayne Metro Coalition CVI Incident Map

CVI Incidents (August 2021-July 2023)



CVI Incidents (August 2023 - July 2025)



During ShotStoppers, hotspot 1 saw a notable decrease in NFS and homicides with only one NFS being reported (see map below). In the southernmost hotspot (hotspot 5), there was also a substantial reduction in the number of NFS and homicides reported.

Hotspots 2 and 4, while seeing fewer incidents, continued to experience both NFS and homicide activity, and in hotspot 3, on the central west side of the target area, NFS and homicides continued to be reported at a similar rate as before.

Although there were reductions in several of the hotspot areas, the central portion of the target area had an increase in the number of homicides. These increases were especially noticeable just south of hotspot 2 and to the north of hotspot 5, suggesting potential displacement.

Conclusion

There was variation among the teams in terms of impact on NFS and homicides concentrations within their target areas before and after ShotStoppers. Certain teams, such as Force Detroit and DFF, saw marked improvements within most of their hotspots. All of the teams experienced at least some improvement in one of their hotspots with most experiencing marked improvement in several hotspots. Some areas, such as West 7 Mile in the DPC area and West McNichols in New Era's zone, remained relatively persistent. These persistent areas, as well as the burgeoning new concentrations, warrant new or continued attention from the individual teams.

Other Major Crime Trends

While the primary objective of ShotStoppers is reducing gun violence, CVI interventions could have a positive impact on other major crime trends in the target areas. In this section, we examine changes in two major violent crime categories (aggravated assault minus non-fatal shootings and robberies) as well as two major property crime categories (burglary and motor vehicle theft). During the first two years of the program, changes in these major crimes varied depending on the crime type and CVI zone.

Aggravated Assaults (minus NFS)

The FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program definition of an aggravated assault is “an unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury.”⁵ According to the FBI definition, these types of incidents usually involve a weapon “or other means” likely to cause great harm or death.⁶

NFS normally fall within this definition of aggravated assaults. Since NFS patterns were discussed earlier in the chapter, in this section of the analysis we remove NFS from the

⁵ <https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/aggravated-assault.pdf>

⁶ Ibid

aggravated assault category to consider whether ShotStoppers had any impact on aggravated assaults that were not NFS.

Table 3-15: Aggravated Assault Incidents by CVI Year (minus NFS)

	Incidents by CVI Year				% Change between Time Periods			
	2 Yrs Prior	Yr Prior	Program Y1	Program Y2	Yr Prior vs 2Yrs Prior	Program Y1 vs Yr Prior	Program Y2 vs Y1	Program Y2 vs Yr Prior
Citywide	7,739	7,366	7,050	7,004	-5%	-4%	-1%	-5%
Non-CVI	5,422	5,134	4,941	4,868	-5%	-4%	-1%	-5%
CVI Total	2,317	2,232	2,109	2,136	-4%	-6%	1%	-4%
D300	348	360	344	356	3%	-4%	3%	-1%
DFF	400	395	376	380	-1%	-5%	1%	-4%
DPC	343	323	336	333	-6%	4%	-1%	3%
Force Detroit	406	363	338	320	-11%	-7%	-5%	-12%
New Era	356	326	288	334	-8%	-12%	16%	2%
WMC	464	465	427	413	0%	-8%	-3%	-11%

*The percent change cells are formatted on a red to green spectrum. The highest value (representing the largest increase) is the darkest shade of red. The lowest value (representing the greatest decrease) is the darkest shade of green. Values in between (from higher to lower) range from orange to yellow to light and dark green.

Comparing Year 2 of ShotStoppers to the year before ShotStoppers started, aggravated assaults minus NFS fell 5% citywide. A similar decline was observed in the non-CVI area as well. For the CVI areas as a whole, there was a decrease in the number of incidents in Year 1 followed by a slight increase in Year 2 of ShotStoppers, leading to a 4% decline overall.

Three teams (D300, DFF, and New Era) followed the same pattern: decreases in incidents in Year 1, followed by an increase in Year 2. For D300 and DFF, the increase was minimal (3% and 1%, respectively), but for New Era it was more substantial (16%). Force Detroit and the Wayne Metro coalition experienced decreases across both program years, leading to 12% and 11% declines in incidents, respectively, when comparing Year 2 to the year before ShotStoppers. DPC was the only team to experience an increase in incidents during Year 1 of ShotStoppers compared to the year prior. There was little change in the number of incidents for DPC in Year 2. This led to DPC being one of the only teams to see an increase in incidents over the course of ShotStoppers compared to the year before the program started (New Era being the other due to its increase in Year 2). Taken together, there was not a consistent pattern to these incident trends across CVI areas.

Robbery

Robbery is defined as “the taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care, custody, or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence and/or by putting the

victim in fear,” according to the FBI UCR Program.⁷ Additionally, robberies can be defined as either armed (if the perpetrator has a weapon) or unarmed. Robberies are considered violent crimes. Analysis of robbery incidents before and after ShotStoppers shows a different pattern than the one seen in aggravated assault incidents.

Table 3-16: Robbery Incidents by CVI Year

	Incidents by CVI Year				% Change between Time Periods			
	2 Yrs Prior	Yr Prior	Program Y1	Program Y2	Yr Prior vs 2Yrs Prior	Program Y1 vs Yr Prior	Program Y2 vs Y1	Program Y2 vs Yr Prior
Citywide	1,484	1,428	1,175	1,131	-4%	-18%	-4%	-21%
Non-CVI	1,087	1,068	870	846	-2%	-19%	-3%	-21%
CVI Total	397	360	305	285	-9%	-15%	-7%	-21%
D300	65	48	52	48	-26%	8%	-8%	0%
DFF	67	68	46	53	1%	-32%	15%	-22%
DPC	69	50	48	46	-28%	-4%	-4%	-8%
Force Detroit	52	55	48	34	6%	-13%	-29%	-38%
New Era	49	46	42	33	-6%	-9%	-21%	-28%
WMC	95	93	69	71	-2%	-26%	3%	-24%

*The percent change cells are formatted on a red to green spectrum. The highest value (representing the largest increase) is the darkest shade of red. The lowest value (representing the greatest decrease) is the darkest shade of green. Values in between (from higher to lower) range from orange to yellow to light and dark green.

**Note: Small changes in numbers can lead to large changes in percentage.

The city as a whole, the non-CVI area, and the collective CVI area all experienced a 21% decrease in robberies during ShotStoppers, compared with the year before ShotStoppers began. The city and non-CVI area had slightly higher percentage declines in Year 1 of ShotStoppers than the CVI area as a whole, but the CVI area saw a more marked decrease than the city and the non-CVI area in Year 2. Consistent with aggravated assaults trends, there was variation in how individual teams contributed to the overall CVI trend.

In contrast to the citywide trends, DFF and WMC both had large decreases in Year 1 of ShotStoppers (32% and 26%, respectively), but these were followed by increases in incidents in Year 2 (15% and 3%, respectively). Given the reductions in Year 1, however, both teams experienced decreases of over 20% when comparing Year 2 to the year before ShotStoppers. D300 and DPC both had a relatively steady number of robbery incidents in the year before ShotStoppers, as they did during the program, leading to little or no change in the annual incident count. Force Detroit and New Era had modest reductions in Year 1 of ShotStoppers, but followed these with even more substantial reductions in Year 2. As a result, they saw the largest

⁷ U.S. Department of Justice - Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information Services Division. (2018) Robbery, Crime in the United States, 2018. Uniform Crime Report. Retrieved from <https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/robbery.pdf>.

percentage reductions between Year 2 and the year before ShotStoppers, 38% for Force Detroit and 28% for New Era.

Burglary

Turning to property crime, burglary is the “unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or theft.”⁸ The table below shows the annual CVI year totals for burglary incidents for each designated area.

Table 3-17: Burglary Incidents by CVI Year

	Incidents by CVI Year				% Change between Time Periods			
	2 Yrs Prior	Yr Prior	Program Y1	Program Y2	Yr Prior vs 2Yrs Prior	Program Y1 vs Yr Prior	Program Y2 vs Y1	Program Y2 vs Yr Prior
Citywide	4,804	4,843	4,890	4,579	1%	1%	-6%	-5%
Non-CVI	3,436	3,450	3,461	3,223	0%	0%	-7%	-7%
CVI Total	1,368	1,393	1,429	1,356	2%	3%	-5%	-3%
D300	201	200	245	198	0%	23%	-19%	-1%
DDF	252	223	259	258	-12%	16%	0%	16%
DPC	201	231	240	180	15%	4%	-25%	-22%
Force Detroit	260	225	201	222	-13%	-11%	10%	-1%
New Era	198	217	170	197	10%	-22%	16%	-9%
WMC	256	297	314	301	16%	6%	-4%	1%

*The percent change cells are formatted on a red to green spectrum. The highest value (representing the largest increase) is the darkest shade of red. The lowest value (representing the greatest decrease) is the darkest shade of green. Values in between (from higher to lower) range from orange to yellow to light and dark green.

In the years leading up to ShotStoppers and in the first year of the program, burglary incidents increased slightly year over year citywide. In Year 2 of ShotStoppers, however, burglaries decreased by 6%. This led to an overall 5% decrease between Year 2 and the year prior to ShotStoppers. A similar pattern occurred in the non-CVI area of the city. In the collective CVI area, the year-over-year percentage increases in burglaries were slightly higher than in the other areas, and the drop in Year 2 of ShotStoppers was slightly smaller. Overall, the CVI area as a whole experienced a 3% decline in incidents between Year 2 and the year before ShotStoppers.

DPC and WMC both had year-over-year increases in incidents in the two years leading up to ShotStoppers and in the first year of the program. DPC experienced a substantial decrease in incidents in Year 2 of ShotStoppers, leading to a 22% drop. WMC’s decrease was not as substantial, and at the end of Year 2, the area was slightly above pre-ShotStoppers levels.

⁸ U.S. Department of Justice - Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information Services Division. (2018) Burglary, Crime in the United States, 2018. Uniform Crime Report. Retrieved from <https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/burglary.pdf>.

D300 and DFF both experienced increases in burglaries during Year 1 of ShotStoppers. D300's numbers decreased back to baseline by the end of Year 2. DFF, however, did not return to baseline, remaining at the same level as Year 1's numbers.

Force Detroit and New Era both experienced a decrease in incidents in the first year of the program. In Year 2, Force Detroit saw an almost commensurate increase in incidents, resulting in little overall change during the program. New Era also experienced an increase in incidents in Year 2 but not as severe as the increase in Force Detroit's area. Compared to the year before ShotStoppers, New Era experienced an almost 10% drop in burglary incidents. Given this variability among the teams, there does not appear to be any significant correlation between the ShotStoppers CVI work and burglary incidents.

Motor Vehicle Theft

Motor vehicle theft, another major property crime, is defined as "the theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle" with a motor vehicle categorized as "a self-propelled vehicle that runs on land surfaces and not on rails."⁹ Carjackings are included in motor vehicle thefts counts as they are both a property crime as well as a violent crime (robbery). The table below presents the annual CVI year totals for motor vehicle thefts.

Table 3-18: Motor Vehicle Thefts by CVI Year

	Incidents by CVI Year				% Change between Time Periods			
	2 Yrs Prior	Yr Prior	Program Y1	Program Y2	Yr Prior vs 2Yrs Prior	Program Y1 vs Yr Prior	Program Y2 vs Y1	Program Y2 vs Yr Prior
Citywide	7,757	10,714	8,092	7,347	38%	-24%	-9%	-31%
Non-CVI	5,613	8,025	6,100	5,377	43%	-24%	-12%	-33%
CVI Total	2,144	2,689	1,992	1,970	25%	-26%	-1%	-27%
D300	390	429	327	301	10%	-24%	-8%	-30%
DFF	353	439	414	355	24%	-6%	-14%	-19%
DPC	362	477	360	350	32%	-25%	-3%	-27%
Force Detroit	340	394	248	286	16%	-37%	15%	-27%
New Era	311	422	266	278	36%	-37%	5%	-34%
WMDA	388	528	377	400	36%	-29%	6%	-24%

*The percent change cells are formatted on a red to green spectrum. The highest value (representing the largest increase) is the darkest shade of red. The lowest value (representing the greatest decrease) is the darkest shade of green. Values in between (from higher to lower) range from orange to yellow to light and dark green.

⁹ U.S. Department of Justice - Federal Bureau of Investigation. (n.d.) Motor Vehicle Theft, What We Investigate. FBI Website. Retrieved from <https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/transnational-organized-crime/motor-vehicle-theft>.

Before ShotStoppers launched in mid-2023, stolen vehicle reports were rising sharply citywide. The same upward trend impacted the non-CVI area as well as the collective CVI area, though the non-CVI area experienced a more pronounced increase percentage-wise. Since the implementation of ShotStoppers, this trend has reversed, as each of these areas has seen a significant downward trend in stolen vehicles. As the table above illustrates, the percentage decreases were much more substantial during Year 1 of ShotStoppers than Year 2.

Each of the CVI teams experienced a similar pattern, with motor vehicle thefts trending up the year before ShotStoppers and trending down in Year 1 of the program. For some teams (D300 and Force Detroit), the percentage increases in motor vehicle thefts prior to ShotStoppers were smaller, in the 10%-15% range. For others (DPC, New Era, and WMC), the increases were much larger, between 32%-36%. Likewise, the decreases in Year 1 of ShotStoppers were smaller for some teams (e.g., DFF at 6%) and much larger for others (Force Detroit and New Era at 37%).

In Year 2 of ShotStoppers, half of the CVI teams' zones experienced a continued decrease in motor vehicle thefts, while the other half experienced increases; notably, Force Detroit had a 15% increase. Still, given the substantial reductions in motor vehicle thefts in Year 1 of ShotStoppers, almost all of the CVI teams experienced percentage declines of 24% or more when comparing Year 2 to the year before ShotStoppers. DFF, with its 6% decline in motor vehicle thefts in Year 1, was the lone exception to this pattern. Unlike the other teams, however, it saw a notable decline in incidents in Year 2 (14%), resulting in a still-impressive 19% decline between Year 2 and the year prior to ShotStoppers.

All together, in each target area examined, motor vehicle thefts declined between the year prior to ShotStoppers and Year 2. New Era saw the most substantial decline over this time period percentage-wise (34%) while DFF saw the smallest (19%).

Conclusion

Analysis of major violent and property crime categories reveals mixed results since the implementation of ShotStoppers, with notable variation by incident type and CVI zone. Citywide trends in aggravated assaults (excluding NFS) and burglary showed aggregate reductions of approximately 5% during the ShotStoppers. These patterns were relatively consistent across the non-CVI areas and the CVI areas as a whole. While there was some variation among the individual teams, the Wayne Metro Coalition and Force Detroit were the only teams to see a notable decrease in aggravated assaults during the program (11% and 12%, respectively). Burglary trends varied: some teams saw improvement, while others experienced an increase in incidents.

Results were more positive and consistent when considering robberies and motor vehicle thefts. The most significant results occurred in the motor vehicle theft category. Pre-program data showed that these reports were increasing throughout the city. This trend reversed across all target areas and the city as a whole during the program, with all of the CVI areas experiencing decreases in this category. Five of the six CVI teams saw decreases of 24% or more in their

zones and the remaining team was not far behind with a 19% reduction in motor vehicle theft incidents.

Over the course of the program, robberies declined by 21% in the city as a whole as well as in the non-CVI and collective CVI areas. Four of the six CVI teams' areas surpassed this percentage decrease, one by 17% (Force Detroit), while the remaining two teams saw minimal to no improvement in this category.

The provided crime data did not include subcategories for these major crime categories (e.g., burglary of occupied vs. unoccupied buildings). Further analysis at these sub-levels would provide more insight into the individualized trends within these categories.

Resident Perceptions

Overview of Detroit Metro Area Communities Study (DMACS)

While the data tables and maps in the previous sections track reported incidents, they do not capture insight into resident perceptions of safety. Further, they are unable to shed light on how the ShotStoppers program is impacting residents' lives. To fill this gap, the evaluation team worked with the Detroit Metro Area Communities Study (DMACS) to survey residents in the summers of 2024 and 2025.

These surveys asked about perceptions of safety, gun violence, violence-endorsing norms, and community violence initiatives. Following an initial 2024 report establishing baseline attitudes, this evaluation highlights several significant changes in residents' perceptions of safety during the ShotStoppers program. Residents were asked a wide range of questions, however, this report only highlights statistically significant changes in residents' responses.

Resident Perceptions of Neighborhood Safety

The DMACS survey contained two questions meant to capture residents' feelings of safety. One asked about changes in residents' perceptions of neighborhood safety over the past six months. Residents in a few areas experienced significant changes in their perceptions, as shown in the highlighted and bolded rows of the table below.

Table 3-19: Perceived Changes in Neighborhood Safety

	2024 Survey	2025 Survey	Difference
Non-CVI	54.0%	51.4%	-2.7%
CVI (overall)	47.8%	47.5%	-0.3%
Detroit 300	47.6%	45.2%	-2.4%
Detroit Friends & Family	40.0%	41.7%	1.7%
Detroit Peoples Community	49.3%	42.6%	-6.7%
Force Detroit	47.2%	53.5%	6.3%
New Era	49.1%	51.9%	2.8%
Wayne Metro coalition	41.4%	41.4%	0.0%

*Highlighted and bolded selections = Areas with statistically significant changes

**Higher values = Greater perceived safety

In the table, higher values indicate greater perceived safety. In the non-CVI area, perceived safety declined by approximately 3 percentage points between surveys, while the CVI areas remained stable overall.

However, two CVI teams saw significant changes: perceived safety declined by nearly 7 percentage points in the DPC zone, but rose by over 6 percentage points in the Force Detroit area. For Force Detroit, NFS victimization trended sharply downward during Year 1 of ShotStoppers and continued to remain low during Year 2, likely contributing to residents' increased sense of safety. DPC also saw year-over-year reductions in NFS victimization during the program, though these reductions were not as substantial as Force Detroit's, percentage-wise. Given this, it is unclear why residents' perceptions changed so significantly during surveys. A possible explanation is that NFS victimization was trending up in the DPC target area while the 2025 survey was being administered.

The other survey question meant to capture residents' perceptions of safety asked residents how safe they felt when walking in their neighborhood. Only residents in one CVI area showed a significant change in this measure.

Table 3-20: Feelings of Safety While Walking in Neighborhood

	2024 Survey	2025 Survey	Difference
Non-CVI	60.9%	58.7%	-2.3%
CVI (overall)	51.0%	52.0%	1.0%
Detroit 300	55.2%	56.0%	0.9%
Detroit Friends & Family	45.9%	43.9%	-2.0%
Detroit Peoples Community	50.8%	55.5%	4.7%
Force Detroit	46.9%	52.3%	5.5%
New Era	53.1%	50.0%	-3.1%
Wayne Metro coalition	40.6%	42.2%	1.6%

*Highlighted and bolded selections = Areas with statistically significant changes

**Higher values = Greater perceived safety walking in neighborhood

Across all CVI teams, Force Detroit's area was the only CVI zone to see a statistically significant increase in perceived safety while walking in their neighborhood, with nearly 6% more residents reporting an improvement on this measure. While there were minor fluctuations in the other CVI team areas and in the non-CVI and CVI areas overall, none met the threshold of statistical significance.

The survey included a series of questions gauging residents' perceived risk of being assaulted or victimized in the next six months, a subject akin to perceptions of safety. There were no statistically significant changes in residents' attitudes in their responses to this set of questions.

A separate set of survey questions asked residents about their experience with crime and police in their neighborhood in the past six months. There were statistically significant changes for only one question: Have you heard gunshots in your neighborhood during the past six months?

Table 3-21: Hearing Gunshots in the Past 6 Months

	2024 Survey	2025 Survey	Difference
Non-CVI	67.1%	68.8%	1.7%
CVI (overall)	77.8%	72.1%	-5.6%
Detroit 300	75.8%	71.0%	-4.8%
Detroit Friends & Family	79.6%	74.5%	-5.1%
Detroit Peoples Community	65.3%	70.7%	5.3%
Force Detroit	83.1%	69.0%	-14.1%
New Era	73.6%	73.6%	0.0%
Wayne Metro coalition	87.1%	82.9%	-4.3%

*Highlighted and bolded selections = Areas with statistically significant changes;

**Higher values = Heard gunshots in neighborhood

Residents of the CVI areas as a whole reported a nearly 6 percentage point decrease in the share of residents reporting hearing gunshots in the past six months. In contrast, responses from non-CVI residents showed little change, highlighting a positive trend in the CVI zones relative to the rest of the city. Further, and most notably, there was a 14 percentage point reduction in the share of Force Detroit residents who reported hearing gunshots in the past six months, making them the team with the smallest percentage of residents saying as much.

No Significant Change or Unexpected Change

While the metrics above showed improvement, others remained unchanged or trended unexpectedly. These metrics are worth noting given the anticipated changes for broader impact.

Resident awareness of community-led programs or community organizations working to reduce violence in their neighborhood remained unchanged, with approximately 30% of respondents in the non-CVI and CVI areas noting they were aware of such groups. This might stem from residents recognizing the groups and their efforts, but not labeling them as “anti-violence programs.” Additionally, CVI teams may be working with targeted populations (e.g., high school students) who are not DMACS survey respondents (who may be older than the target populations for the teams). Consequently, these residents may not frequent specific locations where the CVI teams are working, leaving them unaware of their presence. Further investigation would be needed to verify either explanation.

Additionally, the DMACS surveys asked a series of questions concerning “violence-endorsing norms” within residents’ neighborhoods. That is, do residents feel violence or the threat of violence is intrinsic to respect, safety, and problem-solving in their community life. For example, one question inquired whether neighborhood residents had a higher level of respect for someone willing to use physical force.

Interestingly, between surveys, responses regarding beliefs about violence-endorsing norms showed little movement across zones. There was no significant change in the perceived necessity of carrying a gun to protect oneself or one's family. Additionally, most zones showed no change in the perceived necessity of joining a gang for protection. However, responses in the DFF area saw a statistically significant shift to fewer residents disagreeing that it is necessary to join a gang to protect themselves or their families. The percentage decreased from 86% in the first survey to 77% in the second. This 9 percentage point decline is an unexpected finding and warrants further investigation.

Conclusion

On the whole, residents' perceptions of safety and experiences with crime did not change in meaningful ways between the summer 2024 and summer 2025 DMACS surveys. The notable exceptions to this are the respondents from the Force Detroit area, who felt increasingly safer in their neighborhood between surveys, and the DPC and non-CVI area residents, who felt less safe as a whole. In addition, in the collective CVI area, residents reported hearing fewer gunshots in their neighborhood in Year 2 of ShotStoppers than Year 1. A significantly smaller percentage of Force Detroit area respondents reported hearing gunshots in Year 2 than they did in Year 1 as well.

While these findings tell us something about resident perceptions, particularly about Force Detroit area residents, the evaluation team did not find many significant changes in residents' attitudes or experience with crime or the CVI teams in most of the target areas. In addition to the reasons cited above, it might take more time for residents' attitudes and feelings to change, particularly in neighborhoods that have experienced persistent violence. As the CVI teams continue their outreach to the community, future surveys might measure more significant changes in responses.

4: Process Evaluation of ShotStoppers Program Components

Introduction

As explored in chapter two, the six CVI teams were granted flexibility to offer programming that met the needs of their designated zones. The teams varied by history and experience with CVI, their team leadership, their levels of outside funding and their programming and activities. While chapter 2 describes the teams and the programming offered, this chapter explores the program's structure and governance by examining the roles and relationships of the ShotStoppers program partners: the individual CVI teams, the City CVI team, and the Detroit Police Department. It begins by exploring the program's philosophy before examining the ShotStoppers program operations. Drawing on 21 interviews and focus groups, this chapter identifies the factors critical to successful implementation and the key implementation challenges of the ShotStoppers program.

CVI Program Structure and Governance

The ShotStoppers program relies on a set of relationships between the City (specifically the City CVI team and the mayor's office), the Detroit Police Department, and the CVI teams. This section explores the roles and relationships of these main actors and how they were perceived within the program.

Role of the City CVI Team

The mayor's office established a City CVI team to administer the ShotStoppers program. This team provided strategic direction, oversaw the implementation of the CVI services, and engaged with the grantees / CVI teams through regular individual meetings as well as quarterly meetings with the entire group of CVI teams. The City CVI team also collected data on programming and budgeting from the CVI teams. In turn, the City CVI team helped grantees to track their performance by providing the CVI teams with data on homicides and non-fatal shootings in their CVI zones. The evaluation team interviewed CVI team respondents on three key areas:

- Relationship with the City: The nature of their relationship with the City CVI team and if that changed over the course of the program.
- Information sharing and collaboration: The information shared between the City, the CVI teams, and the collaborative effort to refine ShotStoppers in response to feedback.
- Sustainability and future support needs: The identification of any additional resources or support required from the City for future success.

Across the six teams, five respondents described their relationship with the City CVI team as positive, emphasizing the City's respectful and empowering approach to working with them and how ShotStoppers strengthened their relationship with the City. These five all independently noted that being selected to do this work had been an honor. Multiple people echoed the sentiments of one team leader who noted, "I have the trust of the people. And it is the best thing that ever happened to me ... the City took a chance on us and gave us this

money. I can help people.” Two teams noted that their historical relationship with City leaders changed as a result of this partnership or during the programming. They cited that previously they did not get along with the City leaders very well and credited the CVI program for helping to smooth the relationship and partnership.

Team leaders noted that the ShotStoppers program gave them access to people and information that was previously unavailable to them. For example, multiple teams valued having direct contact information for key City leaders, like housing and employment officials, which streamlined communication and reduced bureaucratic barriers that previously hindered their work. Team leaders appreciated the openness and attention of senior City leadership, with one team leader noting:

They have been very helpful and very open. I mean, [the mayor] has been one of our biggest allies. He has been nothing less than phenomenal. I mean that's the kind of leadership and expectation that we want from a mayor and the city staff. [the Program Administrator] has been nothing but phenomenal as well. He's been very open. He's been very attentive. His phone's always available. I could call him at three in the morning, he's going to answer the phone if he's up. And that's not that I would have to, but that's the kind of leadership that we need from the City. So the City, I couldn't ask for better leadership when it comes to their level of involvement and participation.

The quarterly meetings provided a venue for CVI teams to provide feedback that directly led to program refinement, often with immediate results. Two teams expressed appreciation for the City's willingness to pilot new approaches and refine them based on the experience, opinions, and challenges discussed in the quarterly meetings. On multiple occasions, the meetings led directly to new partnerships and initiatives addressing issues like workforce development, housing, and homelessness.

The CVI summer basketball league is a key example of the programs and partnerships that emerged through Detroit's quarterly mayoral meetings. In the spring of 2025, the City invited Detroit Police Athletic League (PAL) to present partnership opportunities with the CVI teams and their youth-focused programming. The CVI teams, already considering an athletic league, leveraged the City's resources and organizational capabilities to build a summer basketball league. Together they built a summer basketball league that recruited teenagers from the CVI zones to compete in a tournament. Each CVI team organized a squad and partnered with police officers who helped coach and organize the competition. This league exemplified the innovative, collaborative aspect of ShotStoppers and the effectiveness of the meetings as a platform for tangible program development and team engagement.

Three of the six teams expressed concern about the long-term sustainability of their efforts and progress made in their communities. These teams highlighted the need for not just more resources, but more consistent resources as fundamental to maintaining impact. They asserted that being a reliable and consistent resource is valued in the community and essential for trust building. One member of a focus group noted:

And that's where we talk about the [importance of sustaining our work.] [There is] only so much that the personal relationship is going to do. What you're going to do is you're going to run out of promises and then you're going to create mistrust again and you're going to ruin the hope again.

While City leadership generally received positive feedback, CVI teams identified some areas for improvement. One respondent expressed a desire for the quarterly City meetings to be more transparent and productive; they felt that meetings were more performative than substantive. Additionally, despite the flexibility of the City funding, two respondents wished it could be even more adaptable to address community needs. (See the later section on structural and operational factors for a more detailed discussion on how the teams perceived the program's funding structure.) At least two teams found program reporting requirements burdensome, emphasizing the impossibility of capturing all their work through the activity logs. One team leader linked delays in funding to reporting bottlenecks, highlighting a need for faster administrative processing. Despite these critiques, these CVI teams consistently praised the City CVI team in their role in administering the program.

Role of the Detroit Police Department

A key aspect of most CVI efforts across the country is administrative independence from law enforcement. Detroit's program took a different approach. Although ShotStoppers was a partnership between the CVI teams and the City, the City directed the Detroit Police Department to work with the CVI teams, at least on a basic information-sharing level. The City expected DPD to share timely information on violent incidents within specific CVI zones, enabling CVI teams to intervene quickly and prevent retaliatory violence. For some teams, information sharing remained strictly focused on critical details to facilitate rapid de-escalation. Most teams, however, built substantial relationships with DPD that include regular communication channels between leaders on both sides and co-hosting community events. Relying on information the evaluation teams gathered in interviews with police officials, CVI team leads, and CVI staff, this section explores the relationships between DPD and the CVI teams. It will focus on the ways in which they partnered, the nature of their partnerships, and the information shared between the CVI teams and the police department.

The police department initially reacted to the ShotStoppers program with hesitancy and skepticism. The interviewed police officials as well as the CVI team leaders and staff said the police did not initially or universally endorse ShotStoppers. Many of the police officers interviewed were unfamiliar with or unconvinced of the effectiveness of CVI strategies, with one police officer dismissively referring to CVI team staff as "home police." A few expressed skepticism about how sensitive information would be shared and handled.

However, the dynamic changed once police officials saw CVI teams in action and saw tangible results. The vision and support of DPD leadership was crucial in convincing officers to partner with the teams. Leadership at DPD themselves credited the change in officers' attitudes about CVI to the data, saying "people respond to results."

The program leveraged strategic relationships between CVI teams and DPD personnel through intentional mutual education and training to meet the objectives of the program.

One deputy prioritized ensuring his officers, especially his newly hired officers, could identify CVI team members and understood their roles so they could effectively cooperate on the scene of an incident or soon after an incident. This deputy shared photos of the CVI team members with their officers and worked to foster an environment where CVI team members were viewed as essential partners. Professional reciprocity was a two-way street that helped solidify these partnerships. One DPD supervisor described how a CVI team welcomed a new officer to the work:

I had a brand new officer, and there was an incident that happened out on the street while my officers were there. Some people from Detroit 300 came up. Detroit 300 people talked to my officer and actually shook hands, and they took a picture. So it trended on social media ... the [CVI team member] introduce[d] himself, [told the officer] why he was there, and explain[ed] their position.

Similarly a CVI team member spoke about their efforts to build police capacity to develop relationships with community members:

So we're just trying to show them [DPD] a different way to engage with the community so they can build trust with the community. We're not against the police though. ...We try to have a healthy relationship with the police and we try to maintain a healthy division of labor. But a part of building that relationship is educate and inform them on the work that we do.

The majority of the interviewed respondents described the relationship between CVI teams and the police department as mutually respectful and beneficial. At least four police officials expressed gratitude for the shared mission between themselves and the CVI teams working to reduce violence and crime. Police officers saw value in the program. Similarly, when CVI teams spoke about their partnership with the police, five of the six teams described it as beneficial and important. A CVI team leader felt their work in the community was “legitimized” in the eyes of the broader community as a result of their participation in the ShotStoppers program. Another leader argued that their work is viewed as official rather than informal due to the rigorous use of data and the direct partnership with the police department:

I think what it did is it legitimized the work. What [the program did was to offer us] metrics and the quarterly reports and the computer reviews and everything. [The CVI program] being embedded with the police, [that] gives us numbers, it gives us the data that we need. And so for me, I know it gives you that territory, your boundaries.

A CVI team member noted shared goals but valuable differences in the roles that the police played versus the CVI teams:

I'm not here to take your job. I don't want your job... we all have one common goal: to make sure everybody is safe. And so now you get to be that connector between community and police.

Based on our interviews and focus groups with 57 people from CVI teams and DPD, the evaluation team identified four key ways the two groups worked together:

1. Strategic problem-solving

DPD respondents described the importance of brainstorming with CVI teams to get ahead of a situation that could “grow legs.” DPD appreciated how the CVI team’s on-the-ground work complemented their police work. One police official noted:

Our CVI groups, they're from the neighborhood. They know everybody; they are boots on the ground. So when they're talking to them, it's different. So it's not just we're at the scene, we're doing our law enforcement work, but they're at the scene doing the street work and that trust is there. So it truly [meets] needs, that was the piece that we were missing.

Another police official agreed, noting that they spoke with a CVI leader for advice in a few cases that helped them determine their next steps:

What do I need to do with this? What's your guidance when it comes to this? Or who should I call? That kind of thing. I didn't always ask him, but it would be something like I would be debating should I kind of go this route or is it going to be this route? I think he's seen it at all levels.

2. Building bridges in the community

In most cases, DPD noted that they were limited in their capacity to connect with communities and be responsive to all community needs. CVI teams are part of the community and were more able to be responsive when emergency needs arose.

Several police officers used the words “bridge the gap” to describe the CVI team role in their respective communities:

Everyone says [police need to] bridge the gap. Bridge the gap. We're always going to do what we can do. We do events. We're doing Halloween, we do Easter. We put on these events to try to bridge the community. But what's that true bridge? And it's that connection! [But] because we can't say we've been in jail, we don't know what happens in jail. We don't know everything you lose by going there, but our CVI members do. And when they're really giving their story to whatever concern and what area, that's the difference. That's the difference. It opens [the community] up.

One example of how interactions between CVI teams and police fostered better community interactions came when a CVI team asked the police to wear informal uniforms at a shared basketball event. A CVI staff member noted:

I even had them change their attire. They had full-blown police [uniforms] and so now they have T-shirts that have our basketball league on it. They still have police across the back. ... They still got their badge. That was a change that I [was] like, can we shift just the presence to soften it up a little bit? Still be who you are because I get it, still be who you are, but we got to soften that up a little bit. So now they wear our fitted shirts.

One police official described police officers' relationships with CVI leaders and teams as intentionally public. They argued that in some cases, the CVI teams lent credibility to the police department as people that could be trusted.

3. Sharing information and clearing up misinformation

Information sharing has distinct limits given the sensitive nature of ongoing police investigations. However, police shared what they could with CVI teams. As part of ShotStoppers, the CVI teams received performance data for their designated zone. Beyond that, DPD often shared information with CVI teams about ongoing incidents. Police described the CVI teams as effective trusted messengers who helped address misinformation. A police official described how they engaged with a CVI team to clear up misinformation in the community:

There needs to be messaging done to this group of people, but they will not accept it from the police. Or as the police, I'm going to have to chase 'em down, which is going to create some adversarial interaction to deal with. I can then use [the CVI team] as credible messengers to go make that contact. And they [the CVI team] are networked well enough to where they can, pretty much anybody I need to get to, they can get a message from me out to that group.

4. Co-planning events

Respondents from DPD and CVI teams spoke about partnering to co-plan events, such as the basketball league mentioned above. In addition to being a successful collaboration between police and CVI teams, police officers noted that the basketball league provided a positive setting for youth to interact with police officers. "They think they're coming to play basketball, but no, you're having a positive interaction with a police officer," one officer said.

Structural and Operational Factors

This section explores the respondents' reflections on the ShotStoppers approach to CVI zones, the funding and performance-based incentives, the scoring system and the City's guidance and oversight of the CVI work in Detroit.

CVI Zones

The CVI zone designation is a key component of Detroit's ShotStoppers program. Each team proposed and then was assigned a 3 to 5 square mile zone in which to implement the CVI program. The size of the zone was designed to be commensurate with team resources and encourage effective connection within the community. In their applications, each team proposed a specific zone using data on homicides and non-fatal shootings provided by the City. Most teams had a specific area in mind going into the application process based on their previous relationships. The City CVI team then either accepted the proposed zone or worked with the team to adjust their zone to capture areas with the greatest need while not sacrificing existing community relationships. As a result of this back-and-forth process, most teams ended up with zones that they had at least partially chosen.

The evaluation team asked respondents to comment on the pros and cons of having clearly defined zones.

Zones helped teams define where they should focus their efforts. Respondents spoke about the value of a demarcated area and how the structure defined where they should focus their activities, as well as setting boundaries for areas beyond their responsibility. One CVI team member described the importance of having a designated space:

The typical day-to-day activities ... we are able to monitor them a bit better because we do have a selected space. So it's like watering a plant as opposed to watering a field. How we are able to put water on this and then see it grow as opposed to just watering the whole field.

Zones were appropriately sized for team staff sizes and budgets. One CVI team staff member stated that their zone's size allowed them to respond to a call about possible conflict and "stop it in real time." A CVI team leader whose zone expanded the team's previous intervention area was initially hesitant to take on the larger area. After taking on the larger area, however, the leader felt successful, saying, "Because we've got more money, we're able to scale up our resources and we are able to scale up our staff."

Previous connections to assigned zones were important for teams. Multiple team leaders chose their zones because of the connections they or their key staff members had with the zone. For most teams, their zones became their main target areas for recruiting staff, and this hyperlocal staff became integral to their intervention efforts. As one staff member put it, "You got to have people that know the lay of the land, that know the ecosystem over there, that know what's going on, that can tap you into the database. It's essential." These staff often had past interactions with at-risk individuals and their families, providing specific points of connection to intervene.

Zone boundaries did not match how people engaged in violence moved through the city. A primary challenge of the ShotStoppers program is the necessarily arbitrary nature of strict geographical zone boundaries. Because individuals and groups at risk of contributing to violence frequently move across these designated lines into other areas of Detroit, intervening

effectively becomes difficult when conflict is not contained within a specific zone. As one team leader explained:

You can focus within your territory, but it's impractical. And the reason being is [a line] doesn't stop anybody from coming to your [zone]. ... So you have to do what we call cross-organizing. It is essential. It is imperative. ... You can't just solely focus on your neighborhood. You have to primarily focus on your neighborhood, but when you're primarily focusing, you better know who they have issues with, what's going on, and you better be aware of that. ... These are all the different variables and dynamics that you deal with. So yes, we definitely have to work outside of our neighborhood as well.

The police chief recognized this reality while defending the need for the CVI teams to have designated zones in order to focus their work and create accountability.

Funding Structure

ShotStoppers was funded through the federal American Rescue Plan Act from 2023 to 2025. Funding was divided into two buckets: one for base funding and another for performance-based bonuses. Over the two-year period, each team received \$1.4 million in base funding, or \$175,000 per quarter, with a portion of the payment distributed as team salaries and the remainder covering program and participant payments reimbursed after the team reported the out-of-pocket expense. In addition, each team was eligible to receive up to an additional \$175,000 per quarter based on their performance in the main outcome metric of the program: decreasing the number of homicides and non-fatal shootings in their designated CVI zone. Ultimately, every team received at least one performance bonus, and a total of 14 bonuses totaling \$2.1 million were awarded.

Overall, the CVI teams were mostly satisfied with their base funding because it gave them sufficient funds to staff their organizations and focus on their designated zone. Three of the six teams stated that they thought the base funding was appropriate. One team leader stressed that the consistent base funding was critical to develop and maintain appropriate staffing.

Several team leaders and members mentioned challenges related to obtaining the funding in a timely manner. Two teams mentioned challenges to cover payroll due to delays in the City's distribution of team salary payments. At least four of the teams mentioned having to regularly pay for community resources out of pocket because the reimbursement system was too restrictive or took too long. This issue was acute when getting resources to individuals and families in the middle of violent situations required offering immediate support and resources.

The funding was restrictive. Another limitation that CVI teams referenced was the restrictions placed on what the teams could buy with their funding. One team wanted to purchase the property housing their headquarters instead of renting, in order to demonstrate a visible

commitment to their neighborhood. According to the team leader, this was prohibited under the program contract.

Teams sought additional fiscal resources. All six CVI teams expressed a need for increased funding. Three teams mentioned having to limit their interactions with at-risk program participants, either in number or in level of intervention, because of funding limitations. Additionally, one team leader with a particularly large number of staff members mentioned that the grant could not cover their entire staffing needs.

Scoring System

As discussed in Chapter 1, the ShotStoppers scoring system focused on one main performance metric for the program. CVI teams received a point for each non-fatal shooting in their zone and two points for each homicide in their zone. Each quarter, each team's score was compared to their score from the previous year's quarter to produce a percentage change. This was then compared to the percentage change of the non-CVI area of the city over the same period to determine quarterly bonuses. The evaluation team asked respondents to reflect on the scoring system. The following were three key findings concerning this key component of the ShotStoppers program.

The scoring system provided a shared, objective metric that helped teams focus their decision-making and assess their work consistently. Respondents noted that the scoring system influenced team decision-making and implementation. It enabled a straightforward way to assess activity while also supporting more nuanced interpretation of patterns and trends. Most interviewed staff described the data they collected as "illustrative," helping them articulate and contextualize the realities they encountered in the field.

At the same time, respondents identified a limitation in how the scoring system functioned. The strictly defined zone system could result in both over- and under-inclusion of incidents assigned to a given team. Because incidents were attributed to where events culminated, teams may bear responsibility for conflicts that began outside their zone. For example, the Detroit Peoples Community team highlighted a shooting that occurred in their zone during a car chase, even though the underlying conflict likely originated elsewhere.

The scoring system's point structure includes factors outside team control. Counting homicides as two points and non-fatal shootings as one point means that team scores are partly based on external, chance-influenced factors like the quality and speed of emergency medical response, rather than solely on the teams' performances. This underscores the need for caution in interpreting program outcomes exclusively on scoring data and reinforces the importance of using the scores alongside insights from interviews when assessing team performance.

Programmatic Guidance and Oversight

The ShotStoppers program was overseen and administered by the City CVI team and the mayor's office. As part of this role, the City required teams to regularly submit significant data on

their programming and budgets. However, ShotStoppers also gave CVI teams broad latitude in how each team should attempt to decrease the number of homicides and non-fatal shootings in their zone. The City's leaders intentionally empowered the CVI teams to select approaches that the CVI teams theorized would best achieve the main performance metric and meet the needs of their particular zone. The evaluation team asked the CVI teams and other leaders to reflect on the program guidance and oversight.

The City's use of data combined with a flexible approach allowed the teams to experiment with several different approaches to violence intervention. The diversity of approaches led to experimentation and creativity and created a high level of trial and error for determining successful strategies. The teams initially used a variety of staffing models and adjusted over time. A CVI team leader highlighted the program's focus on continuous learning, with teams using crime data and quarterly mayoral meetings to guide changes. All teams used program metrics to tailor their activities and respond dynamically to crime trends in their zones.

Without immediate ramifications for underperformance, some teams fell short on the main metric. In the first year, teams that were unable to decrease homicides and non-fatal shootings were not penalized. City officials worked with these teams to address the issue, offering suggestions like partnering with another better-performing team to learn more successful strategies.

For the initial year, these recommendations were suggestions, not directives. The lack of an initial consequence for underperformance also allowed teams to stray from the core mission of the program. One team, for example, went several quarters without implementing a significant and consistent direct violence intervention strategy due to internal subcontractor funding issues.

At the end of the first year of the program, the City decided to not renew the contract of one of the six teams. This decision was based both on their underperformance on the main metric compared to other teams and their failure to meet the program's administrative requirements, including budget reporting and communications.

Despite challenges, most interviewees across the CVI teams, the City, and DPD viewed the program's hands-off approach as a critical factor in its success. For one team leader, the autonomy, coupled with initially low expectations, gave the teams the room they needed to deploy and test their approaches and ultimately focus on successful strategies:

[W]hat I like about this, nobody, even from the city level it seems, even all the way up to the mayor, they did not have huge expectations. They did not expect this to be successful. They had low expectations from the beginning. So what did that allow us to do when we excelled and were actually successful? Nobody was breathing on your neck because we honestly didn't think that this was going to take off from the beginning. So they have been very hands-off, they've been very supportive. They've given a lot of autonomy as well as a big understanding. ... So that's been great in giving us the cushion and the patience and the grace to think, 'Okay, let's build this out' ... because I've been ... part of organizations

where the funder is down your neck, where their foot's on the gas, right? Foot on your neck, like, 'Money, deliverables, or we want production.' And the City has been, in my opinion, very supportive, very open.

Respondent-identified Successes and Challenges

ShotStoppers allowed teams broad flexibility to develop and implement their own approaches to decrease the number of homicides and non-fatal shootings in their zones. Throughout this chapter, we have focused on the broader structural and programmatic factors that helped the program succeed overall but have not focused on how individual team characteristics impacted outcomes. Partially, this is because, even though teams had large variations in history, leadership, organization and approach, all saw some degree of success in reducing violence in their neighborhoods. Additionally, data on team activities was not robust enough to correlate activities to outcomes, and, even if it were more comprehensive, many things related to community violence stem from factors outside of the control of the CVI teams. However, during the qualitative interviews, the CVI teams, their leaders, the City CVI team, and the DPD officials reflected on factors that led to successful outcomes and those that hindered success. We capture these insights below.

Success: Hiring staff with lived experience from the team's zone. Most respondents attributed part of their success to hiring violence intervention staff who lived in their team's zone and/or had specific connections to the zone. While some teams always took this approach, other teams adapted their hiring approaches as they went. For example, one team with significant violence intervention experience initially hired staff with the same expertise. However, these workers were older than the target populations and not from the local neighborhood. After struggling to decrease violence, this team began hiring more staff with local connections, and they started seeing more of an impact.

Success: Hiring specialized staff. Multiple teams reported broadening their participant recruitment efforts by hiring staff with specific backgrounds, identities, or skillsets. For example, at least two teams hired female violence interrupters to recruit and mentor high-risk females. Another team hired a former star basketball player to offer more sports-based options for mentoring and "occupying time" activities. As these teams expanded their staff, they were able to deploy these workers strategically. As one team member described it: "... If there is a female that is in a situation, [the female violence interrupter] was kind of like the point person with that because the lady would feel more comfortable with her being female more so than maybe with a male person that she might come in contact with."

Success: Developing cross-neighborhood partnerships to share information. Teams noted how they increasingly worked together and across their zone boundaries as the program progressed to share information. Given the design of ShotStoppers, most teams initially focused their efforts within their zones. They spent time at the hot spots within their zones like street corners and school yards to identify and recruit high-risk individuals. As the program progressed, however, most teams began extending their programming outside of their zones. For example, one team began sharing information more regularly with another team after

realizing that young men from one zone were dating young women from another, and this was causing conflicts in both zones. By sharing information and updates, these two teams hoped to gain a better understanding of the conflicts and develop more capacity to predict when and where conflict could boil over into actual violence.

Success: Developing cross-neighborhood partnerships to build capacity and expertise.

Teams reported that they began to leverage each other for specific programming capacity and expertise. For example, after hosting Hood2Hood mobile block parties throughout the city for years, New Era began partnering with other CVI teams to bring Hood2Hood parties to particularly at-risk neighborhoods. In August 2025, for example, the two east side teams — Detroit Friends & Family and Team Pursuit, which replaced the Wayne Metro coalition — invited New Era to run a Hood2Hood party in the neighborhood next to Denby High School, where multiple children had been shot and killed the month before. Almost all the CVI team leaders ended up attending the event, walking the streets, meeting neighbors, and handing out resources. CVI teams hired other team leaders to train their staff in conflict mediation and violence intervention.

Police officials pointed to this cross-neighborhood strategy more often than the CVI teams and city officials did, with five different DPD officials mentioning the importance of the partnerships between the CVI teams. One DPD leader described it this way:

So this program is to me, in my opinion, is extremely successful both individually and collectively. There are times where, ‘hey, well you guys do it this way, we’re going to do it this way.’ But there are other times that they all come together and it’s not even a matter of, ‘Well, this is my zone, this is my zone.’ [Instead, it’s] ‘Hey, what do you need here? Hey, what we’re seeing here, let us know. Hey, just so you know what we’re seeing here, keep on a lookout for this in your area.’ So there is still some harmony. There is a high level of communication amongst the groups, in spite of them having their own territories that they are on individually, or their own individual sectors zones.

Success: Establishing safety with CVI team presence. All six teams attributed their success to their being physically present in communities consistently. For some teams, this involved providing security for events of all kinds, from small family parties to large sporting events. Other times, teams felt that they were able to ensure the safety of partygoers even without playing a formal security role, like at local clubs and hip hop concerts. Several teams implemented programs to ensure the safety of patrons at local businesses like gas stations and liquor stores. This is how one CVI team member explained it:

People also tell us they feel safer going here because they know we come to that area. People feel safer. So we get a lot of feedback from people about feeling better about going certain places in the city because they know that ... a lot of people are working in the community trying to stop violence.

Success: Shifting of cultural norms. Five of the six CVI teams mentioned their success in shifting their community's culture away from one that prizes violence, aggression, and staying armed. One team leader described how all his team's high-risk participants brought a gun everywhere, fearing targeted reprisal or even random violence. That same leader stated that now his participants often left their homes unarmed, and he discussed hearing the same experience from local bar and club owners. A CVI team member explained how it felt:

Now we're changing the culture and we pushing purpose, you know what I mean? We changing the narrative and it is paying attention to the city when we go out. It's like we are the celebrities. We are the mayor. And people see, they say, 'Hey, you, love what y'all doing man, great work.' This is what it all takes.

Challenge: Working in a stressful environment. A total of five respondents named staff burnout as a challenge facing the teams. CVI work does not occur on a typical, predictable schedule. Interviewed respondents from the CVI teams discussed challenges related to responding to crises in the middle of the night, in the morning, and on the weekends. Working in a high stress environment challenged the staff and this dynamic was exacerbated by the "24/7" nature of the work.

Challenge: Effecting long-term change within larger structural forces of poverty and lack of opportunity. Respondents were quick to point out just how limited they were in making the systemic changes they sought to make to truly address violence. Respondents noted that lack of resources, lack of adequate housing, and lack of access to workforce development and/or high-quality schools all limited their ability to carry out the goals of the ShotStoppers program. Respondents argued that in many cases, the residents of Detroit had the decks stacked against them, citing cyclical poverty and its root causes as key challenges. At least five respondents highlighted a lack of safe housing and safe space as a key challenge they faced in stabilizing individuals and families facing violence, including in cases of domestic violence. Similarly, five respondents highlighted the lack of mental health resources in Detroit. They cited long waitlists and / or inadequate affordable mental health resources for individuals facing distress. The contextual factors that face Detroit residents were highlighted by respondents as being key challenges to their work.

Conclusion

The preceding sections have provided a detailed explanation of the program's structure and dynamics, including its main partners and its main operational elements. It also showcased what the program partners thought were the successes and challenges of the program. In the final chapter, we identify key findings and lessons learned across all levels of the program.

5: Lessons Learned from ShotStoppers & Recommendations for Detroit's Future CVI Work

Introduction

As outlined in the previous chapters, the City of Detroit's ShotStoppers program successfully united City, police, and community resources to combat persistent gun violence. After providing an introduction to the program in Chapter 1 and its CVI teams in Chapter 2, this report analysed team activities, crime data, and public perception data to evaluate the program's impact on gun-related violent crime in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 explored program and team processes, successes, and challenges through the voices of the CVI teams and their partners at the City and DPD. In Chapter 5, we summarize the key findings from our impact and process analyses and offer key insights and recommendations.

Key Findings: Impact Evaluation

Chapter 3 began with an analysis of CVI team activities during the ShotStoppers initiative. For most teams, most of their work focused on violence interruption, including outreach and relationship building, while a smaller portion of their efforts supported wraparound services and community programming. However, data quality issues often made it difficult to determine the exact nature or location of these interventions. Consequently, this chapter outlines several recommendations to improve future tracking and reporting.

Our analysis of the impact of ShotStoppers on non-fatal shootings and homicides highlighted that all the CVI zones experienced reductions in these measures during ShotStoppers. Each CVI team earned at least one performance bonus for outpacing the CVI score percentage decrease in the non-CVI area of the city during the program. Some teams, such as Force Detroit, consistently outpaced the non-CVI area while others, such as Detroit 300 and Detroit Peoples Community, did so only once or twice. This variation in team outcomes was consistent throughout the other analyses in Chapter 3.

For most CVI target areas (as well as the city, non-CVI, and collective CVI areas), reductions in non-fatal shootings outpaced the reductions in homicides. The notable exceptions to this were Force Detroit and New Era; although their zones also experienced reductions in non-fatal shootings, they saw even more dramatic reductions in homicides when comparing the second year of the program to the year before ShotStoppers began.

All teams saw at least some improvement in at least one of their gun violence "hotspots." Several teams (e.g., Force Detroit and Detroit Friends & Family) saw decreases in most of their hotspots. Almost all teams had persistent violent crime activity in at least one hotspot in their target area, with emerging hotspots appearing in most.

Robberies and motor vehicle thefts declined during ShotStoppers, while the declines in aggravated assault (minus non-fatal shootings) and burglary reports were less notable. As with the other analyses, the size of the decline varied among the individual teams.

As measured by the Detroit Metro Area Communities Study (DMACS) surveys, residents' perceptions of crime and safety remained mostly unchanged during ShotStoppers, except those in the Force Detroit target area. These respondents reported statistically significant improvements in their perceptions of neighborhood safety. Furthermore, the CVI areas combined saw a significant decrease in the percentage of residents who reported hearing gunshots during the program's second year.

Key Findings: Process Evaluation

Chapter 4 outlined the program's core components and team-identified successes and challenges. Key drivers of success included the program's flexibility, which enabled experimentation with different approaches, and its structured design – specifically its designated zones and clear performance metrics – which provided each CVI team with a manageable focus area and a clear goal to reduce non-fatal shootings and homicides. Furthermore, robust support provided by the City, including the City CVI team, quarterly mayoral meetings, and buy-in from the Detroit Police Department, proved essential.

Beyond program-level factors, interviewees highlighted strategies that contributed to team-level successes and challenges. Effective strategies included hiring staff with lived experience with violence from the team's CVI zone, hiring specialists for specific responsibilities such as recruiting and mentoring individuals from high-risk groups, and developing cross-neighborhood partnerships to share information and build programming capacity. Alongside reductions in homicides and non-fatal shootings, teams noted two other achievements: establishing safety through CVI team presence and shifting community norms away from violence.

Along with these successes, the CVI teams identified programmatic challenges, primarily related to funding. Teams expressed concern over the long-term sustainability of CVI funding, delayed reimbursements, and limitations on emergency resource purchases. These obstacles hampered the delivery of immediate aid and limited teams' ability to engage in long-term planning.

Some team members also suggested that program design elements may have hindered effective implementation. For example, one CVI team felt the program fostered unhealthy competition and resource-guarding. Such dynamics could have undermined inter-team coordination and prevented the sharing of information and resources that are essential to collective success.

Relatedly, the distinct zone designations may have limited awareness of cross-neighborhood conflicts. Resolving these conflicts requires significant cross-neighborhood coordination, not only at the incident-response level but also at a broader information-sharing level. Although

overall information sharing increased during the program, several teams reported that they remained outside key communication loops, which hindered their effectiveness.

Lastly, teams highlighted a significant challenge to community violence work: the underlying societal dynamics that lead to community violence. A lack of resources, adequate housing, and access to workforce development and / or high-quality schools all contribute to violence and also limit the CVI teams' ability to carry out the goals of the ShotStoppers program. These external obstacles consistently threatened teams' efforts to move people from lives of poverty and violence to lives of stability and opportunity.

Key Drivers of ShotStoppers' Successes and Challenges

This section synthesizes input from the City, DPD, and CVI teams, along with evaluator insights, into the drivers of the program's successes and challenges, spanning individual to organizational-level factors. It is divided into three parts – program-wide, partner relationship, and team-level insights – showcasing lessons learned across all aspects of the program.

Program-Wide Insights

Trust and credibility are the basic building blocks for CVI success. Throughout our interviews and focus groups, trust and credibility emerged as essential components across all relationships: team leaders and their staff, teams and their communities, teams and the City, and teams and the police. ShotStoppers and similar CVI programs depend on calculated risks; cities and police must step back from traditional enforcement to empower community groups, and those community groups risk their reputations by partnering with law enforcement. Furthermore, internal success hinges on CVI team leaders granting interventionists autonomy to do their work without interference. This level of risk is only sustainable through deep, established trust among all partners.

Accordingly, the CVI teams were careful to protect the trust and credibility they had with their communities, their peers, and their partners. As in the example discussed earlier, CVI teams and DPD required careful negotiations to develop their CVI basketball league partnership. The CVI teams included the police, but the police were not the main organizers or coaches in the basketball league. Multiple teams outlined specific strategies they developed for interacting with the police. City and police officials recognized the importance of the CVI teams' credibility and sought to grant them autonomy in their interventions, as well as recognition for their successes.

Selecting the “right” people allowed the program to grow and adapt. The research interviews revealed a recurring theme: key personnel consistently attributed the success of components – whether it was an activity, a strategy, or even the entire ShotStoppers program – to having the right people involved.

In some instances, the “right” person was someone who could transform a vague idea into a fully functioning program. For example, several teams recognized the City's ShotStoppers

Program Administrator as the right person for the job. The administrator successfully turned a newly proposed program into a multimillion-dollar, multi-year grant initiative that engages multiple teams and City partnerships.

In other instances, the “right” person was more about finding the right fit for the position. The City’s ShotStoppers Program Administrator emphasized the importance of hiring the right people for the City CVI team. The administrator sought a blend of specialized skills, such as data analysis or grant management, alongside a positive attitude and sense of accomplishment in building something new. For the administrator, the focus was on fostering the right team dynamics rather than immediate performance gains, allowing for growth through effective coaching.

Likewise, City and police officials repeatedly emphasized the importance of having the “right” people and organizations leading the intervention efforts. This perspective aligns with the City’s initial decision to select teams based on their experience and expertise rather than any particular approach or intervention strategy. As one official put it, “the ones who had been doing the work won the contracts. And it’s so important that the right people got the contracts to do the work.”

This approach required significant objectivity. The City deliberately expanded its review beyond claims made in the written applications, incorporating in-person interviews with applicants and extensive reference checks. This process required the right people to conduct the review. Speaking of having a Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA) as part of the selection process, the ShotStoppers program administrator noted:

[B]y doing it this way and actually having a NOFA and sending it out, it’s also not just picking who you know. ... Like, ‘We know of you or you’ve helped us before, so here you go.’ I was like, ‘No, let’s actually put it out. Let’s make sure we get the best groups.’ And I think that was one of the best things they could have done too, as far as bringing me in, someone who has no relationship with any of these groups, to come in and really help pick our review team and really set the criteria of what we’re looking for and really interview without any background knowledge really, or especially not previous relationships.

Having the right people at every level of administration gave ShotStoppers its core strengths: flexibility, adaptability, and collaborative work within and across neighborhoods. These human elements were drivers of the program’s success.

Strong executive leadership empowers and trusts, but also holds teams accountable for violence reduction outcomes. ShotStoppers was built on a model of empowerment and accountability. The mayor’s office entrusted the City CVI team with establishing the program and ensuring its success, while also providing the City CVI team with the resources necessary for success. The City CVI team and the mayor’s office empowered teams to take the lead on their programming while also supporting that work by making connections with city departments,

cutting through “red tape,” and actively problem-solving in quarterly meetings. Several CVI team leaders made a conscious effort to empower their staff to carry out the CVI work. This empowerment, at each level, encouraged individuals to take ownership of their work and increased program capacity.

This empowerment was countered by accountability. Clearly delineated zones and clearly defined performance metrics allowed the City to hold teams accountable for outcomes. The quarterly meetings were a blend of problem-solving and holding teams to account. Teams knew that consistent underperformance could jeopardize their participation in the program. Through accountability, leadership motivated the CVI teams to course correct whenever performance lagged. These expectations prompted teams to refine their tactics and lean on the experience of high-performing groups.

Partner Relationship Insights

Support from and access to top City leadership engendered trust and commitment from the CVI teams and the wider police department. Teams acknowledged the impact of the City’s visible support. Beyond the mayor’s public cheerleading, the dedicated City CVI team offered unprecedented access to City services and agencies. CVI teams and police officials highlighted how the close-knit relationship between the CVI teams, city hall, and the police department mitigated initial skepticism and allowed teams to focus on achieving community results. The visible support from top city officials gave ShotStoppers the initial buy-in it needed to cultivate its credibility through its on-the-ground results.

The program’s flexibility encouraged the CVI teams, their City staff counterparts, and the police department to adapt their programming to neighborhood-level conditions and to experiment with new approaches and partnerships. Several core components of the program – the City’s rigorous selection process, straightforward performance metrics, and hands-off approach to operations – gave teams the freedom to experiment. For example, when recruiting high-risk individuals, several teams initially cast a wide net across schools, correctional facilities, and neighborhood connections, uncertain which source would connect them with individuals who best fit their programming. One team explained how they eventually identified the community as their best referral source through their own data analysis. If the City had been more prescriptive or burdened teams with excessive performance metrics immediately, it would have stifled experimentation in this critical period.

Likewise, the designated zones encouraged teams to develop a deeper understanding of their communities and adapt their programming accordingly. For example, in Detroit, the east side and west side have different street and gang violence dynamics. Two large, longstanding gangs with historical territorial conflicts drive street violence on the east side. In contrast, the west side has less-structured groups whose disputes arise quickly through social media or in spontaneous situations. Recognizing these dynamics allowed teams in each area to develop distinct intervention strategies suited to their neighborhoods.

The City encouraged this adaptability by embracing feedback from CVI teams during quarterly mayoral meetings and translating their feedback into meaningful programming and partnerships. These sessions served as incubators for several innovative initiatives, such as the CVI summer basketball league. In addition, team suggestions led to operational changes, including: a partnership with the City's Housing and Revitalization Department to assist with the emergency relocation of at-risk residents; direct communication channels to resolve vacant property issues and employment barriers; and streamlined access to land bank programs and small business grants for CVI participants.

Specialized roles equipped CVI teams and City CVI staff with the skills and direction to navigate complex challenges. Organizational structure among ShotStopper teams ranged widely. Some teams maintained non-hierarchical structures with fluid roles, while others established distinct roles with whole departments for communications and event planning, for instance. A key differentiator was the leader's roles. While both hands-on and delegating leaders achieved successes in ShotStoppers, teams led by those with specialized staff or empowered deputies tended to produce more consistent reductions in homicides and non-fatal shootings.

Respondents praised the use of counterpart positions between the CVI teams and the City. By requiring teams to designate staff for activity and budget reporting, the City's administrative staff created a direct line to key team members. This specialized channel bypassed leadership, minimized miscommunications, and allowed team leaders to focus on other priorities. Police officials have proposed a similar liaison role to connect teams to their police precincts. This designated point of contact would handle all police communications and ensure consistent coordination. Given the positive experiences of the CVI teams and the City with their grant and budget counterparts, implementing a dedicated police liaison is a logical next step for program efficiency.

Both close and more distant relationships between CVI teams and DPD produced positive outcomes. Relationships between CVI teams and DPD are wide-ranging. From the minimal emergency response communications of New Era and Force Detroit to the near-daily check-in communications of Detroit Friends & Family and Detroit 300, teams at both ends of the spectrum produced significant decreases in homicides and non-fatal shootings.

Formal post-incident notifications also produced positive program outcomes after initial challenges. Teams discussed frustrations with the delayed and unhelpful information following violent incidents early in the program. However, as the City standardized notification expectations, complaints dropped significantly, and team outcomes improved.

Additionally, the relationship between DPD and CVI teams strengthened over the two years, with the CVI summer basketball league serving as one of the most visible demonstrations of these collaborations.

The relationship between the CVI teams and DPD is undefined and its future is uncertain. While CVI team leaders maintain strong relationships with precinct commanders, these

connections rarely extend to front-line CVI team members and patrol officers. Similarly, while almost all of the police officials interviewed had a relationship with at least one CVI team, they characterized these relationships as personal rather than institutional.

As the program evolves, maintaining this leader-centric approach may not be sufficient to sustain and deepen relationships. As violent incidents decrease, the need for reactive post-incident response declines, reducing opportunities for connection. However, this shift provides an opportunity for teams and precincts to transition toward proactive conflict resolution. Achieving this deeper level of cooperation will likely require systematic integration between on-the-ground team members and local precinct officers.

An unresolved challenge involves the role of CVI members in criminal investigations. Police officials recognize that a team's social capital and reputation are essential for engaging high-risk individuals and groups. They expressed concern that if a CVI team has critical information for the arrest and prosecution of a suspect, legal requirements – such as being forced to testify at a trial – could damage the team's reputation or jeopardize the program's standing in the community.

Team-level Insights

Pairing short-term interventions with longer-term supports may have led to the best results. The teams that engaged in short-term conflict mediation had positive results in the program. For these teams, violence intervention involved connecting high-risk individuals, diffusing conflict, and nurturing ongoing relationships. Teams that invested in long-term mentorship programs alongside short-term conflict-resolution efforts had even greater success. The highest-performing teams went beyond stopping the next shooting; they enrolled high-risk individuals in programs that provided life skills, job training, and material resource assistance. A prime example is high-performing Force Detroit, which offered extensive programming and financial support, not just to participants but also to their wider social circles. This holistic strategy supports ShotStoppers' dual mission: addressing gun violence today while building a foundation to reduce gun violence tomorrow.

Teams are increasingly committed to bringing resources directly to the community.

Teams have expanded their focus on bringing direct resources into the community. In the first year, most teams emphasized short-term, immediate interventions consistent with their violence interruption strategy. Teams taking a community organizing approach focused on reclaiming high-risk spaces through block parties and neighborhood cleanups. In contrast, teams focused on disrupting shooter networks concentrated on identifying high-risk individuals and providing conflict mediation and emergency support. By the second year, efforts transitioned toward more sustained resource provision. Teams organized events offering health services, including dental care, and partnered with the City's workforce program, Detroit at Work, to connect participants to job opportunities.

Several teams also established mobile resource units to deliver services more quickly and flexibly. For example, Force Detroit converted a mobile home into a unit providing food, mental

health support, and trauma-informed care following violent incidents. Notably, New Era already implemented a similar model before the ShotStoppers program began. Police officers recognized the significance of this shift, with multiple DPD officials identifying long-term resource provision as a key strength of the program.

The most successful teams hired full-time violence intervention staff. Teams that invested in dedicated full-time staff achieved greater success than those that relied on part-time, volunteer-based models. Force Detroit, a consistent high performer, had the most developed full-time intervention team. Teams that initially struggled had successful quarters after shifting their focus and expanding their hiring practices.

Conversely, the teams lacking centralized, full-time staff were less successful. For example, Detroit 300 relied on a volunteer-led radio patrol as its primary violence reduction effort. While these volunteers displayed long-term commitment, they reported limited capacity to intervene in actual violence or mental health crises compared to specialized, full-time teams. Similarly, the Wayne Metro coalition never fully implemented its program and ultimately lost its funding due to coordination failures between its violence intervention subcontractor and its fiduciary. These examples suggest that full-time teams have greater capacity to build the knowledge and relationships necessary for success, while new or fragmented partnerships may struggle to implement programs.

The New Era exception to these insights: New Era implemented a model that diverged from many of the above “best practices” yet effectively reduced violence in its zone. Rather than implementing standard direct violence interventions or hiring local mentors with experience in street violence, New Era volunteers continued their longstanding commitment to offering opportunities and resources to the broader community. They reclaimed spaces associated with violence and disorder through their mobile Hood2Hood block parties, organized resource fairs, and delivered resources directly to their residents. New Era built a reputation for independence and advocacy, leveraging its role as a “mudroots” community organization to advocate for a cultural shift towards respect and community.

Most teams had limited success in broader community engagement and buy-in. The DMACS survey results suggest CVI efforts have yet to significantly impact broader community perceptions of violence, cultural norms, or program awareness among the CVI zone residents, except in the Force Detroit area. It is not surprising, given the scale of the issues around community violence and the relatively small sizes of the CVI teams, that community perceptions tend to lag on-the-ground changes. All teams increased their broader community engagement efforts in the program's second year. Still, additional outreach may be necessary to bridge the gap between operational success and public perception.

Teams had limited capacity to address other types of violence. The City held teams responsible for all homicides and non-fatal shootings that occurred within their designated zone, regardless of underlying causes or individuals involved. Given their backgrounds and programs, the CVI teams possess the skills to handle conflicts among gangs and other high-risk groups. However, they are not well-equipped to address homicides and non-fatal shootings linked to

domestic or intimate partner violence; the teams lack training in recognizing warning signs or intervening in suspected domestic violence incidents. Additionally, sharing information about domestic violence incidents among the program partners is hindered by confidentiality concerns, contrasting with protocols for other types of violence. At a quarterly meeting, the mayor recommended that CVI teams avoid focusing on domestic violence, which highlights this coordination gap.

CVI teams have expressed concerns about their limited ability to assist individuals in mental health crises. In response, several teams and the City sought to establish relationships with local mental health organizations, such as the Detroit Wayne Integrated Health Network. Expanding these partnerships is crucial for enhancing the program's effectiveness. Further recommendations are provided later in this chapter.

Limited success in working within the school system. The CVI teams, except for Detroit Peoples Community, faced hurdles in establishing school-based programs because of the Detroit Public Schools Community District's strict background-check requirements, which limit the program's reach among school-age youth, as many CVI team members have criminal records.

Recommendations for Detroit's Future CVI Efforts

While ShotStoppers has proven effective in reducing homicides and non-fatal shootings, its long-term momentum faces several critical hurdles. To secure the program's sustainability and maximize its ongoing impact, the evaluation team developed the following strategic recommendations.

Foster innovation while enforcing core program standards. ShotStoppers' flexibility fueled success by fostering innovation and a strong collaborative spirit. However, this flexibility also led to inconsistent performance and a blurred public identity. To mature, the program should bridge the gap between team autonomy and operational rigor. Standardizing administrative reporting to address issues such as the high volume of uncategorized "Other" activities seen with New Era would improve data integrity and enable stronger evaluation of the program. Furthermore, CVI teams requested uniform training guides and clear program standards to ensure high-quality, consistent performance across the entire ShotStoppers program. Police officials proposed creating dedicated law enforcement liaisons to improve communication between the teams and DPD. These changes will strengthen the program structure without stifling the local adaptability that drove early success.

Broaden community engagement to encourage sustainable support for CVI. During the first two years of the program, most CVI teams prioritized identifying and intervening with high-risk individuals and places driving community violence, work that often happens outside public view. The DMACS survey found little improvement in community awareness of these programs, even in zones of concentrated CVI activity. Increased community awareness is crucial for three reasons: it clarifies that CVI teams are reducing violence in partnership with

authorities rather than causing disorder; community connection strengthens the work; and broad community support may be necessary to sustain funding as funding streams change.

Refine performance measures to adjust for success. CVI teams that successfully drive non-fatal shootings and homicides down to single digits face a unique challenge; they are becoming "victims of their own success." Because CVI scores are now so low, minor fluctuations appear as massive percentage increases. For example, a slight rise from four to six incidents per quarter represents a 50% increase, even though the team maintains a very safe, low-crime environment. Relying solely on percentage changes punishes high-performing teams for their previous success and makes them ineligible for incentives. To ensure continued program efficacy, it is crucial to refine performance metrics and develop new incentive structures that reward sustained low crime rates rather than just steep initial declines.

Empower teams to address other drivers of homicides and non-fatal shootings. CVI teams specialize in mediating street and group violence, yet the City measures their performance by the total reduction of homicides and non-fatal shootings in their zones. This creates a challenge because incidents outside their primary scope — such as domestic violence and mental health crises — still directly influence their scores. The teams have limited capacity to tackle these complex issues and have faced challenges obtaining necessary training, skills, and resources.

To empower the teams, the City could connect the CVI teams with domestic violence advocates and mental health care professionals to provide resources during crises. Alternatively, the City could invest in training, expert consultants, and funding for the teams to deliver these services independently.

Encourage more cooperation and coordination among the CVI teams. Multiple CVI teams expressed a desire to meet more regularly with the other CVI teams to discuss their caseloads and coordinate services. Important decisions get made and implemented during the quarterly meetings; increasing their frequency could improve problem-solving, streamline new initiatives, and increase opportunities for "cross-neighborhood" work. Several respondents suggested greater data sharing and analysis, both between CVI teams and between DPD and CVI teams, to facilitate better collaboration.


Institutionalize CVI within the City government. Despite the program's accomplishments, its reliance on temporary funding has created challenges, leading some teams to curtail programming due to fiscal uncertainty. Limited public awareness may have restricted access to schools and mental health networks. Most significantly, the program's relationship with DPD remains fragile, highlighting the need for deeper institutional integration.

While City CVI staff and the mayor's office have been essential in streamlining approvals, team leaders have requested greater transparency about how team feedback is addressed. Making CVI a permanent program would increase awareness of the program both inside and outside of the city government and allow the City to develop more robust systems and provide more consistent funding.

Address staff burnout to ensure program sustainability. As discussed in Chapter 4, CVI staff noted that a key challenge facing their teams is burnout. Full-time staff highlighted that the work is not only emotionally draining and exhausting but also requires being on call 24/7. While this is a challenge for individual CVI teams, it could also affect the program as a whole. If critical team members, especially team leaders, are burned out and no one covers for them, their team, if not the entire program, may suffer. Finding ways to build team leadership capacity and equip team members with skills to cope with and recover from work may prove beneficial not just for the teams but for the program as a whole.

Appendix A: Neighborhood Demographic and Socioeconomic Profiles

City of Detroit and ShotStopper Neighborhoods



In 2023, the City of Detroit created the ShotStoppers community violence intervention grant program to encourage direct community involvement in tackling gun violence. The City identified areas of the city with high levels of gun violence and had organizations apply to develop and implement novel community violence intervention strategies in the identified areas.

Along with sharing high levels of gun violence, the six selected areas had similar, though not identical, population levels and geographic sizes. These neighborhood profiles highlight both the similarities and differences between the CVI zones collectively and the rest of the city, as well as between the individual CVI zones.

The profiles use the most recent American Community Survey census data (5-year 2019-2023 estimates) to describe the neighborhoods across a range of topics, including housing, age, race/ethnicity, marital status, education, labor force/employment, and poverty. We were able to provide statistics at the neighborhood level by synthesizing census block-level data. When CVI zone boundaries did not line up perfectly with the census blocks, we adjusted our calculations to include partial census blocks as closely as possible.

Differences Between CVI vs. Non-CVI Areas

For most of the categories, there were only slight differences between the CVI and non-CVI areas of the city. The significant differences are highlighted below:

- Household composition: The CVI areas have more single parent-headed family households, especially female-headed family households (32% vs. 24%), and fewer married-couple and non-family households (e.g., a person living alone) than the non-CVI areas of the city.
- Race/Ethnicity: The CVI areas as a whole have a higher percentage of Black or African American residents (89% vs. 73%), lower percentage of White residents (6% vs. 14%), and lower percentage of Hispanic or Latino residents (2% vs. 10%) than the non-CVI areas of the city.
- Education: CVI and non-CVI areas have similar percentages of residents who attended college with or without earning a degree (47% vs. 51%), and a lower percentage of CVI area residents completed their degree than non-CVI areas (16% vs 30%).
- Poverty: The CVI areas have a higher percentage of those living below 200% of the federal poverty line than the non-CVI areas of the city (61% vs. 54%) and a correspondingly lower percentage of those living at or above 200% of the federal poverty line (39% vs. 46%).

Differences Between the Individual CVI Areas

Each individual CVI neighborhood profile includes a general assessment of how the area ranks in regards to demographic and socioeconomic measures. Below are the most notable variations among the CVI areas, relative to the city as a whole:

- Population: Population levels vary by about 8,000 within the CVI areas. New Era Community Connection and Detroit Friends & Family are on the low end, serving about 22,000 residents. Detroit 300 and the Wayne Metro/Denby Neighborhood Alliance/Camp Restore coalition (the Wayne Metro coalition) are in the middle, serving 25,000 to 27,000 residents, while Force Detroit and Detroit Peoples Community have the areas with the highest populations of 28,000 and 30,000, respectively.
- Housing: The two east side areas — Detroit Friends & Family and the Wayne Metro coalition — have higher vacancy rates and lower median housing values than the other areas (except for Force Detroit, which has the lowest median housing value). Additionally, the Wayne Metro coalition's area also has a very low homeownership rate.
- Median household income: The Force Detroit area has a lower median household income (at \$31,000) than the other CVI areas and the city as a whole, which range between approximately \$36,000-\$40,000.
- Age: Most CVI teams center their adult programming on two age groups: 18-24 year olds and 25-34 year olds. Among the CVI areas, the Wayne Metro coalition's area stands out

for its high proportions for both groups: 10% of its residents are 18-24 years old and 21% of its residents are 25-34 years old for a combined proportion of 31%. This is well above all of the other CVI areas and the citywide average of 25% (9% of residents are 18-24 year olds and 16% of residents are 25-34 year olds).

- **Race/Ethnicity:** The percentage of the population that identified as Black or African American was much higher in 5 of the 6 CVI neighborhoods (93-95%) than it was citywide and in non-CVI areas (77% and 73%, respectively) with Force Detroit being the lone exception. The Force Detroit area looks much more like the rest of the city than the other CVI areas, with almost 20% of its population identifying as White, 8% as multi-racial, and 70% as Black or African American. Additionally 8% of the Force Detroit population identify as Hispanic or Latino, similar to the city as a whole but significantly more than the other CVI areas.
- **Educational attainment:** All six CVI areas have college graduation rates substantially below the city average of 27%, with the Detroit Friends & Family area particularly low at 11%.
- **High school dropout rate:** The Detroit Peoples Community, Force Detroit, and Detroit 300 areas have high school dropout rates of 14%, 12%, and 11%, respectively, which are significantly higher than the city rate of 7%.
- **Labor force participation rate:** The Wayne Metro coalition's area has a higher labor force participation rate (61%) than the city as a whole (55%). Labor force participation rate refers to the rate of those over 16 years of age who are employed or looking for employment.
- **Unemployment rate:** Detroit 300 (19%), New Era Community Connection (19%), and Detroit Friends & Family (18%) have higher unemployment rates than the city as a whole (14%). Unemployment rate refers to the percentage of those in the labor force who are not employed.
- **Poverty rate:** A larger proportion of people in CVI neighborhoods fall below the poverty line (34%) compared to non-CVI areas as well as the citywide rate (31% for both). Among the CVI neighborhoods, Detroit 300 and New Era Community Connection have the lowest poverty rates at 29% and Force Detroit has the highest at 42%.

The tables below show housing characteristics, household make-up, age, race/ethnicity, marital status, educational attainment, high school dropout rate, labor force participation, income, and poverty rate for residents in each of the six CVI team areas as well the CVI areas as a whole, compared to non-CVI areas, and the city as a whole.

In the tables, the following acronyms are used to identify the teams: D300 (Detroit 300), DFF (Detroit Friends & Family), DPC (Detroit Peoples Community), FD (Force Detroit), NE (New Era), and WMC (Wayne Metro coalition). Green filled boxes indicate percentages higher than citywide percentage; yellow filled indicate percentages below the citywide percentage, and light blue are equal to the citywide percentage.

Housing Units

	City	Non-CVI	CVI	D300	DFF	DPC	FD	NE	WMC
Housing Units	326,065	252,354	73,711	13,216	11,479	12,951	12,735	10,366	12,963
Occupied	78%	77%	80%	81%	73%	86%	83%	80%	73%
Vacant	22%	23%	20%	19%	27%	14%	17%	20%	27%
Owner Occupied	50%	49%	52%	54%	49%	55%	50%	59%	43%
Renter Occupied	50%	51%	48%	46%	51%	45%	50%	41%	57%

*Green filled boxes = higher than citywide percentage; yellow = below the citywide percentage; light blue = equal to citywide percentage

Median Housing Value (for All Owner-Occupied Housing Units)

	City	D300	DFF	DPC	FD	NE	WMC
Median Value	\$76,800	\$80,877	\$55,826	\$77,874	\$55,073	\$67,821	\$55,499

Households

	City	Non-CVI	CVI	D300	DFF	DPC	FD	NE	WMC
Households	253,207	194,550	58,657	10,768	8,350	11,145	10,627	8,276	9,491
Married-Couple (Family)	19%	20%	17%	19%	19%	18%	19%	15%	14%
Male Householder, No Wife Present (Family)	7%	7%	8%	7%	9%	8%	6%	6%	9%
Female Householder, No Husband Present (Family)	26%	24%	32%	27%	35%	34%	31%	35%	31%
Male Householder (Non-family)	24%	25%	21%	24%	22%	18%	22%	18%	24%
Female Householder (Non-family)	24%	25%	22%	23%	15%	22%	22%	25%	22%

Age

	City	Non-CVI	CVI	D300	DFF	DPC	FD	NE	WMC
Total Population	636,644	481,970	154,674	26,729	23,600	29,611	28,339	21,421	24,974
Age 17 & Under	25%	24%	28%	25%	29%	26%	30%	27%	28%
18 to 24 Years	9%	9%	9%	8%	9%	9%	11%	6%	10%
25 to 34 Years	16%	16%	16%	16%	17%	13%	14%	14%	21%
35 to 64 Years	35%	36%	34%	36%	33%	36%	34%	35%	33%
Age 65 & Up	15%	15%	14%	16%	12%	17%	11%	18%	8%

Race/Ethnicity

	City	Non-CVI	CVI	D300	DFF	DPC	FD	NE	WMC
Total Population	636,644	481,970	154,674	26,729	23,600	29,611	28,339	21,421	24,974
White Alone	12%	14%	6%	2%	3%	4%	19%	2%	3%
Black or African American Alone	77%	73%	89%	94%	95%	93%	70%	95%	93%
Two or More Races	5%	5%	4%	4%	2%	2%	8%	2%	2%
Other*	7%	8%	1%	0%	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%
Not Hispanic or Latino	92%	90%	98%	99%	99%	98%	92%	98%	99%
Hispanic or Latino	8%	10%	2%	1%	1%	2%	8%	2%	1%

*Other category includes American Indian and Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islands, and Some Other Race

Marital Status

	City	Non-CVI	CVI	D300	DFF	DPC	FD	NE	WMC
Population 15 Years and Over	503,237	385,090	118,147	21,046	17,448	23,216	20,918	16,441	19,078
Never Married	57%	56%	59%	58%	61%	57%	57%	55%	66%
Now Married (Not Including Separated)	22%	23%	20%	21%	22%	19%	22%	17%	18%
Separated	3%	3%	3%	2%	3%	3%	3%	6%	3%
Widowed	6%	6%	6%	7%	5%	7%	4%	8%	5%
Divorced	12%	12%	12%	11%	9%	13%	13%	14%	8%

Education

	City	Non-CVI	CVI	D300	DFF	DPC	FD	NE	WMC
Population 25 Years and Over	419,121	320,738	98,383	18,018	14,554	19,336	16,621	14,376	15,478
Less than High School	17%	17%	17%	14%	20%	14%	23%	13%	15%
High School Graduate (Includes Equivalency) but No College	33%	32%	36%	37%	40%	38%	34%	32%	37%
Some College (No Bachelors Degree)	23%	21%	31%	28%	29%	31%	28%	38%	35%
Bachelor's Degree or More	27%	30%	16%	20%	11%	16%	15%	17%	14%

Dropout Rate

	City	Non-CVI	CVI	D300	DFF	DPC	FD	NE	WMC
Population 16 to 19 Years	33,658	25,562	8,096	1,371	1,023	1,787	1,469	743	1,703
High School Graduate, or Enrolled (In School)	93%	93%	90%	89%	94%	86%	88%	92%	95%
Not High School Graduate, Not Enrolled (Dropped Out)	7%	7%	10%	11%	6%	14%	12%	8%	5%

Labor Force/Employment

	City	Non-CVI	CVI	D300	DFF	DPC	FD	NE	WM/DA
Population 16 Years and Over	494,408	378,254	116,154	20,588	17,218	22,845	20,562	16,130	18,811
Not in Labor Force	45%	45%	46%	45%	47%	49%	44%	50%	39%
In Labor Force	55%	55%	54%	55%	53%	51%	56%	50%	61%
Employed	86%	86%	84%	81%	82%	86%	87%	81%	85%
Unemployed	14%	14%	16%	19%	18%	14%	13%	19%	15%

Median Household Income

	City	D300	DFF	DPC	FD	NE	WMC
Median Household Income	\$39,575	\$37,732	\$37,874	\$38,175	\$31,388	\$36,533	\$39,712



Poverty

	City	Non-CVI	CVI	D300	DFF	DPC	FD	NE	WMC
Population for Whom Poverty Status Is Determined	626,667	473,115	153,552	26,537	23,542	29,401	28,292	21,205	24,575
Ratio of Income to Poverty Level:									
Under .50 (Deep Poverty)	15%	15%	17%	15%	19%	15%	21%	18%	16%
Between .5 - 1.00 (Doing Poorly)	16%	16%	17%	14%	16%	20%	21%	11%	20%
Between 1.00 - 1.99 (Poor or Struggling)	24%	23%	26%	27%	30%	19%	29%	27%	24%
2.00 and Over (Doing Okay)	44%	46%	39%	43%	35%	45%	30%	43%	40%

Detroit 300 Neighborhood

Boundaries: Puritan (N), Hubbell (E), West Chicago (S), and Southfield (W)


Area: 4.4 square miles



Detroit Friends & Family Neighborhood

Boundaries: Houston Whittier / Whittier / Lakepointe / Morang / Kelly (N), Moross (E), I-94/Harper (S), and Conner/Gratiot (W)


Area: 3.8 square miles



Detroit Peoples Community Neighborhood

Boundaries: 8 Mile (N), Hubbell (E), Curtis (S), and Burt/Pierson (W)


Area: 4.4 square miles



Force Detroit Neighborhood

Boundaries: West Chicago/Plymouth (N), Southfield Freeway (E), Tireman / West Warren / Paul / Kirkwood / Ford (S), and Burt / Trinity / Pierson / Heyden / Evergreen (W)



Area: 4.0 square miles



New Era Community Connection Neighborhood

Boundaries: Curtis (N), Wyoming (E), Schoolcraft (S), and Hubbell (W)


Area: 3.7 square miles



Wayne Metro/Denby Neighborhood Alliance/Camp Restore Neighborhood

Boundaries: 8 Mile/Morang (N), Kelly / Lakepointe (E), Houston Whittier / Whittier (S), and Goulburn (W)

Area: 4.6 square miles



Appendix B: Qualitative Data Collection

CVI Team Leader Interview Guide and Protocol

Initial Interview Guide

Primary Objectives

- Fill in knowledge gaps on organizational information, e.g., mission, day-to-day operations, relevant history
- Cultivate comparable insights across the six organizations
- Allow for flexibility in responses
- Focus on increasing understanding of program administration, implementation, and funding

Introduction

- “Thank you for taking the time to speak with us today.”
- **Brief description** of the ShotStoppers program (if necessary) and our role evaluating it.
 - Example language: We are conducting an evaluation of the community violence intervention programs funded by the City of Detroit to better understand their operations, impact, and potential for future funding and expansion.
 - Who we are: Poverty Solutions is a research initiative at the University of Michigan focused on the mitigation of and alleviation of poverty.
- **What to expect:** Tell the interviewee what to expect during the interview:
 - Scheduled for 60 minutes but may be longer or shorter
 - We want to hear about your experiences with the ShotStopper Program — both successes and challenges — so that we can build a fuller understanding of how this program functions in practice. Additionally, we would like to hear more about how your particular organization approaches community violence interventions. With this information, our hope is to develop a shared knowledge that will lay the groundwork for future successful community violence intervention initiatives.
 - CVI Team Leader - 1st Interview: we plan on discussing your organization’s background, approach to CVI, particular strategies and partnerships, impact, and ongoing challenges.
- **Discomforts and Benefits:** Your participation should cause no more discomfort than you would experience in your everyday life. Although participation may not benefit you directly, the stories you share will help us gain a better understanding of the strategies employed by different community-based organizations to reduce gun violence in the city of Detroit.
- **No obligation:** You have no obligation to participate and you can stop your involvement at any time.
- **Confidentiality:** it is important to note that this conversation is confidential. We will not share the interview recording or transcription with anyone outside of our Poverty

Solutions team, and this includes the City CVI team or any other partner in this project. We will anonymize your responses as part of any report.

- CVI Team Leader: for example, we will likely refer to you as “a leader of one of the CVI teams” or “a staff member of team XX” depending on the context.
- If we do see a need to identify you with a quote, we will ask for your permission prior to using it and you have the right to refuse permission.
- The recordings will be transcribed by a qualified transcription service. Only the research team and the transcription service will have access to the original recordings which will be stored on a secured computer in a locked office and building.
- **Consent to record:** ask for the participant’s consent to record the Zoom meeting.
 - Mention to the participant that we will be using the recordings to ensure correct responses are recorded and reassure them about the confidentiality of their answers and the recording.
 - Remind them that they are allowed to stop the interview or the recording at any time.
- **Start recording** (if permission is provided)
- **Any questions?:** Ask the participant if they have any questions before proceeding with the interview.

Background, Organizational Context & Leadership

- What is your name and age?
- What is your official title in your organization?
 - How long have you been in this position?
- What is the structure of your organization (e.g., staffing)?
 - How many professional staff? How many volunteers?
 - What sort of specialized training?
- What has led to your involvement in the community violence intervention space?
 - Note: looking for both prior experience within the CVI space and beyond, including experiences with incarceration, education, etc.

Organizational History and Philosophy

- How long has your organization been involved in community violence intervention work?
 - How long have you been involved?
- Describe your organization’s mission and your philosophy/approach to community violence intervention.
 - How was this strategy selected, and how has it evolved over time?
 - Target Intervention Population
 - Who do you see as the main target population(s) for your interventions?
 - Note: look for profile of potential participants, for example
 - Why are you focusing on these target populations in particular?
 - Possible prompt: What do you see as the main causes of violence in your community?

- Larger Community Approach: Outside of this target population, are there any other groups that you see as key populations your program serves? If so, how do you engage with them?

Intervention Strategy & Implementation

- Where do your interventions take place (e.g., schools, community centers, streets, online)?
- What does the day-to-day operation of your program look like in practice?
 - I.e., how do you spend most of your time managing the program? In face-to-face or phone meetings? Interacting mostly with your team or with community partners? In an office or out in the community? Reacting to instances of violence or planning for future programming?
 - How has that changed over time?
- Have you made any changes based on community feedback or observed outcomes? If so, describe those changes.

Partnerships

- What is your relationship with:
 - The City administration
 - Detroit Police Department
 - The other CVI teams
- Have those relationships changed since the start of the program? If so, how?
- What have those changes meant for your programming?
 - Note: increased professionalization, etc.
- Besides the City and DPD, what are the key partnerships that support your interventions, and how do they contribute to the work?
 - E.g., like providing funding or offering admin guidance
 - Note: get a sense of how partnership flows

Funding

- What was the organization's previous funding structure before the ShotStoppers program?
- How has the funding changed under the ShotStoppers program?
- What if any differences have resulted from the change in funding?
 - Has it led to the expansion of already-existing programs?
 - Has it allowed you to develop new programs?
- What if any challenges has the current amount and type of funding brought?
 - Note: looking for things like spending limitations or delays

Perceptions of Impact

- In your experience so far, what do you see as some of the most valuable components of the ShotStoppers program? (e.g., direct access to the City Administration, established go-between with DPD, funding, availability of data)
- Have there been any unexpected outcomes — positive or negative — from your intervention?

Challenges & Barriers

- What are the biggest challenges your organization has faced in implementing this intervention?
- Have there been any unforeseen challenges? If so, what have they been?
- Have you encountered resistance from community members or other stakeholders?
- How has your organization addressed these challenges?

Optional for 1st Interview: Comparative Insights & Lessons Learned

- From what you know about other community violence intervention models, how does your approach compare?
- Are there any strategies from other organizations that you have incorporated into your programs?
- Are there any strategies from other organizations that could enhance your work?
- Are there aspects of your intervention that should be adopted in other areas?

End of interview

Thank the interviewee for their time and willingness. Remind them that we would like to do a follow-up interview with them later in the year. If they have any questions in the meantime, [contact]

Follow-Up Interview

Comparative Insights & Lessons Learned

- From what you know about other community violence intervention models, how does your approach compare?
- Are there any strategies from other organizations that you have incorporated into your programs?
- Are there any strategies from other organizations that you think could enhance your work?
- Are there aspects of your intervention that you believe should be adopted in other areas?

Sustainability & Future Considerations

- What aspects of your program do you believe are most sustainable in the long term?
- If additional funding or resources were available, what improvements would you prioritize?
- What advice would you give to policymakers or funders considering expanding community violence interventions?
- Is there anything else you think is important for us to understand about your work?

Funding

- What was the organization's previous funding structure before the ShotStoppers program?
- How has the funding changed under the ShotStoppers program?
- What if any differences have resulted from the change in funding?
 - Has it led to the expansion of already-existing programs?
 - Has it allowed you to develop new programs?
- What if any challenges has the current amount and type of funding brought?
 - Note: looking for things like spending limitations or delays

What are we missing from our analysis?

CVI Team Staff Focus Group Guide and Protocol

Introduction

- "Thank you for taking the time to speak with us today."
- **Brief description** of the ShotStoppers program (if necessary) and our role evaluating it.
 - Example language: We are conducting an evaluation of the community violence intervention programs funded by the City of Detroit to better understand their operations, impact, and potential for future funding and expansion.
 - Who we are: Poverty Solutions is a research initiative at the University of Michigan focused on the mitigation of and alleviation of poverty.
- **What to expect:** Tell the focus group what to expect during the session:
 - Scheduled for 60 minutes but may be longer or shorter
 - We want to hear about your experiences with the ShotStopper Program — both successes and challenges — so that we can build a fuller understanding of how this program functions in practice. Additionally, we would like to hear more about how your particular organization approaches community violence interventions. With this information, our hope is to develop a shared knowledge that will lay the groundwork for future successful community violence intervention initiatives.
- **Discomforts and Benefits:** Your participation should cause no more discomfort than you would experience in your everyday life. Although participation may not benefit you directly, the stories you share will help us gain a better understanding of the strategies

employed by different community-based organizations to reduce gun violence in the city of Detroit.

- **No obligation:** You have no obligation to participate and you can stop your involvement at any time.
- **Confidentiality:** it is important to note that this conversation is confidential. We will not share the interview recording or transcription with anyone outside of our Poverty Solutions team at the University of Michigan. We will not share this conversation with the CVI team, your team leader, or any other partner involved in this project. We will anonymize your responses as part of any report.
 - CVI Team staff member: for example, we will likely refer to you as “a staff member of one of the CVI teams” or “a staff member of team XX” depending on the context.
 - The recordings will be transcribed by a qualified transcription service. Only the research team and the transcription service will have access to the original recordings which will be stored on a secured computer in a locked office and building.
- **Consent to record:** ask for the participant’s consent to record.
 - Mention to the participant that we will be using the recordings to ensure correct responses are recorded and reassure them about the confidentiality of their answers and the recording.
 - Remind them that they are allowed to stop the interview or the recording at any time.
- **Start recording** (if permission is provided)
- **Any questions?:** Ask the participant if they have any questions before proceeding with the interview.

Background and job descriptions

For each participant:

- What is your job at the organization?
 - How long have you been in this position?
 - How long have you been at the organization?
 - Part-time or full-time?
- What led you to your involvement in the community violence intervention space?
 - Note: looking for both prior experience within the CVI space and beyond, including experiences with incarceration, education, etc.

Organizational approach and role

- What do you see as your organization’s mission and approach to community violence intervention?
- Who do you see as the main target population(s) for your interventions?
 - Note: look for profile of potential participants, for example

Day-to-day roles and community interactions

Note: Make sure to be inclusive and solicit responses from everyone

- How do you spend your day working for the organization? Do you have specific tasks you are expected to complete? Is there a regular pattern, or does it vary widely?
- We know your organization has a range of programming and engages with a variety of participants. Is there a particular piece of the programming you focus on? If so, what programming do you do?
- For those who work directly with participants:
 - What sort of people participate in your programming/outreach?(focus on allowing interviewees to describe as they see fit)
 - Prompt only if needed: high school students, young adults, employed/unemployed, criminal justice system involvement, etc.
 - How do you connect with them?
 - Prompt only if needed: face-to-face or phone meetings? Planned or more casual and informal interactions? Interacting mostly as a team or on your own? In an office or out in the community?
 - Has it changed over time? If so, how?
- For those who do not regularly work with participants:
 - Is your work internal to the organization? Or directed toward community partners? Something else?
 - What type of partners do you interact with?
 - Prompt if needed: other outreach orgs, resource non-profits, police, schools, etc.
 - Does your group rely on a formal network of organizations and/or individuals?
- How do you see your role fitting into that larger organizational approach?
- Has that role changed a lot over time? If so, how?

Training

- What kind of training have you participated in? I.e., conflict resolution, mental health intervention, safety, etc.
- Have you found any training helpful or useful in particular? If so, how?
- Have you had opportunities to request trainings that you think will be helpful or important?
- Are there training opportunities you would recommend?

Resources

- Have any of you been directly involved in providing resources to community members, like connections to housing assistance, job training, educational opportunities, emergency services, etc.?
- For those who have, where and how did you learn about these resources?

- Are there examples where these resources have proven particularly helpful? Tell us about those examples.
- When you need additional resources, do you feel your organization's leadership is engaged in helping find the right ones to fit the needs?

Challenges & Barriers

- What are some of the biggest challenges that come to mind when you think about your work in the organization?
- How about challenges in interacting with at-risk individuals or groups?
 - Prompts: identifying needs, connecting to resources, disciplinary/authority issues
- How about organizational challenges, both within the organization and beyond?
 - Prompts: financial/reimbursements, admin, logistics/transportation, etc.
- Have you felt constrained or limited in your work, either by your organization or other partners (the City, the police, etc.)?
- How has your organization addressed these challenges?

Successes

- What do you see as success for your organization?
- What parts of your program have seemed to have the most impact?
 - Why do you think those things have proved so successful?
- What are some examples of successful interventions you have participated in?
- Apart from reducing crime and improving neighborhood safety, what other things do you hope your group is able to achieve?

Changes since ShotStoppers

- Has the ShotStoppers program changed what you do or what you're able to do? If so, how?
- Has your relationship with the city or police department changed since ShotStoppers started? If so, how?

Suggestions & Recommendations

- What suggestions do you have for making your organization more effective?
 - Prompt: these could be at any level, i.e., organizational, city, police, etc.
- What suggestions do you have for making the larger ShotStoppers program more effective?
- We currently collect data a couple of different ways: public safety data from the City and DPD, organizational information from interviews and focus groups like this, public perception through a citywide survey and resident focus groups. Do you think there are better ways to capture your organization's efforts for our evaluation work?

End of interview

- Thank the group for their time and willingness. If they have any questions in the meantime, tell them to contact [X].

City CVI Team Leader Interview Guide and Protocol

Introduction

- “Thank you for taking the time to speak with us today.”
- **Brief description** of the ShotStoppers program (if necessary) and our role evaluating it.
 - Example language: We are conducting an evaluation of the community violence intervention programs funded by the City of Detroit to better understand their operations, impact, and potential for future funding and expansion.
 - Who we are: Poverty Solutions is a research initiative at the University of Michigan focused on the mitigation of and alleviation of poverty.
- **What to expect:** Tell the interviewee what to expect during the interview:
 - Scheduled for 60 minutes but may be longer or shorter
 - We want to hear about your experiences with the ShotStopper Program — both successes and challenges — so that we can build a fuller understanding of how this program functions in practice. With this information, our hope is to develop a shared knowledge that will lay the groundwork for future successful community violence intervention initiatives.
 - City CVI Team Leader - 1st Interview: we plan on discussing your background and the background of the City program, particular strategies and partnerships, impact, and ongoing challenges.
- **Discomforts and Benefits:** Your participation should cause no more discomfort than you would experience in your everyday life. Although participation may not benefit you directly, the stories you share will help us gain a better understanding of the strategies to reduce gun violence in the city of Detroit.
- **No obligation:** You have no obligation to participate and you can stop your involvement at any time.
- **Confidentiality:** it is important to note that this conversation is confidential. We will not share the interview recording or transcription with anyone outside of our Poverty Solutions team, and this includes the City CVI team or any other partner in this project. We will anonymize your responses as part of any report.
 - CVI Team Leader: for example, we will likely refer to you as “a leader of one of the CVI teams” or “a staff member of team XX” depending on the context.
 - If we do see a need to identify you with a quote, we will ask for your permission prior to using it and you have the right to refuse permission.
 - The recordings will be transcribed by a qualified transcription service. Only the research team and the transcription service will have access to the original

recordings which will be stored on a secured computer in a locked office and building.

- **Consent to record:** ask for the participant's consent to record the Zoom meeting.
 - Mention to the participant that we will be using the recordings to ensure correct responses are recorded and reassure them about the confidentiality of their answers and the recording.
 - Remind them that they are allowed to stop the interview or the recording at any time.
- **Start recording** (if permission is provided)
- **Any questions?:** Ask the participant if they have any questions before proceeding with the interview.

Background, Organizational Context & Leadership

- What is your official title and how long have you been in this position?
- What has led to your involvement in the community violence intervention space?
 - Note: looking for both prior work and life experience
- What is the structure of your team (e.g., staffing)? How does your team fit into the larger structure of the Mayor's office?

Organizational History & Philosophy

- What is the story behind the City's involvement with community violence intervention work?
 - Ceasefire Detroit... were there other predecessors?
- Why did the City decide to launch the Shotstoppers grant program?
 - In other words, why did the City decide to commit to a CVI approach (as an alternative to more police-led models, etc.)?
- Describe the City/Administration's philosophy/approach to community violence intervention.
 - How was this strategy selected, and how has it evolved over time?
 - Are there strategies that the City favored or disfavored? (i.e., armed citizen patrol, particular age groups, etc.)
- Have the approaches of other cities influenced the structure of ShotStoppers? If so, which city programs? How have they influenced ShotStoppers as a City-run program?

Organizational Relationships

- Relationship with Detroit Police Department
 - How would you characterize your relationship with DPD? I.e., how close? How respectful? Etc.
 - What do you see as the main components of the relationship? For example, how much of the relationship is characterized as:
 - Information-sharing (and in what direction)
 - Directing action (i.e., encouraging partnerships with the CVI teams)

- Receiving direction (either for the City team's interactions with DPD or as an intermediary between DPD and one or more CVI teams)
 - Cooperative partnership (i.e., developing plans and policies together)
- Who are the main points of contact?
- What have been the major challenges of this relationship?
- How has your relationship changed since the start of the program?
- What have those changes meant for the program?
- Relationship with other City departments
 - What other City departments/agencies do you regularly interact with?
 - For each: describe the relationship and what it has brought to the program
- Are there other key partnerships that support the program, and how do they contribute to the work?
 - E.g., other governmental partnerships, nonprofits, etc.
 - Note: get a sense of how partnership flows

Administration of Funding

- What do you see as the major funding components of the program? For example, the quarterly funds to the team in addition to the performance bonus. Are there other aspects that make this program unique or particularly successful?
- Do you see these components as impactful? If so, What do you see as the major impact of the program's funding structure?
- Do you see the performance-based quarterly bonuses as playing a major role in the program's success? How so?
- Have there been any major or notable changes on the financial side (administrative, etc.) since the beginning of ShotStoppers? If so, how have they affected the overall program?
 - Prompt: e.g., process for transferring funds to teams, changes in how they can spend the funding
- Several of the teams have mentioned challenges in getting some reimbursements and in being limited in what they can use the funding for. How do you see these challenges?
- Federal funding is ending at the end of July. The program will soon be funded through the City budget. Do you see this change in funding source as leading to any major changes in the program? If so, what changes do you foresee?
 - What do you see as the long-term plan for funding the program?

Perceptions of Impact

- In your experience so far, what do you see as some of the most valuable components of the ShotStoppers program for the city? (e.g., direct access to the City Administration, established go-between with DPD, funding, availability of data)
 - For the participating neighborhoods?
 - For those directly involved?

- Have there been any major unexpected outcomes — positive or negative — that you have witnessed? (i.e., new partnerships/opportunities, political challenges because of the place-based nature of the intervention, etc.)

Challenges & Barriers

- What are the biggest challenges the program has faced?
- Were these challenges predictable/foreseeable? If so, why?
- Specific types of challenges to discuss (as needed):
 - Resistance from community members or other stakeholders?
 - Behind-the-scenes administrative/implementation challenges?
 - Tensions/disagreements with the City?
 - Tensions with teams and/or between teams?
 - Tensions with DPD and/or other public safety entities?
- How have you and your team addressed these challenges?
- How do you feel about the future of the program?

Comparative Insights & Lessons Learned

- What do you see as the most successful interventions: what teams? What strategies? Etc.
- We have noticed that teams appear to share strategies and some have even shifted course to adopt large parts of other teams' strategies. How common do you consider this phenomenon? What role has the City played in this sharing?
- What do you see as the most promising ideas from the teams for future strategies?

End of interview

- Thank the interviewee for their time and willingness. Remind them that we would like to do a follow-up interview with them later in the year. If they have any questions in the meantime, tell them to contact [x].

City Team Member Focus Group Guide and Protocol

Introduction

- "Thank you for taking the time to speak with us today."
- **Brief description** of the ShotStoppers program (if necessary) and our role evaluating it.
 - Example language: We are evaluating the community violence intervention programs funded by the City of Detroit to better understand their operations, impact, and potential for future funding and expansion.
 - Who we are: Poverty Solutions is a research initiative at the University of Michigan focused on the mitigation and alleviation of poverty.
- **What to expect:** Tell the focus group what to expect during the interview:
 - Scheduled for 60 minutes but may be longer or shorter
 - We want to hear about your experiences with the ShotStopper Program — both successes and challenges — so that we can build a fuller understanding of how

this program functions in practice. With this information, our hope is to develop a shared knowledge that will lay the groundwork for future successful community violence intervention initiatives.

- **Discomforts and Benefits:** Your participation should cause no more discomfort than you would experience in your everyday life. Although participation may not benefit you directly, the stories you share will help us gain a better understanding of the strategies to reduce gun violence in the city of Detroit.
- **No obligation:** You have no obligation to participate and you can stop your involvement at any time.
- **Confidentiality:** It is important to note that this conversation is confidential. We will not share the interview recording or transcription with anyone outside of our Poverty Solutions team. We will anonymize your responses as part of any report.
 - If we do see a need to identify you with a quote, we will ask for your permission prior to using it and you have the right to refuse permission.
 - The recordings will be transcribed by a qualified transcription service. Only the research team and the transcription service will have access to the original recordings which will be stored on a secured computer in a locked office and building.
- **Consent to record:** Ask for the participants' consent to record the Zoom meeting.
 - Mention to the participants that we will be using the recordings to ensure correct responses are recorded and reassure them about the confidentiality of their answers and the recording.
 - Remind them that they are allowed to stop the interview or the recording at any time.
- **Any questions?:** Ask the participants if they have any questions before proceeding with the interview.
- **Start recording** (if permission is provided)

General: Background & Organizational Context

Go around the room giving each participant time to answer these questions:

- What is your official title and how long have you been in this position?
- Describe your position and your major responsibilities.
- What has led to your involvement in the community violence intervention space?
 - Note: looking for both prior work and life experience

All team members: views on program

- What do you see as the major characteristics/components of the Detroit ShotStoppers community violence intervention program?
- How much do you see the program's individual components contributing to the program's success:
 - Support for multiple teams with multiple approaches?
 - Creation of individual geographic zones?

- Performance-based financial rewards?
- Team scoring system?
- Nature of relationship with DPD: separate, independent, but in collaboration and coordination?
- Clearinghouse for information and connections between teams and City government?
- Any other components you see as particularly important?
- What do you see as the major challenges faced:
 - At the administrative level? I.e., federal grant reporting requirements
 - In coordinating with the teams? I.e., individual team capacity (especially on the admin and budgeting side)
 - With the program as a whole? novelty of approach (so few models to use), etc.
- Have there been any major unexpected outcomes — positive or negative — that you have witnessed? (i.e., new partnerships/opportunities, political challenges because of the place-based nature of the intervention, etc.)
- What do you see as the most successful interventions:
 - Which teams? What strategies? Etc.
 - Why do you think they are successful? What measures of success do you have in mind?
- Have there been any leadership styles and/or group cultures that have particularly impressed you? If so, why?
- What do you see as the most promising ideas from the teams for future strategies?
 - At the neighborhood level?
 - At the city level?
 - Any that would work beyond Detroit?
- What, if any, changes would you make to the program moving forward?
 - I.e., different geographic boundaries (or make it citywide), different strategies or target populations, different administration (through DPD?), fewer or more regulations, etc.

Questions for determining subsection participation

- What is your level of interaction with:
 - Other City departments?
 - DPD?
 - CVI Teams?
 - Other partners?
- For each group that you regularly interact with, how are you interacting with them? What are you doing when you interact with them?
- How much do you work on the financial side of the program? (i.e., reporting, budgeting, distributing, etc.)
- How much are you out in the community?
- How much do you work with data (from the teams, DPD)?

Finance Questions

- How would you describe the financial workings of the overall ShotStoppers program?
 - I.e., budgeting both internally and externally with teams, moving funds to teams, etc.
- What prior experience do you have working on similar finance projects?
- Have you worked with small community organizations with finance and budgeting projects?
 - I.e., distributing funds, financial record-keeping
- How does this experience compare to any past experiences?
- What do you see as the major successes of the financial model?
 - I.e., the overall model of funding community groups through a municipal federal grant, the City process of fund distribution, etc.
- What do you see as the major challenges or limitations of the model?
- Lessons learned?
- Any changes you would make?

Community & Team Interaction Questions

- Describe your regular interactions with the community and/or teams
 - Elements might include:
 - Interfacing with teams regularly about grant reporting, budgeting, comms, etc.
 - Interacting with the community through direct outreach and/or alongside the teams
- In your experience with the wider community, how do you think the community sees the overall ShotStoppers program and the City's CVI efforts?
- How do you think the different interventions are viewed within their neighborhoods/geographic areas?
- What do you see as the major successes of community/team interaction?
- What do you see as the major challenges or limitations of community/team interaction?
- Lessons learned?
- Any changes you would make?

Data Questions

- How would you describe the data management of the overall ShotStoppers program?
 - These elements in particular:
 - Collecting data from the CVI teams?
 - Sharing data with DPD? Any other law enforcement?
 - Analyzing and sharing data both internally with the City and externally?
 - Any additional elements?
- For each element: what do you think has gone well and what have been the challenges?
- What prior experience do you have working on similar data projects?

- I.e., collecting and/or analyzing periodic data from community organizations, collecting and/or analyzing data from a police department like DPD, etc.
- How does this experience compare to any past experiences?
- What is your opinion about the program's scoring method for homicides and non-fatal shootings?
 - Do you think it accurately captures the teams' impact on community violence?
 - What if any limitations and/or challenges do you see with the scoring method?
- Lessons learned?
- Any changes you would make?

End of interview

- Thank the interviewees for their time and willingness. Remind them that we would like to do a follow-up interview with them later in the year. If they have any questions in the meantime, tell them to contact [x].

DPD Chief of Police Interview Guide and Protocol

Introduction

- "Thank you for taking the time to speak with us today."
- **Brief description:** We want to hear about your experiences with the ShotStopper Program — both successes and challenges — so that we can build a fuller understanding of how this program functions in practice. With this information, our hope is to develop a shared knowledge that will lay the groundwork for future successful community violence intervention initiatives.
- **What to expect:** Tell the interviewee what to expect during the interview:
 - Scheduled for 60 minutes but may be longer or shorter
 - DPD Chief: we plan on discussing your background, particular strategies and partnerships, impact, and ongoing challenges.
- **Discomforts and Benefits:** Your participation should cause no more discomfort than you would experience in your everyday life. Although participation may not benefit you directly, the stories you share will help us gain a better understanding of the strategies to reduce gun violence in the city of Detroit.
- **No obligation:** You have no obligation to participate and you can stop your involvement at any time.
- **Confidentiality:** it is important to note that this conversation is confidential. We will not share the interview recording or transcription with anyone outside of our Poverty Solutions team, and this includes the City CVI team or any other partner in this project. We will anonymize your responses as part of any report.
 - If we do see a need to identify you with a quote, we will ask for your permission prior to using it and you have the right to refuse permission.
 - The recordings will be transcribed by a qualified transcription service. Only the research team and the transcription service will have access to the original

recordings which will be stored on a secured computer in a locked office and building.

- **Consent to record:** ask for the participant's consent to record the Zoom meeting.
 - Mention to the participant that we will be using the recordings to ensure correct responses are recorded and reassure them about the confidentiality of their answers and the recording.
 - Remind them that they are allowed to stop the interview or the recording at any time.
- **Start recording** (if permission is provided)
- **Any questions?:** Ask the participant if they have any questions before proceeding with the interview.

Background, Organizational Context & Leadership

- What is your official title and how long have you been in this position?
- Could you give us a quick summary of how you've gotten to where you are? I.e., your career in law enforcement and then working in the Mayor's office
- Everyone identifies you as one of the main proponents of developing a CVI program. How did you first become aware of community violence intervention as an approach?
- What made you think it would be a good fit for Detroit?
- How involved were you with Ceasefire and how would you compare that to ShotStoppers and CVI?
- How would you describe your philosophy of and approach to community violence intervention?
 - Are there strategies that you and/or DPD favor or disfavor? (i.e., armed citizen patrol, particular age groups, etc.)
- Have the approaches of other cities influenced the structure of ShotStoppers? If so, which city programs? How have they influenced ShotStoppers as a City-run program?

Organizational Relationships

- Relationship with the CVI Team at the City
 - What kind of relationships did you have with the people or groups who would ultimately become part of the city ShotStoppers team?
 - How would you characterize your relationship with the mayor and his team at the Mayor's office? I.e., how close? How respectful? Etc.
 - What do you see as the main components of the relationship? For example, how much of the relationship is characterized as:
 - Information-sharing (and in what direction)
 - Directing action (i.e., encouraging partnerships with the CVI teams)
 - Receiving direction (either for the City team's interactions with DPD or as an intermediary between DPD and one or more CVI teams)
 - Cooperative partnership (i.e., developing plans and policies together)
 - Who are the main points of contact?
 - What has been most successful about this relationship?

- What have been the major challenges of this relationship?
- How has your relationship changed since the start of the program?
 - What have those changes meant for the program?
- How would you describe the mayor's role in developing and implementing the program?
 - Did the mayor play a role in bringing the teams together or connecting individuals to the program?
- Relationship with the CVI Teams (grantees)
 - What kind of relationships did you have with the people or groups who would ultimately become part of the CVI ShotStoppers program, the grantees?
 - What kind of relationship did DPD have with those groups?
 - How would you characterize your relationship with the CVI teams? I.e., how close? How respectful? Etc.
 - What do you see as the main components of these relationships? For example, how much of the relationship is characterized as:
 - Information-sharing (and in what direction)
 - Directing action (i.e., encouraging partnerships with the CVI teams and DPD)
 - Receiving direction (either for the City team's interactions with CVI teams or as an intermediary between the City and one or more CVI teams)
 - Cooperative partnership (i.e., developing plans and policies together)

Implementation of Program within DPD

- How do you see the level of buy-in with the program at the Police Department?
 - Has buy-in increased or decreased over time?
 - Has there been any significant pushback from the rank-and-file when they have been asked to work with the CVI groups?
- How would you characterize the relationship between individual precincts and the CVI teams they interact with?
 - What does collaboration look like at the precinct level?
 - Are certain units or details more involved with the work than others?
 - If so, what does collaboration look like with these specific units?
- In addition to the precinct-level units, are there other organizational units or bureaus within DPD that you see as important to community violence intervention work?
 - If so, how?
- Are some groups more engaged with the DPD than others currently?
 - How does engagement vary by CVI group?

Perceptions of Impact

- In your experience so far, what do you see as some of the most valuable components of the ShotStoppers program for the city? (e.g., direct access to the City Administration, established go-between with DPD, funding, availability of data)
 - For the participating neighborhoods?

- For those directly involved?
 - For the DPD (e.g., more organized and direct access to community groups)?
- Has ShotStoppers changed the way that DPD does its work? How?
- Have there been any major unexpected outcomes — positive or negative — that you have witnessed? (i.e., new partnerships/opportunities, political challenges because of the place-based nature of the intervention, etc.)

Challenges & Barriers

- What are the biggest challenges the program has faced overall?
- Were these challenges predictable/foreseeable? If so, why?
- What about the biggest challenges related to the Police Department?
- Specific types of challenges to discuss (as needed):
 - Resistance from community members or other stakeholders?
 - Behind-the-scenes administrative/implementation challenges?
 - Tensions/disagreements with the City?
 - Tensions with teams?
- How have you and your team addressed these challenges?
- How do you feel about the future of the program?

Comparative Insights & Lessons Learned

- What do you see as the most successful interventions: what teams? What strategies? Etc.
- What do you see as the most promising ideas from the teams for future strategies?

Suggestions & Recommendations

- What suggestions do you have for making the larger ShotStoppers program more effective?
- We currently collect data a couple of different ways: public safety data from the City and DPD, organizational information from interviews and focus groups like this, public perception through a citywide survey and resident focus groups. Do you think there are better ways to capture data for our evaluation work?

End of interview

- Thank the interviewee for their time and willingness. Remind them that we would like to do a follow-up interview with them later in the year. If they have any questions in the meantime, tell them to contact [X].

DPD Command Staff and Officer Interview Guide and Protocol

Introduction

- “Thank you for taking the time to speak with us today.”

- **Brief description:** We want to hear about your experiences with the ShotStopper Program — both successes and challenges — so that we can build a fuller understanding of how this program functions in practice. With this information, our hope is to develop a shared knowledge that will lay the groundwork for future successful community violence intervention initiatives.
- **What to expect:** Tell the interviewee what to expect during the interview:
 - Scheduled for 60 minutes but may be longer or shorter
 - DPD Command Staff and Officer - 1st Interview: we plan on discussing your background, experience with and connection to the ShotStoppers program, impressions of the program, and suggestions.
- **Discomforts and Benefits:** Your participation should cause no more discomfort than you would experience in your everyday life. Although participation may not benefit you directly, the stories you share will help us gain a better understanding of the strategies to reduce gun violence in the city of Detroit.
- **No obligation:** You have no obligation to participate and you can stop your involvement at any time.
- **Confidentiality:** it is important to note that this conversation is confidential. We will not share the interview recording or transcription with anyone outside of our Poverty Solutions team, and this includes anyone else at DPD, the City CVI team, or any other partner in this project. We will anonymize your responses as part of any report.
 - If we do see a need to identify you with a quote, we will ask for your permission prior to using it and you have the right to refuse permission.
 - The recordings will be transcribed by a qualified transcription service. Only the research team and the transcription service will have access to the original recordings which will be stored on a secured computer in a locked office and building.
- **Consent to record:** ask for the participant's consent to record.
 - Mention to the participant that we will be using the recordings to ensure correct responses are recorded and reassure them about the confidentiality of their answers and the recording.
 - Remind them that they are allowed to stop the interview or the recording at any time.
- **Start recording** (if permission is provided)
- **Any questions?:** Ask the participant if they have any questions before proceeding with the interview.

Background

- What is your official title and how long have you been in this position?
- Describe your role
- Could you give us a quick summary of how you've gotten to where you are? I.e., your career in law enforcement

History with CVI

- What do you think of when you hear the term “Community Violence Intervention”?
- How would you describe the concept of “Community Violence Intervention” to someone?
- Did you have any experience with community violence intervention work or similar type programs prior to ShotStoppers?
- Prior to the start of ShotStoppers, did you know or had you worked with any of the people or groups who became part of the program? How did you know them? Are you working with them now?

Organizational Relationships

- How would you characterize your team/department/precinct’s relationship with the ShotStoppers program as a whole?
 - If needed: do you and your team interact with the program often? Does the program come up a lot during meetings/briefings/etc.?
- What is the relationship your team/department/precinct has with individual CVI teams?
 - How often do you interact with them?
 - What do you see as the main components of the relationship? For example, how much of the relationship is characterized as:
 - Information-sharing (and in what direction)
 - Directing action (i.e., telling the team whether and how to intervene)
 - Receiving direction (responding to a team’s request for service or assistance or request to hold back from intervening)
 - Cooperative partnership (i.e., developing plans and policies together)
 - Who are the main points of contact?
 - Do you see that relationship as important to your overall job performance? How?
 - How has your relationship changed since the start of the program?
- What is the relationship your team/department/precinct has with the City CVI team?
 - How often do you interact with them?
 - What do you see as the main components of the relationship? For example, how much of the relationship is characterized as:
 - Information-sharing (and in what direction)
 - Directing action (i.e., telling the City team what you need)
 - Receiving direction (responding to requests from the City team)
 - Cooperative partnership (i.e., developing plans and policies together)
 - Who are the main points of contact?
 - Do you see that relationship as important to your overall job performance? How?
 - How has your relationship changed since the start of the program?

Implementation of Program within DPD

- In your opinion, what is the level of buy-in at the Police Department overall with the ShotStoppers program?

- How about buy-in within your unit/department/precinct?
- How do you think your unit compares to the leadership's position, both at your precinct and citywide?
- Do you think buy-in is uniform across all units and precincts?
 - If there is variation: What do you think causes the variation?
 - How does this vary by group?
 - Do certain groups/approaches lend themselves to better/closer collaboration?
- Has buy-in increased or decreased over time?
- Has there been any significant pushback from any parts of the Department when they have been asked to work with the CVI groups?
 - Other precincts?
 - Other units?
 - Rank-and-file officers?

Perceptions of Impact

- In your experience so far, what do you see as some of the most valuable components of the ShotStoppers program for the city? (e.g., direct access to the City Administration, established go-between with DPD, funding, availability of data)
 - For the participating neighborhoods?
 - For those directly involved?
 - For you professionally and/or personally?
- Has ShotStoppers changed the way that DPD does its work? How?
- Has ShotStoppers changed the way you do your work? How?
- Have there been any major unexpected outcomes — positive or negative — that you have witnessed? (i.e., new partnerships/opportunities, political challenges because of the place-based nature of the intervention, etc.)

Challenges & Barriers

- What are the biggest challenges involving the program and your unit/precinct?
- How have you and your team addressed these challenges?
- How do you feel about the future of the program?

Comparative Insights & Lessons Learned

- What do you see as the most successful interventions: what teams? What strategies? Etc.
- What do you see as the most promising ideas from the teams for future strategies?

Suggestions & Recommendations

- What suggestions do you have for making the ShotStoppers program more effective?
- We currently collect data a couple of different ways: public safety data from the City and DPD, organizational information from interviews and focus groups like this, public

perception through a citywide survey and resident focus groups. Do you think there are better ways to capture data for our evaluation work?

End of interview

- Thank the interviewee for their time and willingness. Remind them that we would like to do a follow-up interview with them later in the year. If they have any questions in the meantime, tell them to contact [x]

Appendix C: Understand the CVI Score

Homicide		Additional Points (X)
Date of Incident: The date that the incident is declared a homicide		+1 for an incident in which the Date of Record is in a different quarter than the Date of Incident
Date of Record: The date that the information was captured regarding the homicide	+	
		Non-Fatal Shooting
	+	+2 for an incident in which Date of Backout was in a different quarter than Date of Incident
Date of Backout: If applicable, the date that the incident is no longer classified as a homicide		* Non-Fatal Shootings count as one point for each victim of an incident
		*These points are added to the CVI score to account for:
		1) Individuals who passed during a different quarter than when the injuries were originally sustained
		2) Homicides that are no longer classified as homicides but were backed out after the quarter metrics were finalized
* Homicides count as two points towards the metric – one point for the Date of Incident and one point for the Date of Record		

$$[(2 * 2022 \text{ Homicide Victim Count}) + (2022 \text{ Non-Fatal Shooting Victim Count}) + 2022 X + (2 * 2023 \text{ Homicide Victim Count}) + (2023 \text{ Non-Fatal Shooting Victim Count}) + 2023 X] / 2 = \text{CVI Score}$$

Notes: Criminal Homicide and Non-Fatal Shooting are counted by victim. This PRELIMINARY INFORMATION is used for strategic planning and crime analysis and is subject to change.

Appendix D: Methodology for Analyzing the CVI Team Activity Logs

As part of their monthly reports, CVI teams labeled their activities as one or more of the following activity codes. (Note that all language is original to the dataset received from the City of Detroit):

1. Clean Ups/ Blight Remediation
2. Community Organizing/ Block Clubs
3. Completed Sectoral Training Program
4. Completed Summer Youth Employment
5. Enrolled in Sectoral Training Program
6. Enrolled in Summer Youth Employment
7. Hiring Assistance
8. Organizational Assistance
9. Organizing Assistance
10. Other
11. Violence Interruption - Conflict Mediation
12. Violence Interruption - Post-Incident Response
13. Violence Interruption - Radio Patrol
14. Violence Interruption - Trainings to Prevent Violence
15. Violence Interruption- Ongoing Mentorship
16. Violence Interruption- Ongoing Mentorship/ Recruitment
17. Violence Interruption- Outreach / Relationship Building
18. Wraparound - Behavioral Health
19. Wraparound - Other Life Skills
20. Wraparound - Reentry Assistance
21. Wraparound - Referral to Job Training/ Workforce
22. Wraparound - Relocation
23. Wraparound - Transportation
24. Wraparound -Education / Literacy

The City CVI team developed these activity codes in consultation with the CVI teams throughout the two-year ShotStoppers program, ensuring they reflected the unique nature of each team's work while enabling comparison of the data across teams. However, the open-ended nature of this coding process introduced some complications in our analysis: some codes are duplicative or nearly identical (e.g., "15. Violence Interruption- Ongoing Mentorship" vs. "16. Violence Interruption- Ongoing Mentorship/ Recruitment") and none came with detailed explanations of their meaning or when and how they should be used.

Accordingly, in order to analyze the data, we grouped the activity codes into four categories. Most of these activities (14 of the 24) included one of two broader category labels, either "Violence Interruption" or "Wraparound." For the purposes of our analysis, we adopted the two broad categories that the City included in their labels: "Violence Interruption" and "Wraparound Services" (from the original language of "Wraparound"). We added four of the remaining uncategorized activities to "Wraparound Services" (as noted by an asterisk * in the last below)

and created a third category, “Community Programming” that included four previously uncategorized activities.

In theory, the "Other" code was included among the 24 activity codes to capture activities — such as administration or data entry — that did not fit the other activity types. However, because teams self-coded their data, some records were improperly assigned to "Other." We reviewed notes that the CVI teams included in the original activity log to reassign these to appropriate categories when possible (e.g., reclassifying "Other" to "Violence Interruption" based on the CVI team's activity descriptions). Ultimately, some records remained "Other" due to a lack of descriptive notes, with less than 25% of all "Other" entries providing sufficient information to recode.

This reorganization and review process resulted in the following categories:

Category 1: Violence Interruption

- Outreach/relationship building
- Ongoing mentorship/recruitment
- Ongoing mentorship
- Trainings to prevent violence
- Conflict mediation
- Post-incident response
- Radio patrol

Category 2: Wraparound Services

- Education/literacy
- Other life skills
- Transportation
- Referral to job training/workforce
- Relocation
- Behavioral health
- Reentry assistance
- Enrolled in summer youth employment *
- Completed summer youth employment *
- Enrolled in sectoral training program *
- Hiring assistance *

Category 3: Community Programming

- Community organizing / block clubs
- Clean ups / blight remediation
- Organizational assistance
- Organizing assistance

Category 4: Other

- Other